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Aristotle's theory of the will

New Haven: Yale University Press (1979)

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  1. La estructura del silogismo práctico en Aristóteles.Manuel Oriol - 2004 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 29 (1):53-75.
    Few elements of Aristotle’s practical philosophy have been more discussed than the so-called “practical syllogism”. But there are also few as suggestive to the commentators as this one. In this article I intend to define what the theory of practical syllogism would consist in, as a separated element within the Aristotelian ethical theory (or, more precise-ly, within his theory of action). It is not properly a demonstration of the existence of such a theory, but rather of the possibility that it (...)
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  • Sculpting the space of actions. Explaining human action by integrating intentions and mechanisms.Machiel Keestra - 2014 - Dissertation, University of Amsterdam
    How can we explain the intentional nature of an expert’s actions, performed without immediate and conscious control, relying instead on automatic cognitive processes? How can we account for the differences and similarities with a novice’s performance of the same actions? Can a naturalist explanation of intentional expert action be in line with a philosophical concept of intentional action? Answering these and related questions in a positive sense, this dissertation develops a three-step argument. Part I considers different methods of explanations in (...)
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  • AS RELAÇÕES ENTRE “FINS” E “MEIOS” E A RELEVÂNCIA MORAL DA PHRONESIS NA ÉTICA DE ARISTÓTELES.Lucas Angioni - 2009 - Revista Filosófica de Coimbra 18 (35):185-204.
    I discuss three kinds of relationship between ends and means (or "things that promote ends") in the Aristotelian ethical theory, in order to clarify how moral virtues and phronesis are related both in adopting ends and in determining means for virtuous actions. Phronesis seems to be mainly charged with determining means for an end given by the moral virtues, but it must involve some conception of ends too. Phronesis cannot be parasitic on moral virtue concerning the conception of ends, for (...)
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  • Varieties of Knowledge in Plato and Aristotle.Timothy Chappell - 2012 - Topoi 31 (2):175-190.
    I develop the relatively familiar idea of a variety of forms of knowledge —not just propositional knowledge but also knowledge -how and experiential knowledge —and show how this variety can be used to make interesting sense of Plato’s and Aristotle’s philosophy, and in particular their ethics. I then add to this threefold analysis of knowledge a less familiar fourth variety, objectual knowledge, and suggest that this is also interesting and important in the understanding of Plato and Aristotle.
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  • The trapped infinity: Cartesian volition as conceptual nightmare.Edward S. Reed - 1990 - Philosophical Psychology 3 (1):101-121.
    Abstract Descartes's theory of volition as expressed in his Passions of the Soul is analyzed and outlined. The focus is not on Descartes's proposed answers to questions about the nature and processes of volition, but on his way of formulating questions about the nature of volition. It is argued that the assumptions underlying Descartes's questions have become ?intellectual strait?jackets? for all who are interested in volition: neuroscientists, philosophers and psychologists. It is shown that Descartes's basic assumption?that volition causes change in (...)
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  • Starting with Practical Reason in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI 1: About the Object of the Calculative Part of the Soul.Gabriela Rossi - 2025 - Classical Philology 120 (1):1-20.
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  • Moralische Verantwortung für fahrlässiges Handeln.Philipp Schwind - forthcoming - Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung.
    Moral responsibility for an action can only be ascribed if it allows inferences about the agent. In cases of negligence, such a connection appears absent, as the agent acts in ignorance of readily accessible relevant facts. Yet, we hold individuals accountable for their negligent actions. The literature presents two approaches to resolve this apparent contradiction: Derivative theories trace negligence back to prior culpable misconduct, while non-derivative theories view negligent actions as expressions of blameworthy attitudes. However, there are cases that neither (...)
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  • Ethics for Rational Animals. The Moral Psychology at the Basis of Aristotle's Ethics.Elena Cagnoli Fiecconi - 2024 - Oxford University Press.
    Ethics for Rational Animals brings to light a novel account of akrasia, practical wisdom, and character virtue through an original and comprehensive study of the moral psychology at the basis of Aristotle's ethics. It argues that practical wisdom is a persuasive rational excellence, that virtue is a listening excellence, and that the ignorance involved in akrasia is in fact a failure of persuasion. Aristotle's moral psychology emerges from this reconstruction as a qualified intellectualism. The view is intellectualistic because it describes (...)
