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  1. Verification: The Hysteron Proteron Argument.Francis Jeffry Pelletier & Bernard Linsky - 2018 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 6 (6).
    This paper investigates the strange case of an argument that was directed against a positivist verification principle. We find an early occurrence of the argument in a talk by the phenomenologist Roman Ingarden at the 1934 International Congress of Philosophy in Prague, where Carnap and Neurath were present and contributed short rejoinders. We discuss the underlying presuppositons of the argument, and we evaluate whether the attempts by Carnap actually succeed in answering this argument. We think they don’t, and offer instead (...)
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  • Conventionalism and the Impoverishment of the Space of Reasons: Carnap, Quine and Sellars.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2015 - Journal for the History of Analytical Philosophy 3 (8).
    This article examines how Quine and Sellars develop informatively contrasting responses to a fundamental tension in Carnap’s semantics ca. 1950. Quine’s philosophy could well be styled ‘Essays in Radical Empiricism’; his assay of radical empiricism is invaluable for what it reveals about the inherent limits of empiricism. Careful examination shows that Quine’s criticism of Carnap’s semantics in ‘Two Dogmas of Empiricism’ fails, that at its core Quine’s semantics is for two key reasons incoherent and that his hallmark Thesis of Extensionalism (...)
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  • Empirical Content.Donald Davidson - 1982 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 16 (1):471-489.
    The dispute between Schlick and Neurath over het foundations of empirical knowledge illustrates the difficulties m trymg to draw epistemological conclusions from a verificationist theory of meaning. It also shows how assummg the general correctness of science does not automatically avoid, or provide an easy answer to, skepticism. But while neither Schlick nor Neurath arrived at a satisfactory account of empüical knowledge, there are promising hmts of a better theory m their writmgs. Following up these hints, and drawing on further (...)
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  • A Common-Sense Pragmatic Theory of Truth.John Capps - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):463-481.
    Truth is a fundamental philosophical concept that, despite its common and everyday use, has resisted common-sense formulations. At this point, one may legitimately wonder if there even is a common-sense notion of truth or what it could look like. In response, I propose here a common-sense account of truth based on four “truisms” that set a baseline for how to go about building an account of truth. Drawing on both ordinary language philosophy and contemporary pragmatic approaches to truth, I defend (...)
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  • “True” as Ambiguous.Max Kölbel - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (2):359-384.
    In this paper, I argue (a) that the predicate "true" is ambiguously used to express a deflationary and a substantial concept of truth and (b) that the two concepts are systematically related in that substantial truths are deflationary truths of a certain kind. Claim (a) allows one to accept the main insights of deflationism but still take seriously, and participate in, the traditional debate about the nature of truth. Claim (b) is a contribution to that debate. The overall position is (...)
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  • A influência do Tractatus no critério positivista de significado.Renata Maria Santos Arruda - 2019 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 13:6-17.
    Uma das motivações para as pesquisas realizadas pelos membros do Círculo de Viena a respeito dos fundamentos da linguagem científica se encontra na obra de Wittgenstein “Tractatus Logico-Philophicus”.Embora haja divergências sobre a legitimidade dessa influência, o livro foi, com efeito, tomado como motivação teórica para a estruturação da linguagem científica, desenvolvida pelos empiristas lógicos. Este artigo apresenta as teorias desenvolvidas pelos membros do Círculo de Viena ressaltando os elementos presentes no Tractatusque foram tomados, em grande parte, como influência sobre o (...)
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  • Knowing Things in Themselves.M. Oreste Fiocco - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (3):332-358.
    A perennial epistemological question is whether things can be known just as they are in the absence of any awareness of them. This epistemological question is posterior to ontological considerations and more specific ones pertaining to mind. In light of such considerations, the author propounds a naïve realist, foundationalist account of knowledge of things in themselves, one that makes crucial use of the work of Brentano. After introducing the resources provided by Brentano’s study of mind, the author reveals the ontological (...)
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  • Demystifying the Influential IS Legends of Positivism.Mikko Siponen & Aggeliki Tsohou - 2018 - Journal of the Association for Information Systems 19 (7):600-617.
    Positivism has been used to establish a standard that Information Systems research must meet to be scientific. According to such positivistic beliefs in IS, scientific research should: 1) be generalizable, 2) focus on stable independent variables, 3) have certain ontological assumptions, and 4) use statistical or quantitative methods rather than qualitative methods. We argue that logical positivist philosophers required none of these. On the contrary, logical positivist philosophers regarded philosophizing in general and ontological considerations in particular as nonsense. Moreover, the (...)
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  • Carl Hempel: Whose Philosopher?Nikolay Milkov - 2013 - In N. Milkov & V. Peckhaus (eds.), The Berlin Group and the Philosophy of Logical Empiricism. Springer, pp. 293-308. pp. 293--309.
