Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Metaphysics and Conceptual Analysis: Experimental Philosophy's Place under the Sun.Uriah Kriegel - 2017 - In David Rose (ed.), Experimental Metaphysics. New York: Bloomsbury Academic. pp. 7-46.
    What is the rationale for the methodological innovations of experimental philosophy? This paper starts from the contention that common answers to this question are implausible. It then develops a framework within which experimental philosophy fulfills a specific function in an otherwise traditionalist picture of philosophical inquiry. The framework rests on two principal ideas. The first is Frank Jackson’s claim that conceptual analysis is unavoidable in ‘serious metaphysics’. The second is that the psychological structure of concepts is extremely intricate, much more (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Descriptions.P. Elbourne - 2012 - In Ed Zalta (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Interactive Realism.Emma Ruttkamp - 2011 - South African Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):41-52.
    I investigate a new understanding of realism in science, referred to as ‘interactive realism’, and I suggest the ‘evolutionary progressiveness’ of a theory as novel criterion for this kind of realism. My basic claim is that we cannot be realists about anything except the progress affected by myriad science-reality interactions that are constantly moving on a continuum of increased ‘fitness’ determined according to empirical constraints. Moreover to reflect this movement accurately, there is a corresponding continuum of verdicts about the status (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Realism bit by bit: Part II. Disjunctive partial reference.Christina McLeish - 2006 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 37 (2):171-190.
    In this second paper, I continue my discussion of the problem of reference for scientific realism. First, I consider a final objection to Kitcher’s account of reference, which I generalise to other accounts of reference. Such accounts make attributions of reference by appeal to our pretheoretical intuitions about how true statements ought to be distibuted among the scientific utterances of the past. I argue that in the cases that merit discussion, this strategy fails because our intuitions are unstable. The interesting (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Belief-that and Belief-in: Which Reductive Analysis?Uriah Kriegel - 2018 - In Alex Gzrankowski & Michelle Montague (eds.), Non-Propositional Intentionality. pp. 192-213.
    Let propositionalism be the thesis that all mental attitudes are propositional. Anti-propositionalists typically point at apparently non-propositional attitudes, such as fearing a dog and loving a spouse, and play defense against attempts at propositional analysis of such attitudes. Here I explore the anti-propositionalist’s prospects for going on the offensive, trying to show that some apparently propositional attitudes, notably belief and judgment, can be given non-propositional analysis. Although the notion that belief is a non-propositional attitude may seem ludicrous at first, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The 'Gödel' effect.Gary Ostertag - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):65-82.
    In their widely discussed paper, “Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style”, Machery et al. argue that Kripke’s Gödel–Schmidt case, generally thought to undermine the description theory of names, rests on culturally variable intuitions: while Western subjects’ intuitions conflict with the description theory of names, those of East Asian subjects do not. Machery et al. attempt to explain this discrepancy by appealing to differences between Western and East Asian modes of categorization, as identified in an influential study by Nisbett et al. I claim that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Theoretical terms without analytic truths.Michael Strevens - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):167-190.
    When new theoretical terms are introduced into scientific discourse, prevailing accounts imply, analytic or semantic truths come along with them, by way of either definitions or reference-fixing descriptions. But there appear to be few or no analytic truths in scientific theory, which suggests that the prevailing accounts are mistaken. This paper looks to research on the psychology of natural kind concepts to suggest a new account of the introduction of theoretical terms that avoids both definition and reference-fixing description. At the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Against causal descriptivism.Panu Raatikainen - 2006 - Mind and Society 5 (1):78-84.
    Causal descriptivism and its relative nominal descriptivism are critically examined. It is argued that they do not manage to undermine the principal conclusions of the new theory of reference.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference.Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):121 - 137.
