- Eliciting and Assessing our Moral Risk Preferences.Shang Long Yeo - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (2):109-126.details
|
|
Two out of three ain't bad: A comment on “the ambiguity aversion literature: A critical assessment”.Marciano Siniscalchi - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):335-356.details
|
|
Expected comparative utility theory: A new theory of instrumental rationality.David Robert - manuscriptdetails
|
|
Probability discounting and money pumps.Petra Kosonen - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
|
|
Decision Theory.Katie Steele & H. Orri Stefánsson - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Conceptual evaluation: epistemic.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 304-332.details
|
|
On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
|
|
Should longtermists recommend hastening extinction rather than delaying it?Richard Pettigrew - 2024 - The Monist 107 (2):130-145.details
|
|
Consequentialism and rational choice: Lessons from the Allais paradox.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.details
|
|
Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections.Rob van Someren Greve - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):481-492.details
|
|
Instrumental Rationality Without Separability.Johanna Thoma - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1219-1240.details
|
|
The consequences of taking consequentialism seriously.Philip E. Tetlock - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):31-32.details
|
|
Actions, inactions and the temporal dimension.Karl Halvor Teigen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):30-31.details
|
|
What are the minimal requirements of rational choice? Arguments from the sequential-decision setting.Katie Siobhan Steele - 2010 - Theory and Decision 68 (4):463-487.details
|
|
How to be imprecise and yet immune to sure loss.Katie Steele - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):427-444.details
|
|
Gambling with Death.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):271-281.details
|
|
Fair Chance and Modal Consequentialism.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (3):371-395.details
|
|
What goals are to count?Mark D. Spranca - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-30.details
|
|
Reversing 30 years of discussion: why causal decision theorists should one-box.Wolfgang Spohn - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):95-122.details
|
|
Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
|
|
Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (3):263-293.details
|
|
Uncertainty and the difficulty of thinking through disjunctions.Eldar Shafir - 1994 - Cognition 50 (1-3):403-430.details
|
|
The value of perfect information in nonlinear utility theory.Edward E. Schlee - 1991 - Theory and Decision 30 (2):127-131.details
|
|
The sure thing principle and the value of information.Edward E. SchleeE - 1997 - Theory and Decision 42 (1):21-36.details
|
|
Goals, values and benefits.Frederic Schick - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):29-29.details
|
|
Dynamic consistency in the logic of decision.Gerard J. Rothfus - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3923-3934.details
|
|
Can goals be uniquely defined?Ilana Ritov - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):28-29.details
|
|
Broadening the base for bringing cognitive psychology to bear on ethics.Peter Railton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):27-28.details
|
|
A “should” too many.Paul M. Pietroski - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):26-27.details
|
|
Some examples of nonconsequentialist decisions.Gerald M. Phillips - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):25-26.details
|
|
Side effects: Limitations of human rationality.Keith Oatley - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):24-25.details
|
|
Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
|
|
Fearing fear: gender and economic discourse.Julie A. Nelson - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (1):129-139.details
|
|
Sequential decision making without independence: a new conceptual approach. [REVIEW]A. Nebout - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (1):85-110.details
|
|
Does consequentialism pay?Adam Morton - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):24-24.details
|
|
Are Plans Necessary?Michael McDermott - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 138 (2):225-232.details
|
|
Pragmatic Rationality and Rules.Edward F. Mcclennen - 1997 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 26 (3):210-258.details
|
|
Consequentialism in haste.Roger A. McCain - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):23-24.details
|
|
Preference reversal in Ellsberg problems.Patrick Maher & Yoshihisa Kashima - 1997 - Philosophical Studies 88 (2):187-207.details
|
|
Book review. [REVIEW]Mark J. Machina - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (3):265-271.details
|
|
Jonathan Baron, consequentialism and error theory.Sanford S. Levy - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):22-23.details
|
|
A Process Approach to the Utility for Gambling.Marc Le Menestrel - 2001 - Theory and Decision 50 (3):249-262.details
|
|
On begging the question when naturalizing norms.Leonard D. Katz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-22.details
|
|
Norm-Endorsement Utilitarianism and the Nature of Utility.Jonathan Baron - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):165.details
|
|
Multiple-Stage Decision-Making: The Effect of Planning Horizon Length on Dynamic Consistency.Joseph G. Johnson & Jerome R. Busemeyer - 2001 - Theory and Decision 51 (2/4):217-246.details
|
|
Computing rank dependent utility in graphical models for sequential decision problems.Gildas Jeantet & Olivier Spanjaard - 2011 - Artificial Intelligence 175 (7-8):1366-1389.details
|
|
Departing from consequentialism versus departing from decision theory.Frank Jackson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-21.details
|
|
Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
|
|
Elicitation rules and incompatible goals.Julie R. Irwin - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):20-21.details
|
|
Bradley Conditionals and Dynamic Choice.Simon M. Huttegger & Gerard J. Rothfus - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6585-6599.details
|
|