- Can a Thought's Whole Subject-Matter Be Itself? The Case of Pain.D. Goldstick - 2024 - Dialogue 63 (1):139-145.details
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Revisionary intellectualism and Gettier.Yuri Cath - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):7-27.details
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Philosophical intuitions , heuristics , and metaphors.Eugen Fischer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):569-606.details
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Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.details
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Imagining as a Guide to Possibility.Peter Kung - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3):620-663.details
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Intellectual Flourishing as the Fundamental Epistemic Norm.Berit Brogaard - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 11-31.details
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Presupposition and the a priori.Nate Charlow - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):509-526.details
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The Epistemology of Debunking Argumentation.Jonathan Egeland - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (4):837-852.details
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A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
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Hawthorne on the Deeply Contingent A Priori1.Yuval Avnur - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (1):174-183.details
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(1 other version)Scepticism, Rationalism, and Externalism.Brian Weatherson - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 1:311-331.details
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(1 other version)A Priori Bootstrapping.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Albert Casullo & Joshua C. Thurow (eds.), The a Priori in Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 226-246.details
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Contingent A Priori Knowledge.John Turri - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 83 (2):327-344.details
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Why Nearly Everything Is Knowable A Priori.Brian Cutter - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):80-100.details
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Naturalism, fallibilism, and the a priori.Lisa Warenski - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):403-426.details
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Deception and evidence.Nicholas Silins - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):375–404.details
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Evidentialist Reliabilism.Juan Comesaña - 2010 - Noûs 44 (4):571-600.details
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Bootstrapping, defeasible reasoning, and a priori justification.Stewart Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):141-159.details
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Humeans Aren’t Out of their Minds.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):529–535.details
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(1 other version)Sosa on Knowledge, Judgment and Guessing.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Synthese:1-20.details
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Dogmatism and Ampliative Inference.Berit Brogaard - 2021 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 66 (1):e42186.details
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Contextualism, skepticism, and the Gettier problem.B. Brogaard - 2004 - Synthese 139 (3):367 - 386.details
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The a priority of abduction.Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (3):735-758.details
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Abduction versus conceiving in modal epistemology.Stephen Biggs & Jessica Wilson - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 8):2045-2076.details
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External World Skepticism, Confidence and Psychologism about the Problem of Priors.Sharon Berry - 2019 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 57 (3):324-346.details
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A Quantitative History of Ordinary Language Philosophy.J. D. Porter & Nat Hansen - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1–36.details
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Does anti-exceptionalism about logic entail that logic is a posteriori?Jessica M. Wilson & Stephen Biggs - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-17.details
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Merely superficially contingent a priori knowledge and the McKinsey paradox.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-15.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.details
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Moral Knowledge By Deduction.Declan Smithies - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):537-563.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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The Analysis of Knowledge.Brian C. Barnett - 2021 - In Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community. pp. Chapter 1.details
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Topic-sensitive Two-dimensional Truthmaker Semantics.David Elohim - manuscriptdetails
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Is knowledge of causes sufficient for understanding?Xingming Hu - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):291-313.details
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The Bayesian and the Dogmatist.Brian Weatherson - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt2):169-185.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Intuitive expertise and intuitions about knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Ideal rationality and logical omniscience.Declan Smithies - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2769-2793.details
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The A Posteriori Armchair.Daniel Nolan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):211-231.details
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The Price of Inscrutability.J. R. G. Williams - 2008 - Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.details
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Induction and Supposition.Brian Weatherson - 2012 - The Reasoner 6:78-80.details
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Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
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Metaphysical Contingentism.Kristie Miller - 2020 - In Ricki Bliss & James Miller (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metametaphysics. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 405-420.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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(1 other version)Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017details
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A Refutation of Cartesian Fallibilism.Ram Neta - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):658-695.details
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Knowledge, Ignorance and True Belief.Pierre le Morvan - 2011 - Theoria 77 (1):32-41.details
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Les intuitions rationnelles sont-elles des intuitions modales?Pierre Saint-Germier - 2017 - Philosophiques 44 (1):49-71.details
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