    My main aim in this paper is to clarify the concepts of referential success and of referential continuity that are so crucial to the scientific realism debate. I start by considering the three dominant theories of reference and the intuitions that motivate each of them. Since several intuitions cited in support of one theory conflict with intuitions cited in support of another something has to give way. The traditional policy has been to reject all intuitions that clash with a chosen (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • (1 other version)Reference and description revisited.Frank Jackson - 1998 - Philosophical Perspectives 12:201-218.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   127 citations  
  • Kitcher on reference.Stathis Psillos - 1997 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 11 (3):259 – 272.
    In his (1978) and parts of (1993), Philip Kitcher advances a new context-sensitive theory of reference which he applies to abandoned theoretical expression-types, such as Joseph Priestley’s ‘dephlogisticated air’, in order to show that, although qua types they fail to refer uniformly, they nonetheless have referential tokens. This piece offers a critical examination of Kitcher’s theory. After a general investigation into the overall adequacy of Kitcher’s theory as a general account of reference, I focus on the case of abandoned theoretical (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   15 citations  
  • From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis.Frank Jackson - 1998 - New York: Oxford University Press.
    Frank Jackson champions the cause of conceptual analysis as central to philosophical inquiry. In recent years conceptual analysis has been undervalued and widely misunderstood, suggests Jackson. He argues that such analysis is mistakenly clouded in mystery, preventing a whole range of important questions from being productively addressed. He anchors his argument in discussions of specific philosophical issues, starting with the metaphysical doctrine of physicalism and moving on, via free will, meaning, personal identity, motion, and change, to ethics and the philosophy (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1061 citations  
  • (1 other version)Pretence fictionalism about the non-present.Kristie Miller - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1825-1859.
    Presentists hold that only present things exist. But we all, presentists included, utter sentences that appear to involve quantification over non-present objects, and so we all, presentists included, seem to commit ourselves to such objects. Equally, we all, presentists included, take utterances of many past-tensed (and some future-tensed) sentences to be true. But if no past or future things exist, it’s hard to see how there can be anything that those utterances are about, which makes them true. This paper presents (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Referencia - preprint.Genoveva Martí - forthcoming - In Temas de Filosofía del Lenguaje.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Is Intentionality a Relation? A Dialogue.David Bourget & Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - Argumenta.
    This dialogue explores the question of whether intentionality—the “ofness”, “aboutness”, or “directedness” of mental states—is a relation. We explore three views: the Naive View, on which intentionality is a relation to ordinary, everyday objects, facts, and other such items; the Abstract Contents View, on which intentionality is a relation to mind-independent abstract entities that are our contents; and the Aspect View, on which intentionality is a matter of having intentional states with particular (non-relational) aspects that are our contents. We consider (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Samethinking.Romain Bourdoncle - 2022 - Dissertation, École Normale Supérieure
    This thesis investigates the nature of the relation between mental representations in successful verbal communication, thought attribution, agreement, and disagreement — a relation which I call “samethinking”. The nature of samethinking raises several foundational questions about the nature of (non-natural) meaning, and the cognitive underpinnings of the emergence of culture. It bears on long-lasting puzzles in the philosophy of mind and language (such as Frege’s puzzle and Kripke’s puzzle about belief). Samethinking does not amount to sharing a reference (with “sharing" (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Kripkean argument for descriptivism.Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):654-669.
    In this paper, we offer a novel defense of descriptivism about reference. Our argument is based on principles about the relevance of speaker intentions to reference that are shared by many opponents of descriptivism, including Saul Kripke. We first show that two such principles that are plausibly endorsed by Kripke and other prominent externalists in fact entail descriptivism. The first principle states that when certain kinds of speaker intentions are present, they suffice to determine and explain reference. According to the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • In Defense of Semantic Externalism.Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - E-Logos 27 (2):57-70.
    The most popular and influential strategies used against semantic externalism and the causal theory of reference are critically examined. It is argued that upon closer scrutiny, none of them emerges as truly convincing.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Como os Nomes Nomeiam: Um Passeio Filosófico Sobre a Referência.Sagid Salles - 2020 - Pelotas: UFPel.
