- A moral reason to be a mere theist: improving the practical argument.Xiaofei Liu - 2016 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 79 (2):113-132.details
|
|
El problema de las razones inadecuadas.Miranda del Corral - 2014 - Factótum 11:103-111.details
|
|
Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
|
|
Fitting Attitudes And Essentially Contestable Concepts.Cain Todd - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
|
|
A Short Refutation of Strict Normative Evidentialism.Andrew E. Reisner - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy (5):1-9.details
|
|
Sosa on the normativity of belief.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):617-624.details
|
|
The Use of Reasons in Thought (and the Use of Earmarks in Arguments).Pamela Hieronymi - 2013 - Ethics 124 (1):114-127.details
|
|
Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Two Reasons Why Epistemic Reasons Are Not Object‐Given Reasons.Anthony Robert Booth - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):1-14.details
|
|
Blameworthiness and Time.Jules Coleman & Alexander Sarch - 2012 - Legal Theory 18 (2):101-137.details
|
|
Expressivism and Convention-Relativism about Epistemic Discourse.Allan Hazlett - 2014 - In Abrol Fairweather & Owen Flanagan (eds.), Naturalizing Epistemic Virtue. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
|
|
Ethics in e-trust and e-trustworthiness: the case of direct computer-patient interfaces.Philip J. Nickel - 2011 - Ethics and Information Technology 13 (2):355-363.details
|
|
Justice and Retaliation.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Philosophical Papers 39 (3):315-341.details
|
|
Voluntary Belief on a Reasonable Basis.Philip J. Nickel - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):312-334.details
|
|
Stakes, withholding, and pragmatic encroachment on knowledge.Mark Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (2):265 - 285.details
|
|
(1 other version)“But it would be wrong”.Stephen Darwall - 2010 - Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (2):135-157.details
|
|
Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
|
|
Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.details
|
|
Buck-passing accounts of value.Jussi Suikkanen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779.details
|
|
Abandoning the buck passing analysis of final value.Andrew E. Reisner - 2009 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 12 (4):379 - 395.details
|
|
On the Rationalist Solution to Gregory Kavka's Toxin Puzzle.Ken Levy - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (2):267-289.details
|
|
Is there reason to be theoretically rational?Andrew Reisner - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Value and the right kind of reason.Mark Schroeder - 2010 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 5:25-55.details
|
|
Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.details
|
|
Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Practical reason.R. Jay Wallace & Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
(1 other version)Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Value theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
The reasons of trust.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):213 – 236.details
|
|
Autonomous reasons for intending.Randolph Clarke - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):191 – 212.details
|
|
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.details
|
|
A field guide to social construction.Ron Mallon - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):93–108.details
|
|
Responsibility for believing.Pamela Hieronymi - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):357-373.details
|
|
Aspects of Blame: In which the nature of blame, blameworthiness, standing to blame and proportional blame are discussed.Marta Johansson Werkmäster - 2023 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
|
|
In defence of object-given reasons.Michael Vollmer - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (2):485-511.details
|
|
Instrumentalism, Moral Encroachment, and Epistemic Injustice.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
|
|
In defense of guilt‐tripping.Rachel Achs - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (3):792-810.details
|
|
Ratiocination.Winnie Sung - 2022 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):1-28.details
|
|
Doxastic Wronging and Evidentialism.Sophia Dandelet - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy (1):82-95.details
|
|
Causal Blame.Eugene Chislenko - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (4):347-58.details
|
|
A New Argument for the Non-Instrumental Value of Truth.Veli Mitova - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (5):1911-1933.details
|
|
Fitting anxiety and prudent anxiety.James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8555-8578.details
|
|
The Cooperative Origins of Epistemic Rationality?Corey Dethier - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1269-1288.details
|
|
All Reasons are Fundamentally for Attitudes.Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (2).details
|
|
(1 other version)A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
|
|
(1 other version)A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
|
|
How It All Relates : Exploring the Space of Value Comparisons.Henrik Andersson - 2017 - Dissertation, Lund Universitydetails
|
|
Constitutive Reasons and the Suspension of Judgement.Whitney Lilly - 2019 - Dialogue 58 (2):215-224.details
|
|
Redundant Reasons.Daniel Wodak - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (2):266-278.details
|
|