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I defend an analog of probabilism that characterizes rationally coherent estimates for chances. Specifically, I demonstrate the following accuracydominance result for stochastic theories in the C*algebraic framework: supposing an assignment of chance values is possible if and only if it is given by a pure state on a given algebra, your estimates for chances avoid accuracydominance if and only if they are given by a state on that algebra. When your estimates avoid accuracydominance, I say that they are sufficiently coherent. (...) 

This essay explores the thesis that for vague predicates, uncertainty over whether a borderline instance x of red/large/tall/good is to be understood as practical uncertainty over whether to treat x as red/large/tall/good. Expressivist and quasirealist treatments of vague predicates due to John MacFarlane and Daniel Elstein provide the stalkinghorse. It examines the notion of treating/counting a thing as F , and links a central question about our attitudes to vague predications to normative evaluation of plans to treat a thing as (...) 

Revisionary theories of logic or truth require revisionary theories of mind. This essay outlines nonclassically based theories of rational belief, desire, and decision making, singling out the supervaluational family for special attention. To see these nonclassical theories of mind in action, this essay examines a debate between David Lewis and Derek Parfit over what matters in survival. Lewis argued that indeterminacy in personal identity allows caring about psychological connectedness and caring about personal identity to amount to the same thing. The (...) 

In this paper, I provide an accuracybased argument for conditionalization (via reflection) that does not rely on norms of maximizing expected accuracy. / (This is a draft of a paper that I wrote in 2013. It stalled for no very good reason. I still believe the content is right). 

Probabilism is the view that a rational agent's credences should always be probabilistically coherent. It has been argued that Probabilism follows, given the assumption that an epistemically rational agent ought to try to have credences that represent the world as accurately as possible. The key claim in this argument is that the goal of representing the world as accurately as possible is best served by having credences that are probabilistically coherent. This essay shows that this claim is false. In certain (...) 

Recently, there has been some discussion of how Dutch Book arguments might be used to demonstrate the rational incoherence of certain hidden variable models of quantum theory. In this paper, we argue that the 'form of inconsistency' underlying this alleged irrationality is deeply and comprehensively related to the more familiar 'inconsistency' phenomenon of contextuality. Our main result is that the hierarchy of contextuality due to Abramsky and Brandenburger corresponds to a hierarchy of additivity/convexityviolations which yields formal Dutch Books of different (...) 

"Chance" crops up all over philosophy, and in many other areas. It is often assumed  without argument  that chances are probabilities. I explore the extent to which this assumption is really sanctioned by what we understand by the concept of chance. 

In this paper I examine a neglected question concerning the centerpiece of Carnap's philosophy: the principle of tolerance. The principle of tolerance states that we are free to devise and adopt any welldefined form of language or linguistic framework we please. A linguistic framework defines frameworkinternal standards of correct reasoning that guide us in our firstorder scientific pursuits. The choice of a linguistic framework, on the other hand, is an ‘external’ question to be settled on pragmatic grounds and so not (...) 

This article compares inference to the best explanation with Bayes’s rule in a social setting, specifically, in the context of a variant of the Hegselmann–Krause model in which agents not only update their belief states on the basis of evidence they receive directly from the world, but also take into account the belief states of their fellow agents. So far, the update rules mentioned have been studied only in an individualistic setting, and it is known that in such a setting (...) 

Many accounts of structural rationality give a special role to logic. This paper reviews the problem case of cleareyed logical uncertainty. An account of rational norms on belief that does not give a special role to logic is developed: doxastic probabilism. 



It is well known that the convex hull of the classical truth value functions contains all and only the probability functions. Work by Paris and Williams has shown that this also holds for various kinds of nonclassical logics too. This note summarises the formal details of this topic and extends the results slightly. 

Joyce (1998) gives an argument for probabilism: the doctrine that rational credences should conform to the axioms of probability. In doing so, he provides a distinctive take on how the normative force of probabilism relates to the injunction to believe what is true. But Joyce presupposes that the truth values of the propositions over which credences are defined are classical. I generalize the core of Joyce’s argument to remove this presupposition. On the same assumptions as Joyce uses, the credences of (...) 



Probability and logic are two branches of mathematics that have important philosophical applications. This article discusses several areas of intersection between them. Several involve the role for probability in giving semantics for logic or the role of logic in governing assignments of probability. Some involve probability over nonclassical logic or selfreferential sentences. 

This paper investigates the relationship between two evaluative claims about agents’ de grees of belief: (i) that it is better to have more, rather than less accurate degrees of belief, and (ii) that it is better to have less, rather than more probabilistically incoherent degrees of belief. We show that, for suitable combinations of inaccuracy measures and incoherence measures, both claims are compatible, although not equivalent; moreover, certain ways of becoming less incoherent always guarantee improvements in accuracy. Incompatibilities between particular (...) 

The foundations of probability are viewed through the lens of the subjectivist interpretation. This article surveys conditional probability, arguments for probabilism, probability dynamics, and the evidential and subjective interpretations of probability. 