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  • Virtude do Caráter e Phronesis na Ethica Nicomachea.Angelo Antonio Pires De Oliveira - 2017 - Dissertation, University of Campinas, Brazil
    In the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle makes the following claims: “the end cannot be a subject of deliberation, but only what contributes to the ends” (NE 1112b33-34) and “virtue makes the goal right, practical wisdom makes the things to- ward the goal right" (NE 1144a7-9). A problem arises from such claims: the ends as- sumed by a moral agent cannot be subject to rational choice. For deliberation, an intel- lectual procedure, is bound to deal with the things that contribute to the (...)
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  • Sungnōmē in Aristotle.Carissa Phillips-Garrett - 2017 - Apeiron 50 (3):311-333.
    Aristotle claims that in some extenuating circumstances, the correct response to the wrongdoer is sungnōmē rather than blame. Sungnōmē has a wide spectrum of meanings that include aspects of sympathy, pity, fellow-feeling, pardon, and excuse, but the dominant interpretation among scholars takes Aristotle’s meaning to correspond most closely to forgiveness. Thus, it is commonly held that the virtuous Aristotelian agent ought to forgive wrongdoers in specific extenuating circumstances. Against the more popular forgiveness interpretation, I begin by defending a positive account (...)
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  • Choice and Action in Aristotle.A. W. Price - 2016 - Phronesis 61 (4):435-462.
    There is a current debate about the grammar of intention: do I intend to φ, or that I φ? The equivalent question in Aristotle relates especially to choice. I argue that, in the context of practical reasoning, choice, as also wish, has as its object an act. I then explore the role that this plays within his account of the relation of thought to action. In particular, I discuss the relation of deliberation to the practical syllogism, and the thesis that (...)
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  • What Aristotelian Decisions Cannot Be.Jozef Müller - 2016 - Ancient Philosophy 36 (1):173-195.
    I argue that Aristotelian decisions (προαιρέσεις) cannot be conceived of as based solely on wish (βούλησις) and deliberation (βούλευσις), as the standard picture (most influentially argued for in Anscombe's "Thought and Action in Aristotle", in R. Bambrough ed. New Essays on Plato and Aristotle. London: Routledge, 1965) suggests. Although some features of the standard view are correct (such as that decisions have essential connection to deliberation and that wish always plays a crucial role in the formation of a decision), Aristotelian (...)
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  • Aristotle, Akrasia, and the Place of Desire in Moral Reasoning.Byron J. Stoyles - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (2):195-207.
    This paper serves both as a discussion of Henry’s (Ethical Theory Moral Practice, 5:255–270, 2002) interpretation of Aristotle on the possibility of akrasia – knowing something is wrong and doing it anyway – and an indication of the importance of desire in Aristotle’s account of moral reasoning. As I will explain, Henry’s interpretation is advantageous for the reason that it makes clear how Aristotle could have made good sense of genuine akrasia, a phenomenon that we seem to observe in the (...)
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  • Stoics Against Stoics In Cudworth's A Treatise of Freewill.John Sellars - 2012 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 20 (5):935-952.
    In his A Treatise of Freewill, Ralph Cudworth argues against Stoic determinism by drawing on what he takes to be other concepts found in Stoicism, notably the claim that some things are ?up to us? and that these things are the product of our choice. These concepts are central to the late Stoic Epictetus and it appears at first glance as if Cudworth is opposing late Stoic voluntarism against early Stoic determinism. This paper argues that in fact, despite his claim (...)
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  • The Practical Syllogism in Aristotle: A New Interpretation.Anthony W. Price - 2008 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11 (1):151-162.
    Does Aristotle by his phrase “syllogisms of things to be done” mean syllogisms of a distinctive and inherently practical content, perhaps syllogisms subject to an unfamiliar logic? Or does he just mean syllogisms that are relevant in contexts concerning what to do next? I propose the second interpretation, taking the syllogisms in question to constitute the deductive kernel of stretches of practical thinking. They are pieces of deduction that take on a practical function in context.