    Uma das características mais interessantes da filosofia é sua capacidade de revelar problemas difíceis em lugares inesperados. É precisamente isto que ocorre com o caso dos nomes próprios. Usamos nomes cotidianamente para selecionar ou fazer referência a objetos particulares, e depois podermos dizer algo sobre eles. Talvez o leitor diga a um colega que gostaria de estar tomando um café em Paris, ao invés de gastar tempo lendo mais um livro de filosofia. Neste caso, estará usando o nome “Paris” para (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Turning Aboutness About.Alexander Sandgren - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1):136-155.
    There are two families of influential and stubborn puzzles that many theories of aboutness (intentionality) face: underdetermination puzzles and puzzles concerning representations that appear to be about things that do not exist. I propose an approach that elegantly avoids both kinds of puzzle. The central idea is to explain aboutness (the relation supposed to stand between thoughts and terms and their objects) in terms of relations of co-aboutness (the relation of being about the same thing that stands between the thoughts (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Nomes Próprios: por que a teoria causal de Perry não dá conta da retenção de crenças.Sagid Salles - 2016 - Investigação Filosófica 4:6-29.
    Tenho dois objetivos principais neste texto. Primeiro, defenderei que a versão de Perry da teoria causal da referência não dá conta de casos de retenção de crença. Faço isto por meio de um contraexemplo à teoria de Perry. Segundo, defenderei que uma versão específica de teoria da identificação é capaz de lidar com o contraexemplo apresentado e, neste sentido, é superior à teoria de Perry.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Realism, reference & perspective.Carl Hoefer & Genoveva Martí - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (3):1-22.
    This paper continues the defense of a version of scientific realism, Tautological Scientific Realism, that rests on the claim that, excluding some areas of fundamental physics about which doubts are entirely justified, many areas of contemporary science cannot be coherently imagined to be false other than via postulation of radically skeptical scenarios, which are not relevant to the realism debate in philosophy of science. In this paper we discuss, specifically, the threats of meaning change and reference failure associated with the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Idealist Origins: 1920s and Before.Martin Davies & Stein Helgeby - 2014 - In Graham Oppy & Nick Trakakis (eds.), History of Philosophy in Australia and New Zealand. Dordrecht: Springer. pp. 15-54.
    This paper explores early Australasian philosophy in some detail. Two approaches have dominated Western philosophy in Australia: idealism and materialism. Idealism was prevalent between the 1880s and the 1930s, but dissipated thereafter. Idealism in Australia often reflected Kantian themes, but it also reflected the revival of interest in Hegel through the work of ‘absolute idealists’ such as T. H. Green, F. H. Bradley, and Henry Jones. A number of the early New Zealand philosophers were also educated in the idealist tradition (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?Panu Raatikainen - 2020 - In Andrea Bianchi (ed.), Language and reality from a naturalistic perspective: Themes from Michael Devitt. Cham: Springer. pp. 69–103.
    The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Realism about What? Unobservable Entities and the Metaphysics of Modality.Bruno Borge - 2016 - Filosofia Unisinos 17 (1):69-74.
    Most philosophers who advocate Scientific Realism endorse also Modal Realism, i.e., assume commitments with objective modality. However, the precise relationship between these positions has been scarcely explored. In this paper I argue that there is an indirect implication from SR to MR. Although the basic thesis of SR does not imply MR, both the main argument for SR and the best realist theory of reference do imply modal commitments.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3677-3695.
    Geach points out that some pairs of beliefs have a common focus despite there being, apparently, no object at that focus. For example, two or more beliefs can be directed at Vulcan even though there is no such planet. Geach introduced the label ‘intentional identity’ to pick out the relation that holds between attitudes in these cases; Geach says that ’[w]e have intentional identity when a number of people, or one person on different occasions, have attitudes with a common focus, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Metasemantics and Metaethics.Laura Schroeter & Francois Schroeter - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 519-535.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Speaker’s Reference, Semantic Reference, and Intuition.Richard G. Heck - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):251-269.
