- The knowledge norm of apt practical reasoning.Andy Mueller - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5395-5414.details
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Fragmentalism We can Believe in.Giovanni Merlo - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 73 (1):184-205.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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Objectivism and Perspectivism about the Epistemic Ought.McHugh Conor - 2017 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 4.details
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I—How Both You and the Brain in a Vat Can Know Whether or Not You Are Envatted.Ofra Magidor - 2018 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 92 (1):151-181.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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Do Reasons and Evidence Share the Same Residence.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):720-727.details
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Being More Realistic About Reasons: On Rationality and Reasons Perspectivism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):605-627.details
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A note concerning justification and access.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):369-386.details
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Are Epistemic Reasons Ever Reasons to Promote?Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Logos and Episteme 4 (3):353-360.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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Assertion: A Function First Account.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Noûs 52 (2):411-442.details
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On the Nature of Belief in Pluralistic Ignorance.Marco Antonio Joven-Romero - 2018 - Contemporary Pragmatism 15 (1):23-45.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation: When the time is ripe to actualize one's epistemic potential.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):277-285.details
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Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.details
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Is the Norm on Belief Evaluative? A Response to McHugh.Alexander Greenberg & Christopher Cowie - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:128-145.details
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How I learned to stop worrying and love probability 1.Daniel Greco - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):179-201.details
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Introspecting knowledge.John Gibbons - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):559-579.details
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Anti-Exceptionalism About Requirements of Epistemic Rationality.Claire Https://Orcidorg Field - 2020 - Acta Analytica 36 (3):423-441.details
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What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1523-1544.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2018 - Synthese:1-22.details
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On the generality argument for the knowledge norm.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3459-3480.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Are epistemic reasons perspective-dependent?Davide Fassio - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (12):3253-3283.details
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Just do it? When to do what you judge you ought to do.Julien Dutant & Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3755-3772.details
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There’s Something About Authority.Casey Doyle - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Research 46:363-374.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Against boredom : 17 essays on ignorance, values, creativity, metaphysics, decision-making, truth, preference, art, processes, Ramsey, ethics, rationality, validity, human ills, science, and eternal life to Nils-Eric Sahlin on the occasion of his 60th birthday. [REVIEW]Johannes Persson, Göran Hermerén & Eva Sjöstrand - unknowndetails
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Collateral conflicts and epistemic norms.J. Adam Carter - 2021 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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How reasons are sensitive to available evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.details
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The analysis of knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Who's Afraid Of Epistemic Dilemmas?Nick Hughes - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Mathias Steup & Kevin McCain (eds.), Epistemic Dilemmas: New Arguments, New Angles.details
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Welfarist Pluralism: A Theory of the Foundations of a Pluralist Account of Reasons for Belief [Chapter 1 of A New Theory of Reasons for Belief: Pragmatic Foundations and Pluralistic Reasons (Under Contract with OUP).Andrew Reisner - manuscriptdetails
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Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Internalism and the Nature of Justification.Jonathan Egeland Harouny - 2020 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Evidence and its Limits.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Conor McHugh Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press.details
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Two Thesis about the Distinctness of Practical and Theoretical Normativity.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In C. McHugh, J. Way & D. Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 221-240.details
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When Ignorance is No Excuse.Maria Alvarez & Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In Philip Robichaud & Jan Willem Wieland (eds.), Responsibility - The Epistemic Condition. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 64-81.details
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Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Barcelonadetails
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Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10. Oxford University Press.details
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