- On begging the question when naturalizing norms.Leonard D. Katz - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-22.details
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Some examples of nonconsequentialist decisions.Gerald M. Phillips - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):25-26.details
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Why care where moral intuitions come from?Susan Dwyer - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):14-15.details
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Le comportement et le concept de choix.Jean Baccelli - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (1):43-60.details
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Deriving Harsanyi’s Utilitarianism from De Finetti’s Book-Making Argument.Enrico Diecidue - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (4):363-371.details
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Objective Consequentialism and Avoidable Imperfections.Rob van Someren Greve - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (3):481-492.details
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Rationality and the Structure of the Self Volume II: A Kantian Conception.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2013 - APRA Foundation.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge, Bets, and Interests.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 75--103.details
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The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason.Jean Hampton - 1994 - Economics and Philosophy 10 (2):195.details
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Two out of three ain't bad: A comment on “the ambiguity aversion literature: A critical assessment”.Marciano Siniscalchi - 2009 - Economics and Philosophy 25 (3):335-356.details
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Backward induction and beliefs about oneself.Michael Bacharach - 1992 - Synthese 91 (3):247-284.details
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On Uncertainty.Brian Weatherson - 1998 - Dissertation, Monash Universitydetails
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Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Rational risk‐aversion: Good things come to those who weight.Christopher Bottomley & Timothy Luke Williamson - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):697-725.details
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Expected comparative utility theory: A new theory of instrumental rationality.David Robert - manuscriptdetails
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Degrees of commensurability and the repugnant conclusion.Alan Hájek & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 2021 - Noûs 56 (4):897-919.details
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Should longtermists recommend hastening extinction rather than delaying it?Richard Pettigrew - 2024 - The Monist 107 (2):130-145.details
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Dynamic consistency in the logic of decision.Gerard J. Rothfus - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3923-3934.details
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Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2016 - Mind:fzv218.details
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Rational monism and rational pluralism.Jack Spencer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1769-1800.details
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The Sequential Dominance Argument for the Independence Axiom of Expected Utility Theory.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (1):21-39.details
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Conceptual evaluation: epistemic.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 304-332.details
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Decision Theory.Johanna Thoma - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 57-106.details
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If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?Ryan Doody - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):141-173.details
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Duhemian Themes in Expected Utility Theory.Philippe Mongin - 2009 - In Gayon Anastasios Brenner and Jean (ed.), French Studies in the Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 303-357.details
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Orderly Decision Theory.Peter J. Hammond - 1988 - Economics and Philosophy 4 (2):292-297.details
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Decision making: Social and creative dimensions.Carl Martin Allwood & Marcus Selart - 2001 - In Carl Martin Allwood & Marcus Selart (eds.), Decision making: Social and creative dimensions. Springer Media.details
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Consequentialism and Preference Formation in Economics and Game Theory.Daniel M. Hausman - 2006 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 59:111-130.details
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Has Game Theory Been Refuted?Francesco Guala - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy 103 (5):239-263.details
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Costs of abandoning the Sure-Thing Principle.Rachael Briggs - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):827-840.details
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Book review. [REVIEW]Mark J. Machina - 1992 - Theory and Decision 33 (3):265-271.details
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Departing from consequentialism versus departing from decision theory.Frank Jackson - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):21-21.details
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Do, or should, all human decisions conform to the norms of a consumer-oriented culture?L. Jonathan Cohen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):12-13.details
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Consequentialism and utility theory.Deborah Frisch - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-16.details
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Revealed preference and linear utility.Stephen A. Clark - 1993 - Theory and Decision 34 (1):21-45.details
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Reply to Critics. [REVIEW]Allan Gibbard - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 72 (3):729 - 744.details
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Dependency Equilibria and the Causal Structure of Decision and Game Situation.Wolfgang Spohn - unknowndetails
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Can redescriptions of outcomes salvage the axioms of decision theory?Jean Baccelli & Philippe Mongin - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1621-1648.details
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Instrumental Rationality Without Separability.Johanna Thoma - 2018 - Erkenntnis 85 (5):1219-1240.details
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What rationality is.Arif Ahmed - details
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Exploiting Cyclic Preference.Arif Ahmed - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):975-1022.details
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Revisiting Risk and Rationality: a reply to Pettigrew and Briggs.Lara Buchak - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):841-862.details
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Fearing fear: gender and economic discourse.Julie A. Nelson - 2015 - Mind and Society 14 (1):129-139.details
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Truth or consequences.John Heil - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):19-20.details
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Jonathan Baron, consequentialism and error theory.Sanford S. Levy - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):22-23.details
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Fairness to policies, distinctions and intuitions.Jonathan E. Adler - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):10-11.details
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Normative and descriptive consequentialism.Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):15-16.details
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Is consequentialism better regarded as a form of reasoning or as a pattern of behavior?Steve Fuller - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (1):16-17.details
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Utility theory and the Bayesian paradigm.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1989 - Theory and Decision 26 (3):263-293.details
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