    Some years ago, Machery, Mallon, Nichols, and Stich reported the results of experiments that reveal, they claim, cross-cultural differences in speaker’s ‘intuitions’ about Kripke’s famous Gödel–Schmidt case. Several authors have suggested, however, that the question they asked their subjects is ambiguous between speaker’s reference and semantic reference. Machery and colleagues have since made a number of replies. It is argued here that these are ineffective. The larger lesson, however, concerns the role that first-order philosophy should, and more importantly should not, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • The Mill-Frege Theory of Proper Names.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Mind 127 (508):1107-1168.
    This paper argues for a version of metalinguistic descriptivism, the Mill-Frege view, comparing it to a currently popular alternative, predicativism. The Mill-Frege view combines tenets of Fregean views with features of the theory of direct reference. According to it, proper names have metalinguistic senses, known by competent speakers on the basis of their competence, which figure in ancillary presuppositions. In support of the view the paper argues that the name-bearing relation—which predicativists cite to account for the properties that they take (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   25 citations  
  • Actually-Rigidified Descriptivism Revisited.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (1):5-21.
    In response to Kripke's modal argument contemporary descriptivists suggest that referring terms, e.g., ‘water’, are synonymous with actually-rigidified definite descriptions, e.g., ‘the actual watery stuff’. Following Scott Soames, this strategy has the counterintuitive consequence that possible speakers on Perfect Earth cannot be ascribed water-beliefs without beliefs about the actual world. Co-indexing the actuality and possibility operators has the equally untoward result that possible speakers on Twin Earth are ascribed water-beliefs. So, Soames's dilemma is that the descriptivist can account for either (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Cruel Intensions: An Essay on Intentional Identity and Intentional Attitudes.Alexander Sandgren - 2016 - Dissertation, The Australian National University
    Some intentional attitudes (beliefs, fears, desires, etc.) have a common focus in spite of there being no object at that focus. For example, two beliefs may be about the same witch even when there are no witches, different astronomers had beliefs directed at Vulcan, even though there is no such planet. This relation of having a common focus, whether or not there is an actual concrete object at that focus, is called intentional identity. In the first part of this thesis (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Causing Trouble: Theories of Reference and Theory of Mind.J. Robert Thompson - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (1):119-130.
    Michael and MacLeod’s paper on theories of reference for intentional concepts addresses neglected connections between theories of reference and Theory of Mind debates. Unfortunately, their paper neither shows the negative effects of descriptivism on theories of reference for intentional concepts nor provides an adequate picture of how the sort of theory they advocate might explain either the reference of intentional concepts or the puzzles of development on which they focus. In this article, I give reasons to think that the prospects (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Methodological realism and modal resourcefulness: out of the web and into the mine.Lydia Patton - 2015 - Synthese 192 (11):3443-3462.
    Psillos, Kitcher, and Leplin have defended convergent scientific realism against the pessimistic meta-induction by arguing for the divide et impera strategy. I argue that DEI faces a problem more serious than the pessimistic meta-induction: the problem of accretion. When empirically successful theories and principles are combined, they may no longer make successful predictions or allow for accurate calculations, or the combination otherwise may be an empirical failure. The shift from classical mechanics to the new quantum theory does not reflect the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Reference and Modality: A Theory of Intensions.Alik Pelman - 2007 - Dissertation, University of London, Ucl
    The study of reference often leads to addressing fundamental issues in semantics, metaphysics and epistemology; this suggests that reference is closely linked to the three realms. The overall purpose of this study is to elucidate the structure of some of these links, through a close examination of the “mechanism” of reference. As in many other enquiries, considering the possible (i.e., the modal,) in addition to the actual proves very helpful in clarifying and explicating insights. The reference of a term with (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Names and natural kind terms.David Braun - 2005 - In Ernie Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 490--515.