    Recently, Michael Friedman has claimed that virtually all the seeds of Hempel’s philosophical development trace back to his early encounter with the Vienna Circle (Friedman 2003, 94). As opposed, however, to Friedman’s view of the principal early influences on Hempel, we shall see that those formative influences originated rather with the Berlin Group. Hempel, it is true, spent the fall term of 1929 as a student at the University of Vienna, and, thanks to a letter of recommendation from Hans Reichenbach, (...)
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  • Enciclopédia de Termos Lógico-Filosóficos.João Branquinho, Desidério Murcho & Nelson Gonçalves Gomes (eds.) - 2006 - São Paulo, SP, Brasil: Martins Fontes.
    Esta enciclopédia abrange, de uma forma introdutória mas desejavelmente rigorosa, uma diversidade de conceitos, temas, problemas, argumentos e teorias localizados numa área relativamente recente de estudos, os quais tem sido habitual qualificar como «estudos lógico-filosóficos». De uma forma apropriadamente genérica, e apesar de o território teórico abrangido ser extenso e de contornos por vezes difusos, podemos dizer que na área se investiga um conjunto de questões fundamentais acerca da natureza da linguagem, da mente, da cognição e do raciocínio humanos, bem (...)
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  • Is Reflective Equilibrium Enough?Thomas Kelly & Sarah McGrath - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):325-359.
    Suppose that one is at least a minimal realist about a given domain, in that one thinks that that domain contains truths that are not in any interesting sense of our own making. Given such an understanding, what can be said for and against the method of reflective equilibrium as a procedure for investigating the domain? One fact that lends this question some interest is that many philosophers do combine commitments to minimal realism and a reflective equilibrium methodology. Here, for (...)
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  • Against Truth as Coherence.Jan Woleński - 1996 - Logic and Logical Philosophy 4:41-51.
    Traces of the coherence theory are to be found in rationalistic epistemological systems of Leibniz, Spinoza, Kant, Hegel and Fichte. However, the first fully advanced coherence theory was proposed by Bradley in XIX century. He was followed by Joachim, McTaggart, and particularly Blanshard and Ewing. The coherence theory later became popular among philosophers of the Vienna Circle, notably in Neurath and Hempel.2 Recently, Rescher tried to combine various proposals of coherentists into one fully unified view.
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  • Kuhn, Naturalism, and the Positivist Legacy.Alexander Bird - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (2):337-356.
    I defend against criticism the following claims concening Thomas Kuhn: (i) there is a strong naturalist streak in The structure of scientific revolutions, whereby Kuhn used the results of a posteriori enquiry in addressing philosophical questions; (ii) as Kuhn's career as a philosopher of science developed he tended to drop the naturalistic elements and to replace them with more traditionally philosophical a prior approaches; (iii) at the same there is a significant residue of positivist thought in Kuhm, which Kuhn did (...)
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  • Émotions et Valeurs.C. Tappolet - 2000 - Presses Universitaires de France.
    Pour contrer le scepticisme au sujet de la connaissance des valeurs, la plupart soutiennent avec John Rawls qu’une croyance comme celle qu’une action est bonne est justifiée dans la mesure où elle appartient à un ensemble de croyances cohérent, ayant atteint un équilibre réfléchi. -/- Christine Tappolet s’inspire des travaux de Max Scheler et d’Alexius von Meinong pour défendre une conception opposée au cohérentisme. La connaissance des valeurs est affirmée dépendre de nos émotions, ces dernières étant conçues comme des perceptions (...)
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  • Wittgenstein on Verification and Seeing-As, 1930–1932.Andreas Blank - 2011 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 54 (6):614 - 632.
    Abstract This article examines the little-explored remarks on verification in Wittgenstein's notebooks during the period between 1930 and 1932. In these remarks, Wittgenstein connects a verificationist theory of meaning with the notion of logical multiplicity, understood as a space of possibilities: a proposition is verified by a fact if and only if the proposition and the fact have the same logical multiplicity. But while in his early philosophy logical multiplicities were analysed as an outcome of the formal properties of simple (...)
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  • Coherence and Correspondence in the Network Dynamics of Belief Suites.Patrick Grim, Andrew Modell, Nicholas Breslin, Jasmine Mcnenny, Irina Mondescu, Kyle Finnegan, Robert Olsen, Chanyu An & Alexander Fedder - 2017 - Episteme 14 (2):233-253.
    Coherence and correspondence are classical contenders as theories of truth. In this paper we examine them instead as interacting factors in the dynamics of belief across epistemic networks. We construct an agent-based model of network contact in which agents are characterized not in terms of single beliefs but in terms of internal belief suites. Individuals update elements of their belief suites on input from other agents in order both to maximize internal belief coherence and to incorporate ‘trickled in’ elements of (...)
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  • The Dialectics of Infinitism and Coherentism: Inferential Justification Versus Holism and Coherence.Frederik Herzberg - 2014 - Synthese 191 (4):701-723.
