- Actual Utility, The Objection from Impracticality, and the Move to Expected Utility.Fred Feldman - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (1):49-79.details
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Matters of ambiguity: faultless disagreement, relativism and realism.John Eriksson & Marco Tiozzo - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1517-1536.details
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Elaborating Expressivism: Moral judgments, Desires and Motivation.John Eriksson - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (2):253-267.details
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Expressivism, Attitudinal Complexity and Two Senses of Disagreement in Attitude.John Eriksson - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):775-794.details
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Emotions, Attitudes, and Reasons.Kelly Epley - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):256-282.details
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The epistemological challenge to metanormative realism: how best to understand it, and how to cope with it.David Enoch - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):413-438.details
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How Noncognitivists Can Avoid Wishful Thinking.David Enoch - 2003 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 41 (4):527-545.details
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Logical reasons.Pascal Engel - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):21 – 38.details
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Determinism, ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’ and Moral Obligation.Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Dialectica 74 (1):35-62..details
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The Varieties of Instrumental Rationality.Stephen Ellis - 2008 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 46 (2):199-220.details
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Kantian Cognitivism.E. Sonny Elizondo - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):711-725.details
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Should moral intuitionism go social?Marvin Backes, Matti Eklund & Eliot Michaelson - 2022 - Noûs 57 (4):973-985.details
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The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):837-852.details
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Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value: Relativist Dispositional Theories of Value.Andy Egan - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):557-582.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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The persecutor's Wager.Craig Duncan - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (1):1-50.details
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Emotional engagement in professional ethics.W. Scott Dunbar - 2005 - Science and Engineering Ethics 11 (4):535-551.details
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Y a-t-il des sentiments moraux?Paul Dumouchel - 2004 - Dialogue 43 (3):471-490.details
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Biological Modules and Emotions.Paul Dumouchel - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (sup1):115-134.details
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Reasoning beyond belief acquisition.Daniel Drucker - 2021 - Noûs 56 (2):416-442.details
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A Rightness-Based Theory of Communicative Propriety.Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (1):121-135.details
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Lockean and logical truth conditions.J. Dreier - 2004 - Analysis 64 (1):84-91.details
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Hume on the epistemology and metaphysics of value.Tsarina Doyle - 2017 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 20 (1):187-209.details
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Précis of Talking to Our Selves: Reflection, Ignorance, and Agency.John M. Doris - 2018 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 41.details
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If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?Ryan Doody - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):141-173.details
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Moral Sentimentalism in Counterfactual Contexts: Moral Properties Are Response-Enabled.Daniel Dohrn - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):69-82.details
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Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
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Understanding Singular Terms.Imogen Dickie - 2020 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 94 (1):19-55.details
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Moral Error Theory: History, Critique, Defence.Jonas Olson - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Learning emotions and ethics.Patricia Greenspan - 2010 - In Peter Goldie (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Emotion. Oxford University Press.details
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Quasi-Dependence.Selim Berker - 2020 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 15:195-218.details
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Mettere a Fuoco Il Mondo. Conversazioni sulla Filosofia di Achille Varzi (Special Issue of Isonomia – Epistemologica).Elena Casetta, Valeria Giardino, Andrea Borghini, Patrizia Pedrini, Francesco Calemi, Daniele Santoro, Giuliano Torrengo, Claudio Calosi, Pierluigi Graziani & Achille C. Varzi (eds.) - 2014 - ISONOMIA – Epistemologica. University of Urbino.details
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The Philosophy of Generative Linguistics.Peter Ludlow - 2011 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Reality: A Defence of Moral Realism.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Lund University.details
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Metaethics After Moore.Terry Horgan & Mark Timmons (eds.) - 2006 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Realism.Alexandern D. Miller - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2019 - In John McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Structuring reality.Naomi Margaret Claire Thompson - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Order-Based Salience Patterns in Language: What They Are and Why They Matter.Ella Whiteley - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.details
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Faktum der Vernunft oder Faktum der Kultur? Ein Problem für Kants Beweis der Freiheit.Stefan Fischer - forthcoming - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung.details
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, Th Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Series). Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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Attributivism.Casey Sean Elliott - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Birminghamdetails
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Sociolinguistic variation, slurs, and speech acts.Ethan Nowak - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Irrationality, and Depression.Gunnar Björnsson - 2002 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 40 (3):327-344.details
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How reasons are sensitive to available evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.details
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Cognitive values, theory choice, and pluralism : on the grounds and implications of philosophical diversity.Guy Stanwood Axtell - unknowndetails
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.details
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Moral motivation.Connie S. Rosati - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Moral Sentimentalism.Antti Kauppinen - 2002 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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