    Names and natural kind terms have long been a major focus of debates about meaning and reference. This article discusses some of the theories and arguments that have appeared in those debates. It is remarkably difficult to say what names are without making controversial theoretical assumptions. This article does not attempt to do so here. It instead relies on paradigm examples that nearly all theorists would agree are proper names, for instance, ‘Aristotle’, ‘Mark Twain’, ‘London’, ‘Venus’, and ‘Pegasus’. All of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   12 citations  
  • Are Natural Kind Terms Ambiguous?Jussi Haukioja, Jeske Toorman, Giosuè Baggio & Jussi Jylkkä - 2023 - Cognitive Science 47 (9):e13335.
    Recent experimental studies have claimed to find evidence for the view that natural kind terms such as “water” are ambiguous: that they have two extensions, one determined by superficial properties, the other by underlying essence. In an online experiment, we presented to 600 participants scenarios describing discoveries of novel samples that differ in deep structure from samples of a familiar kind but are superficially identical, such as a water-like substance that is not composed of H2O. We used three different types (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Judgements of Co-Identification.Stacie Friend - forthcoming - In Alex Grzankowski & Anthony Savile (eds.), Thought: its Origin and Reach. Essays in Honour of Mark Sainsbury. Routledge.
    A popular way for irrealists to explain co-identification—thinking and talking ‘about the same thing’ when there is no such thing—is by appeal to causal, historical or informational chains, networks or practices. Recently, however, this approach has come under attack by philosophers who contend that it cannot provide necessary and/or sufficient conditions for co-identification. In this paper I defend the approach against these objections. My claim is not that the appeal to such practices can provide necessary and sufficient conditions for co-identification, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Content internalism and testimonial knowledge.Joey Pollock - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (6):1947-1968.
    It is commonly assumed that content preservation is required for success in testimonial exchanges. Many content internalists, however, cannot endorse this assumption. They must claim instead that testimonial exchanges can often succeed when the content grasped by the hearer is not the content of the speaker’s testimony, p, but some merely similar content, p*. Goldberg (2007. Anti-Individualism: Mind and Language, Knowledge and Justification. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) argues that this internalist approach is epistemically problematic: it cannot maintain certain features thought (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2021 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.
    Can humans and artificial intelligences share concepts and communicate? Making AI Intelligible shows that philosophical work on the metaphysics of meaning can help answer these questions. Herman Cappelen and Josh Dever use the externalist tradition in philosophy to create models of how AIs and humans can understand each other. In doing so, they illustrate ways in which that philosophical tradition can be improved. The questions addressed in the book are not only theoretically interesting, but the answers have pressing practical implications. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Which witch is which? Exotic objects and intentional identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):721-739.
    This paper is about intentional identity, the phenomenon of intentional attitudes having a common focus. I present an argument against an approach to explaining intentional identity, defended by Nathan Salmon, Terence Parsons and others, that involves positing exotic objects. For example, those who adopt this sort of view say that when two astronomers had beliefs about Vulcan, their attitudes had a common focus because there is an exotic object that both of their beliefs were about. I argue that countenancing these (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Theories of reference and the philosophy of science.Panu Raatikainen - 2008
    It has sometimes been suggested that the so-called new theory of reference (NTR) would provide an alternative picture of meaning and reference which avoids the unwelcome consequences of the meaning-variance thesis and incommesurability. However, numerous philosophers of science have been quite critical towards the idea and NTR in general. It is argued that many of them have an over-simplified and, in part, mistaken understanding of what NTR amounts to. It is submitted that NTR, when correctly understood, can be an important (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • The subsumption of reference.David Braddon-Mitchell - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (1):157-178.
    How can the reference of theoretical terms be stable over changes of theory? I defend an approach to this that does not depend on substantive metasemantic theories of reference. It relies on the idea that in contexts of use, terms may play a role in a theory that in turn points to a further (possibly unknown) theory. Empirical claims are claims about the nature of the further theories, and the falsification of these further theories is understood not as showing that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   13 citations  
  • Reference, contingency, and the two-dimensional framework.Martin Davies - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 118 (1-2):83-131.
