- Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):211-224.details
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Two Notions of Epistemic Risk.Martin Smith - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1069-1079.details
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Getting a little closure for closure.James Simpson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12331-12361.details
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Two Approaches to Belief Revision.Ted Shear & Branden Fitelson - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):487-518.details
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Evidence and the openness of knowledge.Assaf Sharon & Levi Spectre - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (4):1001-1037.details
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The ‘Default View’ of Perceptual Reasons and ‘Closure-Based’ Sceptical Arguments.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (2):114-135.details
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Scepticism About Scepticism or the Very Idea of a Global ‘Vat-Language’.Genia Schönbaumsfeld - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):91-105.details
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Probabilistic Truth, Relativism, and Objective Chance.Svenja Schimmelpfennig - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):757-777.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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Knowledge and inquiry—the missing key for a knowledge-based decision theory.Moritz Schulz - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-13.details
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Degrees of Doxastic Justification.Moritz Schulz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2943-2972.details
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Wittgensteinian Epistemology and Cartesian Skepticism.Nicola Claudio Salvatore - 2015 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):53-80.details
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On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (S3):647-665.details
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Confirmation, transitivity, and Moore: the Screening-Off Approach.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-21.details
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Confirmation, transitivity, and Moore: the Screening-Off Approach.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):797-817.details
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Authority without privilege: How to be a Dretskean conciliatory skeptic on self-knowledge.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2021 - Synthese 198 (2):1071-1087.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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Are There Heavyweight Perceptual Reasons?Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-26.details
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Warrant, Conclusive Reason, and Failure-Of-Transfer-Of-Warrant.Murali Ramachandran - 2018 - Problemos 94:35.details
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The Bayesian explanation of transmission failure.Geoff Pynn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1519-1531.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Wittgenstein and the groundlessness of our believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):255-272.details
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Wright contra McDowell on perceptual knowledge and scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 171 (3):467 - 479.details
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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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Scepticism and Epistemic Angst, Redux.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 15):3635-3664.details
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Relevant alternatives, perceptual knowledge and discrimination.Duncan Pritchard - 2010 - Noûs 44 (2):245-268.details
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I—Duncan Pritchard: Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.details
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Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.details
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I—Duncan Pritchard: Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism: Responses to my Critics.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Analysis 75 (4):627-637.details
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Epistemic Angst: Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing.Duncan Pritchard - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (3):70-90.details
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Defusing epistemic relativism.Duncan Pritchard - 2009 - Synthese 166 (2):397-412.details
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Contrastivism, evidence, and scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2008 - Social Epistemology 22 (3):305 – 323.details
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Contextualism and radical scepticism.Duncan Pritchard - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4733-4750.details
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Book Symposium: Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Angst.Duncan Pritchard, Michael Veber, Nicola Claudio Salvatore & Rodrigo Borges - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (1):115-165.details
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Epistemic presentism.Spyridon Orestis Palermos - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (3):458-478.details
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A strategy for assessing closure.Peter Murphy - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (3):365 - 383.details
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The Explanationist and the Modalist.Dario Mortini - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Epistemic Entitlement, Epistemic Risk and Leaching.Luca Moretti & Crispin Wright - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):566-580.details
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An Argument for External World Skepticism from the Appearance/Reality Distinction.Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):368-383.details
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Dretske on Self-Knowledge and Contrastive Focus: How to Understand Dretske’s Theory, and Why It Matters.Michael Roche & William Roche - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (5):975-992.details
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The heterogeneity problem for sensitivity accounts.Guido Melchior - 2015 - Episteme 12 (4):479-496.details
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Easy Knowledge, Closure Failure, or Skepticism: A Trilemma.Guido Melchior - 2016 - Metaphilosophy 47 (2):214-232.details
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Two skeptical arguments or only one?Kevin McCain - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):289-300.details
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Is knowledge closed under known entailment? The strange case of Hawthorne's "heavyweight conjunct".Mark Mcbride - 2009 - Theoria 75 (2):117-128.details
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Davies on Easy Knowledge.Mark McBride - 2014 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 4 (1):1-20.details
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On The Hypothetical Given.Adam Marushak - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):497-514.details
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The Moral Closure Argument.Matt Lutz - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (1).details
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Mark McBride, Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017, 228 pp., £16.95 , ISBN 978‐1‐78374‐283‐7. [REVIEW]Artūrs Logins - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):280-285.details
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Why warrant transmits across epistemological disjunctivist Moorean-style arguments.Thomas Lockhart - 2018 - Synthese 195 (1):287-319.details
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