- Dogmatism, Seemings, and Non-Deductive Inferential Justification.Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard - 2023 - In Kevin McCain, Scott Stapleford & Matthias Steup (eds.), Seemings: New Arguments, New Angles. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. Chapter 8.details
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A Quantitative History of Ordinary Language Philosophy.J. D. Porter & Nat Hansen - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1–36.details
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Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e42186.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Does anti-exceptionalism about logic entail that logic is a posteriori?Jessica M. Wilson & Stephen Biggs - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-17.details
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The necessity of conceivability.Sophie R. Allen & Javier Cumpa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-18.details
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The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):837-852.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.details
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Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):537-563.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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The Analysis of Knowledge.Brian C. Barnett - 2021 - In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community. pp. Chapter 1.details
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Topic-sensitive Two-dimensional Truthmaker Semantics.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Realism and Lexical Flexibility.Christopher A. Vogel - 2020 - Theoria 86 (2):145-186.details
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External World Skepticism, Confidence and Psychologism about the Problem of Priors.Sharon Berry - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):324-346.details
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Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology.Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2045-2076.details
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Experience and reasoning: challenging the a priori/a posteriori distinction.Daniele Sgaravatti - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1127-1148.details
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Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):80-100.details
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Externalism and Conceptual Analysis.Christopher A. Vogel - 2018 - Metaphilosophy 49 (5):730-765.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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Two Notions Of Safety.Julien Dutant - 2010 - Swiss Philosophical Preprints.details
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Goldman On Knowledge As True Belief.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (2):145-155.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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Rational Argument in Moral Philosophy: Some Implications of Gordon Baker's Therapeutic Conception of Philosophy.Christopher Lawton - unknowndetails
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The a priority of abduction.Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):735-758.details
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Epistemic Value and the Jamesian Goals.Sophie Horowitz - 2018 - In Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Jeff Dunn (eds.), Epistemic Consequentialism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemically Transformative Experience.Jane Friedman - manuscriptdetails
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The rationalism in Anil Gupta’s Empiricism and Experience.Karl Schafer - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (1):1-15.details
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Is justification easy or impossible? Getting acquainted with a middle road.Samuel A. Taylor - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2987-3009.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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Evaluating beliefs.Alexander Paul Vincent Jackson - unknowndetails
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The A Posteriori Armchair.Daniel Nolan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):211-231.details
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Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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The Problem of Easy Justification: An Investigation of Evidence, Justification, and Reliability.Samuel Alexander Taylor - 2013 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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The Price of Inscrutability.J. R. G. Williams - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.details
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Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.details
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Philosophical intuitions , heuristics , and metaphors.Eugen Fischer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):569-606.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.details
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A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism.Ram Neta - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):658-695.details
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Naturalistic Epistemology and Reliabilism.Alvin I. Goldman - 1994 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1):301-320.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.details
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Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
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Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
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