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  1. Freedom, self-prediction, and the possibility of time travel.Alison Fernandes - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):89-108.
    Do time travellers retain their normal freedom and abilities when they travel back in time? Lewis, Horwich and Sider argue that they do. Time-travelling Tim can kill his young grandfather, his younger self, or whomever else he pleases—and so, it seems can reasonably deliberate about whether to do these things. He might not succeed. But he is still just as free as a non-time traveller. I’ll disagree. The freedom of time travellers is limited by a rational constraint. Tim can’t reasonably (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.
    Bayesians since Savage (1972) have appealed to asymptotic results to counter charges of excessive subjectivity. Their claim is that objectionable differences in prior probability judgments will vanish as agents learn from evidence, and individual agents will converge to the truth. Glymour (1980), Earman (1992) and others have voiced the complaint that the theorems used to support these claims tell us, not how probabilities updated on evidence will actually}behave in the limit, but merely how Bayesian agents believe they will behave, suggesting (...)
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  • Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.
    For two ideally rational agents, does learning a finite amount of shared evidence necessitate agreement? No. But does it at least guard against belief polarization, the case in which their opinions get further apart? No. OK, but are rational agents guaranteed to avoid polarization if they have access to an infinite, increasing stream of shared evidence? No.
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  • A Deliberative Approach to Causation.Fernandes Alison Sutton - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):686-708.
    Fundamental physics makes no clear use of causal notions; it uses laws that operate in relevant respects in both temporal directions and that relate whole systems across times. But by relating causation to evidence, we can explain how causation fits in to a physical picture of the world and explain its temporal asymmetry. This paper takes up a deliberative approach to causation, according to which causal relations correspond to the evidential relations we need when we decide on one thing in (...)
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  • Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (4):1205-1230.
    Traditional Bayesianism requires that an agent’s degrees of belief be represented by a real-valued, probabilistic credence function. However, in many cases it seems that our evidence is not rich enough to warrant such precision. In light of this, some have proposed that we instead represent an agent’s degrees of belief as a set of credence functions. This way, we can respect the evidence by requiring that the set, often called the agent’s credal state, includes all credence functions that are in (...)
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  • Knowledge attribution revisited: a deflationary account.Eleonora Cresto - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3737-3753.
    According to the usual way of understanding how true knowledge attribution works, it is not right to attribute knowledge of p to S unless p is true and S is justified in believing p. This assumption seems to hold even if we shun away from the idea that we can give an analysis of knowledge in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions. I want to raise some suspicions on the correctness of this traditional picture. I suggest that justification is not (...)
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  • Introducción. La epistemología y el derecho.Andrés Páez - 2015 - In Andrés Páez (ed.), Hechos, evidencia y estándares de prueba. Ensayos de epistemología jurídica. Bogotá, D.C., Colombia: Ediciones Uniandes. pp. 1-12.
    Aunque el derecho probatorio y el derecho procesal se han dedicado desde siempre al estudio de los problemas relacionados con las pruebas y el establecimiento de los hechos en los procesos judiciales, el énfasis ha estado siempre en el aspecto formal, doctrinal y procedimental en detrimento de los fundamentos filosóficos y teóricos. Durante los últimos años ha habido un intento sostenido de explorar estos fundamentos combinando no sólo las herramientas tradicionales proporcionadas por la lógica, la gramática y la retórica, sino (...)
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  • Probabilistic Reasoning in Cosmology.Yann Benétreau-Dupin - 2015 - Dissertation, The University of Western Ontario
    Cosmology raises novel philosophical questions regarding the use of probabilities in inference. This work aims at identifying and assessing lines of arguments and problematic principles in probabilistic reasoning in cosmology. -/- The first, second, and third papers deal with the intersection of two distinct problems: accounting for selection effects, and representing ignorance or indifference in probabilistic inferences. These two problems meet in the cosmology literature when anthropic considerations are used to predict cosmological parameters by conditionalizing the distribution of, e.g., the (...)