    I review and reconsider some of the themes of ‘Two notions of necessity’ (Davies and Humberstone, 1980) and attempt to reach a deeper understanding and appreciation of Gareth Evans’s reflections (in ‘Reference and contingency’, 1979) on both modality and reference. My aim is to plot the relationships between the notions of necessity that Humberstone and I characterised in terms of operators in two-dimensional modal logic, the notions of superficial and deep necessity that Evans himself described, and the epistemic notion of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   30 citations  
  • Semanttisen eksternalismin puolustus.Panu Raatikainen - 2019 - Ajatus 76 (1):11–36.
    Suosituimpia ja vaikutusvaltaisimpia semanttista eksternalismia ja kausaalista viittaamisen teoriaa vastaan käytettyjä strategioita arvioidaan kriittisesti. Tarkemmassa tarkastelussa mikään niistä ei osoittaudu erityisen vakuuttavaksi.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • ‘Knowledge’ as a natural kind term.Victor Kumar - 2014 - Synthese 191 (3):439-457.
    Naturalists who conceive of knowledge as a natural kind are led to treat ‘knowledge’ as a natural kind term. ‘Knowledge,’ then, must behave semantically in the ways that seem to support a direct reference theory for other natural kind terms. A direct reference theory for ‘knowledge,’ however, appears to leave open too many possibilities about the identity of knowledge. Intuitively, states of belief count as knowledge only if they meet epistemic criteria, not merely if they bear a causal/historical relation to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Epistemic Two-Dimensionalism and Arguments from Epistemic Misclassification.Edward Elliott, Kelvin McQueen & Clas Weber - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):375-389.
    According to Epistemic Two-Dimensional Semantics (E2D), expressions have a counterfactual intension and an epistemic intension. Epistemic intensions reflect cognitive significance such that sentences with necessary epistemic intensions are a priori. We defend E2D against an influential line of criticism: arguments from epistemic misclassification. We focus in particular on the arguments of Speaks [2010] and Schroeter [2005]. Such arguments conclude that E2D is mistaken from (i) the claim that E2D is committed to classifying certain sentences as a priori, and (ii) the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Descriptions.Peter Ludlow - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   36 citations  
  • Introduction: Individual Concepts in Language and Thought.Tadeusz Ciecierski & Paweł Grabarczyk - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):349-356.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Philosophy, Drama and Literature.Rick Benitez - 2010 - In Graham Robert Oppy, Nick Trakakis, Lynda Burns, Steven Gardner & Fiona Leigh (eds.), A companion to philosophy in Australia & New Zealand. Clayton, Victoria, Australia: Monash University Publishing. pp. 371-372.
    Philosophy and Literature is an internationally renowned refereed journal founded by Denis Dutton at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch. It is now published by the Johns Hopkins University Press. Since its inception in 1976, Philosophy and Literature has been concerned with the relation between literary and philosophical studies, publishing articles on the philosophical interpretation of literature as well as the literary treatment of philosophy. Philosophy and Literature has sometimes been regarded as iconoclastic, in the sense that it repudiates academic pretensions, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • (1 other version)Does causal descriptivism solve the problem of reference of theoretical terms?Bruno Borge - 2017 - Ideas Y Valores 66 (163):125-151.
    RESUMEN Las teorías de la referencia puramente descriptivistas o causales fracasan a la hora de dar cuenta del modo en que se fija y puede rastrearse la referencia de los términos teóricos. Psillos propuso dos versiones del descriptivismo causal que recogen argumentos presentes en defensas previas de dicha posición. Se trata de una teoría mixta que pretende solucionar el problema y acomodarse a intuiciones presentes en enfoques alternativos, como el que apela a oraciones de Ramsey. El artículo se propone mostrar (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation