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How to predict future duration from present age.Bradley Monton & Brian Kierland - 2006 - Philosophical Quarterly 56 (222):16-38.details
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Why are Normal Distributions Normal?Aidan Lyon - 2014 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 65 (3):621-649.details
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More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
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The logic of the past hypothesis.David Wallace - 2023 - In Barry Loewer, Brad Weslake & Eric Winsberg (eds.), The Probability Map of the Universe: Essays on David Albert’s _Time and Chance_. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 76-109.details
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(1 other version)Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Peirce, Pedigree, Probability.Rush T. Stewart & Tom F. Sterkenburg - 2022 - Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 58 (2):138-166.details
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Modes of Convergence to the Truth: Steps Toward a Better Epistemology of Induction.Hanti Lin - 2022 - Review of Symbolic Logic 15 (2):277-310.details
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Looking at the Arrow of Time and Loschmidt’s Paradox Through the Magnifying Glass of Mathematical-Billiard.Mario Stefanon - 2019 - Foundations of Physics 49 (10):1231-1251.details
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Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle.Nicholas Shackel & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):505-523.details
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The objectivity of Subjective Bayesianism.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):539-558.details
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There Is No Pure Empirical Reasoning.Michael Huemer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):592-613.details
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Deceptive updating and minimal information methods.Haim Gaifman & Anubav Vasudevan - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):147-178.details
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Locating IBE in the Bayesian Framework.Jonathan Weisberg - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):125-143.details
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A Tool-Based View of Theories of Evidence.Chien-Yang Huang - 2020 - Dissertation, Durham Universitydetails
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We are All Bayesian, Everyone is Not a Bayesian.Mattia Andreoletti & Andrea Oldofredi - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):477-485.details
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Entropy and Insufficient Reason: A Note on the Judy Benjamin Problem.Anubav Vasudevan - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (3):1113-1141.details
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Inductive reasoning and chance discovery.Ahmed Y. Tawfik - 2004 - Minds and Machines 14 (4):441-451.details
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The Metaphysical Foundations of the Principle of Indifference.Binyamin Eisner - 2024 - Metaphysica 25 (1):175-191.details
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Invariant Equivocation.Jürgen Landes & George Masterton - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):141-167.details
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Estimation of Reliability Parameters Under Incomplete Primary Information.A. N. Golodnikov, P. S. Knopov & V. A. Pepelyaev - 2004 - Theory and Decision 57 (4):331-344.details
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(2 other versions)Concepts of projectibility and the problems of induction.John Earman - 1985 - Noûs 19 (4):521-535.details
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The key to the knowledge norm of action is ambiguity.Patricia Rich - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9669-9698.details
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Decision problems under uncertainty based on entropy functionals.Hans W. Gottinger - 1990 - Theory and Decision 28 (2):143-172.details
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Bayesian decision theory, subjective and objective probabilities, and acceptance of empirical hypotheses.John C. Harsanyi - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):341 - 365.details
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A note on scale invariance.Peter Milne - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (1):49-55.details
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Additive representation of separable preferences over infinite products.Marcus Pivato - 2014 - Theory and Decision 77 (1):31-83.details
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