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  • Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.
    This paper considers two novel Bayesian responses to a well-known skeptical paradox. The paradox consists of three intuitions: first, given appropriate sense experience, we have justification for accepting the relevant proposition about the external world; second, we have justification for expanding the body of accepted propositions through known entailment; third, we do not have justification for accepting that we are not disembodied souls in an immaterial world deceived by an evil demon. The first response we consider rejects the third intuition (...)
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  • Reason Dethroned; Knowledge Regained.James Arthur Moore - 1991 - Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
    Hume held that we have no rational justification for our inductive beliefs. A more radical view is that we have no rational justification for any of our beliefs. This dissertation has two goals pertaining to this more radical view. // The first goal is to find a basis for constructive epistemology that is consistent with this view. This goal is first sought by considering externalist theories of knowledge since these do not require rational justification for knowledge. Externalist theories are defended (...)
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  • Transformative Decision Rules.Peterson Martin - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (1):71-85.
    A transformative decision rule transforms a given decision probleminto another by altering the structure of the initial problem,either by changing the framing or by modifying the probability orvalue assignments. Examples of decision rules belonging to thisclass are the principle of insufficient reason, Isaac Levi'scondition of E-admissibility, the de minimis rule, andthe precautionary principle. In this paper some foundationalissues concerning transformative decision rules are investigated,and a couple of formal properties of this class of rules areproved.
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  • What's in a link?Jerome A. Feldman - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):474-475.
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  • Coherence: Beyond constraint satisfaction.Gareth Gabrys & Alan Lesgold - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):475-475.
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  • Explanation and acceptability.Peter Achinstein - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):467-468.
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  • New science for old.Bruce Mangan & Stephen Palmer - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):480-482.
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  • Acceptability, analogy, and the acceptability of analogies.Robert N. McCauley - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):482-483.
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  • Probability and normativity.David Papineau - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):484-485.
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  • Does ECHO explain explanation? A psychological perspective.Joshua Klayman & Robin M. Hogarth - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):478-479.
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  • Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.
    Dilation occurs when an interval probability estimate of some event E is properly included in the interval probability estimate of E conditional on every event F of some partition, which means that one’s initial estimate of E becomes less precise no matter how an experiment turns out. Critics maintain that dilation is a pathological feature of imprecise probability models, while others have thought the problem is with Bayesian updating. However, two points are often overlooked: (1) knowing that E is stochastically (...)
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  • Belief Is Credence One (in Context).Roger Clarke - 2013 - Philosophers' Imprint 13:1-18.
    This paper argues for two theses: that degrees of belief are context sensitive; that outright belief is belief to degree 1. The latter thesis is rejected quickly in most discussions of the relationship between credence and belief, but the former thesis undermines the usual reasons for doing so. Furthermore, identifying belief with credence 1 allows nice solutions to a number of problems for the most widely-held view of the relationship between credence and belief, the threshold view. I provide a sketch (...)
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  • Explanatory coherence (plus commentary).Paul Thagard - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):435-467.
    This target article presents a new computational theory of explanatory coherence that applies to the acceptance and rejection of scientific hypotheses as well as to reasoning in everyday life, The theory consists of seven principles that establish relations of local coherence between a hypothesis and other propositions. A hypothesis coheres with propositions that it explains, or that explain it, or that participate with it in explaining other propositions, or that offer analogous explanations. Propositions are incoherent with each other if they (...)
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  • Epistemic entrenchment with incomparabilities and relational belief revision.Sten Lindström & Wlodek Rabinowicz - 1991 - In Andre Fuhrmann & Michael Morreau (eds.), The Logic of Theory Change: Workshop, Konstanz, FRG, October 13-15, 1989, Proceedings. Springer. pp. 93--126.
    In earlier papers (Lindström & Rabinowicz, 1989. 1990), we proposed a generalization of the AGM approach to belief revision. Our proposal was to view belief revision as a relation rather thanas a function on theories (or belief sets). The idea was to allow for there being several equally reasonable revisions of a theory with a given proposition. In the present paper, we show that the relational approach is the natural result of generalizing in a certain way an approach to belief (...)
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  • Reliabilism and the Value of Knowledge.Alvin I. Goldman & Erik J. Olsson - 2009 - In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & Duncan Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic value. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-41.
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  • Keynes, Uncertainty and Interest Rates.Brian Weatherson - 2002 - Cambridge Journal of Economics 26 (1):47-62.
    Uncertainty plays an important role in The General Theory, particularly in the theory of interest rates. Keynes did not provide a theory of uncertainty, but he did make some enlightening remarks about the direction he thought such a theory should take. I argue that some modern innovations in the theory of probability allow us to build a theory which captures these Keynesian insights. If this is the right theory, however, uncertainty cannot carry its weight in Keynes’s arguments. This does not (...)
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  • Begging the Question and Bayesians.Brian Weatherson - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30:687-697.
    The arguments for Bayesianism in the literature fall into three broad categories. There are Dutch Book arguments, both of the traditional pragmatic variety and the modern ‘depragmatised’ form. And there are arguments from the so-called ‘representation theorems’. The arguments have many similarities, for example they have a common conclusion, and they all derive epistemic constraints from considerations about coherent preferences, but they have enough differences to produce hostilities between their proponents. In a recent paper, Maher (1997) has argued that the (...)
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  • Inferential and non-inferential reasoning.Bart Streumer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):1-29.
    It is sometimes suggested that there are two kinds of reasoning: inferential reasoning and non-inferential reasoning. However, it is not entirely clear what the difference between these two kinds of reasoning is. In this paper, I try to answer the question what this difference is. I first discuss three answers to this question that I argue are unsatisfactory. I then give a different answer to this question, and I argue that this answer is satisfactory. I end by showing that this (...)
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  • Degree-of-belief and degree-of-support: Why bayesians need both notions.James Hawthorne - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):277-320.
    I argue that Bayesians need two distinct notions of probability. We need the usual degree-of-belief notion that is central to the Bayesian account of rational decision. But Bayesians also need a separate notion of probability that represents the degree to which evidence supports hypotheses. Although degree-of-belief is well suited to the theory of rational decision, Bayesians have tried to apply it to the realm of hypothesis confirmation as well. This double duty leads to the problem of old evidence, a problem (...)
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  • Changing the theory of theory change: Towards a computational approach.Neil Tennant - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (3):865-897.
    The Theory of theory change has contraction and revision as its central notions. Of these, contraction is the more fundamental. The best-known theory, due to Alchourrón, Gärdenfors, and Makinson, is based on a few central postulates. The most fundamental of these is the principle of recovery: if one contracts a theory with respect to a sentence, and then adds that sentence back again, one recovers the whole theory. Recovery is demonstrably false. This paper shows why, and investigates how one can (...)
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  • Why scientists gather evidence.Patrick Maher - 1990 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 41 (1):103-119.
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  • Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability.Antony Eagle - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.
    I argue that any broadly dispositional analysis of probability will either fail to give an adequate explication of probability, or else will fail to provide an explication that can be gainfully employed elsewhere (for instance, in empirical science or in the regulation of credence). The diversity and number of arguments suggests that there is little prospect of any successful analysis along these lines.
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  • (1 other version)Multi-agent Logics for Reasoning About Higher-Order Upper and Lower Probabilities.Dragan Doder, Nenad Savić & Zoran Ognjanović - 2020 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 29 (1):77-107.
    We present a propositional and a first-order logic for reasoning about higher-order upper and lower probabilities. We provide sound and complete axiomatizations for the logics and we prove decidability in the propositional case. Furthermore, we show that the introduced logics generalize some existing probability logics.
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  • Learning and Pooling, Pooling and Learning.Rush T. Stewart & Ignacio Ojea Quintana - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (3):1-21.