    This paper formally explores the common ground between mild versions of epistemological coherentism and infinitism; it proposes—and argues for—a hybrid, coherentist–infinitist account of epistemic justification. First, the epistemological regress argument and its relation to the classical taxonomy regarding epistemic justification—of foundationalism, infinitism and coherentism—is reviewed. We then recall recent results proving that an influential argument against infinite regresses of justification, which alleges their incoherence on account of probabilistic inconsistency, cannot be maintained. Furthermore, we prove that the Principle of Inferential Justification (...)
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  • The Concept of Truth in Carnap'slogical Syntax of Language.Thomas Oberdan - 1992 - Synthese 93 (1-2):239 - 260.
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  • Commonsense Realism and Triangulation.Chris Calvert-Minor - 2009 - Philosophia 37 (1):67-86.
    Realism about the external world enjoys little philosophical support these days. I rectify this predicament by taking a relatively pragmatist line of thought to defend commonsense realism; I support commonsense realism through an interpretation and application of Donald Davidson’s notion of triangulation, the triangle composed of two communicators coordinating and correcting their responses with a shared causal stimulus. This argument is important because it has a crucial advantage over the often used abductive argument for realism. My argument avoids unwarranted conclusions, (...)
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  • What Should a Correspondence Theory Be and Do?Patricia Marino - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 127 (3):415-457.
    Correspondence theories are frequently either too vaguely expressed - "true statements correspond to the way things are in the world," or implausible - "true statements mirror raw, mind-independent reality." I address this problem by developing features and roles that ought to characterize what I call "modest" correspondence theories. Of special importance is the role of correspondence in directing our responses to cases of suspected non-factuality; lack of straightforward correspondence shows the need for, and guides us in our choice of, various (...)
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  • Coherence, Anti-Realism and the Vienna Circle.James O. Young - 1991 - Synthese 86 (3):467 - 482.
    Some members of the Vienna Circle argued for a coherence theory of truth. Their coherentism is immune to standard objections. Most versions of coherentism are unable to show why a sentence cannot be true even though it fails to cohere with a system of beliefs. That is, it seems that truth may transcend what we can be warranted in believing. If so, truth cannot consist in coherence with a system of beliefs. The Vienna Circle's coherentists held, first, that sentences are (...)
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  • The Vienna Circle's 'Anti-Foundationalism'.Thomas Oberdan - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (2):297-308.
    Uebel has recently claimed that, contrary to popular opinion, none of the philosophers of the Vienna Circle of Logical Positivists were proponents of epistemological foundationalism. According to the considerations of the current discussion, however, Uebel's conclusion is erroneous, especially with respect to the work of Moritz Schlick. The chief reason Uebel offers to support his conclusion is that current attempts to portray Schlick's epistemology as foundationalist fail to overcome its ‘ultimate incoherence’. In contrast, it is argued that current interpretations, based (...)
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  • Neurath's Programme for Naturalistic Epistemology.Thomas E. Uebel - 1991 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 22 (4):623-646.
    I examine the thesis that Otto Neurath anticipated the programme of naturalised epistemology already at the time of the Vienna Circle and consider the relation between Neurath's proposals and those of two contemporary theorists whose research programmes he would thus have broadly anticipated. The thesis is confirmed by reference to Neurath's own writings. The connection between Neurath's programme and the programmes of his two successors considered here, however, is found to be highly indirect in one case and nonexistent in the (...)
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  • Maximal Propositions and the Coherence Theory of Truth.James B. Freeman & Charles B. Daniels - 1978 - Dialogue 17 (1):56-71.
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  • Mutual Recognition and Rational Justification in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit.Kenneth R. Westphal - 2009 - Dialogue 48 (4):753-99.
    : This paper explicates and defends the thesis that individual rational judgment, of the kind required for justification, whether in cognition or in morals, is fundamentally socially and historically conditioned. This puts paid to the traditional distinction, still influential today, between ‘rational’ and ‘historical’ knowledge. The present analysis highlights and defends key themes from Kant’s and Hegel’s accounts of rational judgment and justification, including four fundamental features of the ‘autonomy’ of rational judgment and one key point of Hegel’s account of (...)
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  • “Logical Positivism”—“Logical Empiricism”: What's in a Name?Thomas Uebel - 2013 - Perspectives on Science 21 (1):58-99.
    Do the terms “logical positivism” and “logical empiricism” mark a philosophically real and significant distinction? There is, of course, no doubt that the first term designates the group of philosophers known as the Vienna Circle, headed by Moritz Schlick and including Rudolf Carnap, Herbert Feigl, Philipp Frank, Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath, Friedrich Waismann and others. What is debatable, however, is whether the name “logical positivism” correctly distinguishes their doctrines from related ones called “logical empiricism” that emerged from the Berlin Society (...)
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