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  • (2 other versions)The Ethical Syllogism.Paula Gottlieb - 2008 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11 (1):197-212.
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  • Aristoteles’ praktische Syllogismen in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts.Klaus Corcilius - 2008 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 11 (1):101-132.
    After a short description of the Aristotelian examples for practical syllogisms, the essay gives an overview of the interpretations of the practical syllogism since the 1950s. These interpretations can be divided into two main groups: while the first group connects the practical syllogism with practical thinking, the second, smaller group considers it as an illustration of the causal explananation of actions. The essay closes with some remarks on the reasons for these different interpretations.
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  • “Two Types of Wisdom”.Jason Baehr - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (2):81-97.
    The concept of wisdom is largely ignored by contemporary philosophers. But given recent movements in the fields of ethics and epistemology, the time is ripe for a return to this concept. This article lays some groundwork for further philosophical work in ethics and epistemology on wisdom. Its focus is the distinction between practical wisdom and theoretical wisdom or between phronesis and sophia . Several accounts of this distinction are considered and rejected. A more plausible, but also considerably more complex, account (...)
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  • On Acting Against One's Best Judgement: A Social Constructionist Interpretation for the Akrasia Problem.Diego Romaioli, Elena Faccio & Alessandro Salvini - 2008 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 38 (2):179-192.
    Akrasia is a philosophical concept meaning the possibility to perform actions against one's best judgement. This contribution aims to clarify this phenomenon in terms of a social construction, stating it as a narrative configuration generated by an observer. The latter finds himself engaged in justifying a “problematic” line of action with regard to specific cultural beliefs referring to the self, the others and the behaviour. This paper intends to make explicit the assumptions underlying the traditional definitions of akrasia when, paradoxically, (...)
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  • (1 other version)Phantasía logistikē in the Configuration of Desire in Aristotle.Claudia Carbonell - 2013 - Ideas Y Valores 62 (152):133-158.
    RESUMEN En De Anima III 10, Aristóteles introduce la noción de phantasía logistikē como uno de los principios de la acción racional. A partir de la exposición de algunos textos del De Anima y de Ética a Nicómaco, se busca interpretar el lugar de aquel tipo de imaginación en el razonamiento práctico. Para ello, se presenta primero la doctrina aristotélica de los principios de la acción y la problemática de su articulación, y luego se discute el papel de la imaginación (...)
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  • Social and Justified Legal Normativity: Unlocking the Mystery of the Relationship.Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco - 2012 - Ratio Juris 25 (3):409-433.
    Can Hart's non-cognitivism be reconciled with his rejection of the predictive and sanction-based explanations of law? This paper analyses Hart's notion of the internal point of view and focuses on the notion of acceptance of a rule along the lines of a non-cognitivist understanding of intentional actions. It is argued that a non-cognitivist analysis of acceptance of rules is incomplete and parasitic on a more basic or primary model of acceptance that does not involve mental states. This basic or primary (...)
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  • Augustine, Arendt, and anthropy.Barry Clarke & Lawrence Quill - 2009 - Sophia 48 (3):253-265.
    Arendt’s theoretical influence is generally traced to Heidegger and experientially to the traumatic events that occurred in Europe during the Second World War. Here, we suggest that Arendt’s conception of politics may be usefully enriched via a proto-anthropic principle found in Augustine and adopted by Arendt throughout her writings. By appealing to this anthropic principle; that without a spectator there could be no world; a profound connection is made between the ‘cosmic jackpot’ of life in the universe and the uniquely (...)
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  • An All-inclusive Interpretation of Aristotle’s Contemplative Life.Wei Liu - 2011 - Sophia 50 (1):57-71.
    The debate between ‘inclusive’ and ‘dominant’ interpretations of Aristotle's concept of happiness (eudaimonia) has become one of the thorniest problems of Aristotle interpretation. In this paper, I attempt to solve this problem by presenting a multi-step argument for an ‘all-inclusive’ thesis, i.e., the Aristotelian philosopher or contemplator, in the strict sense, is someone who already possesses all the intellectual virtues (except technē), all the moral virtues (by way of the possession of phronēsis), and considerable other goods. If this thesis is (...)