    We explore which types of probabilistic updating commute with convex IP pooling. Positive results are stated for Bayesian conditionalization, imaging, and a certain parameterization of Jeffrey conditioning. This last observation is obtained with the help of a slight generalization of a characterization of externally Bayesian pooling operators due to Wagner :336–345, 2009). These results strengthen the case that pooling should go by imprecise probabilities since no precise pooling method is as versatile.
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  • Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.
    There are two ways of representing rational belief: qualitatively as yes-or-no belief, and quantitatively as degrees of belief. Standard rationality conditions are: consistency and logical closure, for qualitative belief, satisfaction of the probability axioms, for quantitative belief, and a relationship between qualitative and quantitative beliefs in accordance with the Lockean thesis. In this paper, it is shown that these conditions are inconsistent with each of three further rationality conditions: fallibilism, open-mindedness, and invariance under independent conceptual expansions. Restrictions of the Lockean (...)
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  • Against boredom : 17 essays on ignorance, values, creativity, metaphysics, decision-making, truth, preference, art, processes, Ramsey, ethics, rationality, validity, human ills, science, and eternal life to Nils-Eric Sahlin on the occasion of his 60th birthday. [REVIEW]Johannes Persson, Göran Hermerén & Eva Sjöstrand - unknown
    in Undetermined Table d’Hôte Ingar Brinck: Investigating the development of creativity: The Sahlin hypothesis 7 Linus Broström: Known unknowns and proto-second-personal address in photographic art 25 Johan Brännmark: Critical moral thinking without moral theory 33 Martin Edman: Vad är ett missförhållande? 43 Pascal Engel: Rambling on the value of truth 51 Peter Gärdenfors: Ambiguity in decision making and the fear of being fooled 75 Göran Hermerén: NIPT: Ethical aspects 89 Mats Johansson: Roboethics: What problems should be addressed and why? 103 (...)
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  • Perception as Input and as Reason for Action.Isaac Levi - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1):135-154.
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  • (1 other version)Eric Martin and Daniel Osherson, Elements of Scientific Inquiry. Cambridge, MA: Bradford, MIT Press, 1998, cloth £23.95. ISBN: 0 262 13342 3. [REVIEW]Oliver Schulte - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):347-352.
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  • Assimilating evidence: The key to revision?Michelene T. H. Chi - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):470-471.
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  • Two problems for the explanatory coherence theory of acceptability.L. Jonathan Cohen - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):471-471.
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  • Extending explanatory coherence.Paul Thagard - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):490-502.
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  • Psychology, or sociology of science?N. E. Wetherick - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):489-489.
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  • Coherence and abduction.Paul O'Rorke - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):484-484.
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  • Explanatory coherence in understanding persons, interactions, and relationships.Stephen J. Read & Lynn C. Miller - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):485-486.
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  • Measuring the plausibility of explanatory hypotheses.James A. Reggia - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):486-487.
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  • (1 other version)Theory autonomy and future promise.Matti Sintonen - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):488-488.
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  • Inference to the best explanation is basic.John R. Josephson - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):477-478.
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  • Explanatory coherence in neural networks?Daniel S. Levine - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):479-479.
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  • Explanationism, ECHO, and the connectionist paradigm.William G. Lycan - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):480-480.
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  • What does explanatory coherence explain?Ronald N. Giere - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):475-476.
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  • Objective Bayesian Calibration and the Problem of Non-convex Evidence.Gregory Wheeler - 2012 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 63 (4):841-850.
    Jon Williamson's Objective Bayesian Epistemology relies upon a calibration norm to constrain credal probability by both quantitative and qualitative evidence. One role of the calibration norm is to ensure that evidence works to constrain a convex set of probability functions. This essay brings into focus a problem for Williamson's theory when qualitative evidence specifies non-convex constraints.
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  • The Paradoxes of Allais and Ellsberg.Isaac Levi - 1986 - Economics and Philosophy 2 (1):23.
    In The Enterprise of Knowledge, I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented approach (...)
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