- Intuition.Ole Koksvik - 2011 - Dissertation, Australian National Universitydetails
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Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.details
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The Knowledge Argument is an Argument about Knowledge.Tim Crane - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Nonconceptual Content.Eva Schmidt - 2015 - In Modest Nonconceptualism: Epistemology, Phenomenology, and Content. Cham: Springer.details
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The Knowledge Argument and Epiphenomenalism.Yujin Nagasawa - 2010 - Erkenntnis 72 (1):37 - 56.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Consciousness and the Philosophy of Signs: How Peircean Semiotics Combines Phenomenal Qualia and Practical Effects.Marc Champagne - 2018 - Cham: Springer.details
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Consciousness and mental causation: Contemporary empirical cases for epiphenomenalism, in Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch (ed.) - 2021 - Oxford University Press.details
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What was that like? Intuitions and the epistemology of consciousness.Brandon Ashby - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.details
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Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content.Michael Tye - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):589-613.details
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The Experience of Emotion: An Intentionalist Theory.Michael Tye - 2008 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 62 (1):25--50.details
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Absent qualia and the mind-body problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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Physicalism Requires Functionalism: A New Formulation and Defense of the Via Negativa.Justin Tiehen - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):3-24.details
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Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
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Lehrer on consciousness.Leopold Stubenberg - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):131-140.details
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Temperature, Color and the Brain: An Externalist Reply to the Knowledge Argument.Paul Skokowski - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):287-299.details
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Representationalism and Blindsight.Graham Peebles - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (3):541-556.details
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Why Intentionalism Cannot Explain Phenomenal Character.Harold Langsam - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (2):375-389.details
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A new low: Reassessing (and revising) the local recurrency theory of consciousness.Benjamin Kozuch - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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What Physicalists Have to Say about the Knowledge Argument.Frank Jackson - 2016 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 93 (4):511-524.details
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Conceivability, higher order patterns, and physicalism.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz & Amir Horowitz - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (4):349-366.details
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Writing on the page of consciousness.Christoph Hoerl - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):187-209.details
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Episodic memory and theory of mind: a connection reconsidered.Christoph Hoerl - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (2):148-160.details
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Philosophical problems, cluster concepts, and the many lives of Molyneux’s question.Brian R. Glenney - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):541-558.details
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Philosophical expertise under the microscope.Miguel Egler & Lewis Dylan Ross - 2020 - Synthese 197 (3):1077-1098.details
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The Problem of Intuitive Presence.Miguel Egler - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Fame in the predictive brain: a deflationary approach to explaining consciousness in the prediction error minimization framework.Krzysztof Dołęga & Joe E. Dewhurst - 2020 - Synthese 198 (8):7781-7806.details
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Dorr on the language of ontology.Chris Daly & David Liggins - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3301-3315.details
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The Transcendentist Theory of Persistence.Damiano Costa - 2017 - Journal of Philosophy 114 (2):57-75.details
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The ability hypothesis and the new knowledge-how.Yuri Cath - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):137-156.details
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Are Introspective Beliefs about One’s Own Visual Experiences Immediate?Wolfgang Barz - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1).details
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Imagining subjective absence: Marcus on zombies.Torin Alter - 2007 - Disputatio 2 (22):91-101.details
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The Semiotic Mind: A Fundamental Theory of Consciousness.Marc Champagne - 2014 - Dissertation, York Universiydetails
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Béatrice Longuenesse and Ned Block Vide Kant.Ekin Erkan - 2021 - Cosmos and History 17 (1):405-452.details
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The Rise and Fall of the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - forthcoming - In Corine Besson, Anandi Hattiangadi & Romina Padro (eds.), Meaning, Modality and Mind: Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.details
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Naturalism.Davidn D. Papineau - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Going Out of My Head: An Evolutionary Proposal Concerning the “Why” of Sentience.Stan Klein, Bill N. Nguyen & Blossom M. Zhang - forthcoming - Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice.details
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Consciousness.Robert van Gulick - 2004 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Katalin Balog - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), Oxford Handbook in the Philosophy of Mind. Oxford University Press. pp. 292--312.details
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Acquaintance and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 2012 - In Simone Gozzano & Christopher S. Hill (eds.), New Perspectives on Type Identity: The Mental and the Physical. Cambridge University Press. pp. 16-43.details
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Review of Torin Alter and Sven Walter Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. [REVIEW]James Trafford - 2009 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 15 (2).details
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Phenomenal concepts and the explanatory gap.David J. Chalmers - 2006 - In Torin Andrew Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.details
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How Does Colour Experience Represent the World?Adam Pautz - 2020 - In Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Colour. Routledge.details
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Non-eliminative Reductionism: Reconciling Qualia and Physicalism.Dennis Nicholson - manuscriptdetails
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Review essay: Dennett's sweet dreams philosophical obstacles to a science of consciousness.Leslie Marsh - 2005 - Marsh, Leslie (2005) Review Essay.details
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Review of P. Ludlow, Y. Nagasawa & D. Stoljar, There's Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument. [REVIEW]Torin Alter - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11.details
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Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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