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  • Aristotle on Thumos.Patricia Marechal - 2024 - Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Mind 4:517-541.
    This paper argues that Aristotelian thumos is a non-reducible mental phenomenon that plays a central role in Aristotle’s theory of the mind, motivation, and action. For Aristotle, thumos is not primarily, as others have argued, a desire for the noble, social appraisal, or retaliation; rather, it is an inner drive or impulse to act. More precisely, it is an executory urge to implement or enact one’s ends or goals, whatever they are. Thumos accounts for someone’s proneness to spring into action (...)
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  • Responsibility and Justice in Aristotle’s Non-Voluntary and Mixed Actions.Andre Santos Campos - 2013 - Journal of Ancient Philosophy 7 (2):100.
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  • Could a robot flirt? 4E cognition, reactive attitudes, and robot autonomy.Charles Lassiter - 2022 - AI and Society 37 (2):675-686.
    In this paper, I develop a view about machine autonomy grounded in the theoretical frameworks of 4E cognition and PF Strawson’s reactive attitudes. I begin with critical discussion of White, and conclude that his view is strongly committed to functionalism as it has developed in mainstream analytic philosophy since the 1950s. After suggesting that there is good reason to resist this view by appeal to developments in 4E cognition, I propose an alternative view of machine autonomy. Namely, machines count as (...)
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  • Aristotle's Functional Theory of the Emotions.Angela Chew - 2009 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 16 (1):5-37.
    Placing Aristotle’s ethical works in dialogue with the work of G.E.M. Anscombe, this paper outlines a functional definition of emotions that describes a meta-theory for social-scientific research. Emotions are defined as what makes the thought and action of rational and political animals ethical.
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  • On Conscience and Prudence.Mark Sultana - 2015 - Heythrop Journal 56 (4):619-628.
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  • Overstraining Human Nature in the Nicomachean Ethics.Doug Reed - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (1):45-67.
    In this paper, I investigate Aristotle’s claim in 'Nicomachean Ethics' III.1 about situations that “overstrain human nature.” By setting out and answering several interpretative questions about such situations, I offer a comprehensive interpretation of this passage. I argue that in (at least some of) these cases, the agent voluntarily does something wrong, even though there is a right action available. Furthermore, I argue that Aristotle would think it is possible for a rare agent to perform the right action in (at (...)
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  • Practical reason and mathematical argument.John O'Neill - 1998 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 29 (2):195-205.
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  • Colloquium 6: Was Aristotle a Particularist?A. W. Price - 2006 - Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 21 (1):191-233.
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  • On Practical Abduction.Risto Hilpinen - 2007 - Theoria 73 (3):207-220.
    In this paper practical reasoning is understood in the Aristotelian sense as reasoning leading to action or to an intention to do something. Georg Henrik von Wright and a number of other philosophers have tried to assimilate certain forms of such reasoning to deductive reasoning. Many examples of practical reasoning, including some examples given by Aristotle, do not fit a deductive or quasi‐deductive model. It is argued that instances of good practical reasoning often resemble abductive rather than deductive or inductive (...)
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  • Prudence: Aristotelian perspectives on practical reason.Nick Haslam - 1991 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 21 (2):151–169.
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  • Human Habitat, Space and Place.Miquel Bastons & Jaume Armengou - 2016 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 29 (4):559-570.
    This article is a conceptual contribution on how to make human habitat more sustainable. Taking Heidegger’s conception of “dwelling” as a starting point, a new form of understanding the organization of the city as a human habitat is proposed. It is argued that human habitat is today in crisis and that such crisis has its roots in a spatial understanding of human dwelling, disregarding its temporal-historical dimension. For long time, the city has been considered as a physical “place” and its (...)
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  • Virtue reversed: Principal argumentative vices in political debate.Christian Kock - unknown
    Contributing to an understanding of the true virtues of argumentation, this paper sketches and exemplifies a theoretically reasoned but simple typology of argumentative vices or ‘malpractices’ that are rampant in political debate in modern democracies. The typology reflects, in negative, a set of argumentative norms, thus making a bid for something that civic instruction might profitably teach students at all levels about deliberative democracy.
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