- Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Can Objectivists Account for Subjective Reasons?Daniel Wodak - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 12 (3):259-279.details
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Reductive Views of Knowledge and the Small Difference Principle.Simon Wimmer - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (8):777-788.details
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Very Improbable Knowing.Timothy Williamson - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (5):971-999.details
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Hyman on Knowledge and Ability.Timothy Williamson - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (1):243-248.details
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The Glass is Half Empty: A New Argument for Pessimism about Aesthetic Testimony.Daniel Whiting - 2015 - British Journal of Aesthetics 55 (1):91-107.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Knowledge, justification, and (a sort of) safe belief.Daniel Whiting - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3593-3609.details
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Against Second‐Order Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):398-420.details
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Defending interest-relative invariantism.Brian Weatherson - 2011 - Logos and Episteme 2 (4):591-609.details
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Knowledge first, stability and value.Barnaby Walker - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3833-3854.details
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Knowing in the “Executive Way”: Knowing How, Rules, Methods, Principles and Criteria.N. Waights Hickman - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):311-335.details
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(Implicit) Knowledge, reasons, and semantic understanding.Natalia Waights Hickman - 2021 - Mind and Language 36 (5):707-728.details
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You always have a reason to check! A new take on the bank cases.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Philosophia 51 (2):1007-1018.details
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Insufficient reasons insufficient to rescue the knowledge norm of practical reasoning: towards a certainty norm.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-11.details
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Epistemic excuses and the feeling of certainty.Jacques-Henri Vollet - 2022 - Analysis (4):663-672.details
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Antiluminosity, Excuses and the Sufficiency of Knowledge for Rational Action.Jacques-Henri Vollet - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-22.details
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Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):25-41.details
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Abilism, Ableism, and Reliabilism’s Achievement Gap: A Normative Argument for A New Paradigm in Epistemology.John Turri - 2022 - Philosophia 50 (3):1495-1501.details
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Uncoordinated Norms of Belief.Oliver Traldi - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (3):625-637.details
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A Case for Weak Safety.Niklaas Tepelmann - 2020 - Res Philosophica 97 (4):545-569.details
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Selfless assertions and the Knowledge Norm.Nicholas Tebben - 2021 - Synthese 198 (12):11755-11774.details
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Explanation and the A-theory.David Storrs-Fox - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178:4239-4259.details
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Against Right Reason.Robert Steel - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):431-460.details
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Replies to Gilbert Harman, Ram Neta, and Stephen Schiffer. [REVIEW]Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):196-210.details
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Précis of knowledge and practical interests. [REVIEW]Jason Stanley - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (1):168–172.details
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Knowledge and certainty.Jason Stanley - 2008 - Philosophical Issues 18 (1):35-57.details
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How do Beliefs Simplify Reasoning?Julia Staffel - 2019 - Noûs 53 (4):937-962.details
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Two faces of rationality.Vishnu Sridharan - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11103-11124.details
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Empirical tests of interest-relative invariantism.Chandra Sekhar Sripada & Jason Stanley - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):3-26.details
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Knowledge-lies.Roy Sorensen - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):608-615.details
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The Normative Role of Knowledge.Declan Smithies - 2011 - Noûs 46 (2):265-288.details
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Some Thoughts on the JK-Rule1.Martin Smith - 2012 - Noûs 46 (4):791-802.details
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Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.details
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Knowledge and reasoning.Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):10371-10388.details
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How Doxastic Justification Helps Us Solve the Puzzle of Misleading Higher-Order Evidence.Paul Silva - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):308-328.details
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Epistemic closure under deductive inference: what is it and can we afford it?Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2013 - Synthese 190 (14):2731-2748.details
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Approximate Truth, Quasi-Factivity, and Evidence.Michael J. Shaffer - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (3):249-266.details
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What is a Reason to Act?Kieran Setiya - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):221-235.details
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Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
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Rational stability under pragmatic encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.details
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Partial Reliance.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (6):436-451.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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Knowledge and decision: Introduction to the Synthese topical collection.Moritz Schulz, Patricia Rich, Jakob Koscholke & Roman Heil - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-13.details
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Genericity and Inductive Inference.Henry Ian Schiller - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science:1-18.details
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Entscheidendes Wissen: Kommentar zu Beings of Thought and Action.Moritz Schulz - 2023 - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung 77 (1):63-69.details
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Doxastic planning and epistemic internalism.Karl Schafer - 2014 - Synthese 191 (12):2571-2591.details
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Degrees of Doxastic Justification.Moritz Schulz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2943-2972.details
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Decisions and Higher‐Order Knowledge.Moritz Schulz - 2017 - Noûs 51 (3):463-483.details
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Contrastive Knowledge Surveyed.Jonathan Schaffer & Joshua Knobe - 2010 - Noûs 46 (4):675-708.details
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