- (1 other version)Permissiveness in morality and epistemology.Han Li & Bradford Saad - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (10):1861-1881.details
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How to be indifferent.Sebastian Liu - forthcoming - Noûs.details
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Permissivist Evidentialism.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - In Scott Stapleford, Kevin McCain & Matthias Steup (eds.), Evidentialism at 40: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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Bertrand’s Paradox and the Principle of Indifference.Nicholas Shackel - 2024 - Abingdon: Routledge.details
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Permissive Divergence.Simon Graf - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):240-255.details
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Norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Topics.details
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The Epistemological Subject(s) of Mathematics.Silvia De Toffoli - 2024 - In Bharath Sriraman (ed.), Handbook of the History and Philosophy of Mathematical Practice. Cham: Springer. pp. 1-27.details
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Center indifference and skepticism.David Builes - 2024 - Noûs 58 (3):778-798.details
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Permissivism and Intellectual Virtue.Troy Seagraves - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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A New Argument for Uniqueness about Evidential Support.Paul Forrester - forthcoming - Episteme:1-22.details
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Probability and Inductive Logic.Antony Eagle - manuscriptdetails
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Scepticism about epistemic blame.Tim Smartt - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (5):1813-1828.details
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The Uniqueness Thesis: A Hybrid Approach.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Sussexdetails
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(2 other versions)Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Immodesty and permissivism.Marc-Kevin Daoust & David Montminy - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-21.details
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):501-517.details
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EXTREME PERMISSIVISM REVISITED.Tamaz Tokhadze - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A1)5-26.details
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(2 other versions)Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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A Permissivist Defense of Pascal’s Wager.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2315-2340.details
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Are scrutability conditionals rationally deniable?Jens Kipper & Zeynep Soysal - 2021 - Analysis 81 (3):452-461.details
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Epistemic Value, Duty, and Virtue.Guy Axtell - 2021 - In Brian C. Barnett (ed.), Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology. Rebus Community.details
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Resolutions Against Uniqueness.Kenji Lota & Ulf Hlobil - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1013–1033.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Permissivism and self-fulfilling propositions.Anantharaman Muralidharan - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):217-226.details
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Permissivism and the Truth Connection.Michele Palmira - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):641-656.details
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Uniqueness and Modesty: How Permissivists Can Live on the Edge.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Mind.details
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What is the Function of Reasoning? On Mercier and Sperber's Argumentative and Justificatory Theories.Sinan Dogramaci - 2020 - Episteme 17 (3):316-330.details
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Introduction to Philosophy: Epistemology.Brian C. Barnett (ed.) - 2021 - Rebus Community.details
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Permissivism, Margin-for-Error, and Dominance.John Hawthorne & Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):515-532.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme (4):654-673.details
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Unacknowledged Permissivism.Julia Jael Smith - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (1):158-183.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):539-554.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Bertrand's Paradox and the Maximum Entropy Principle.Nicholas Shackel & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):505-523.details
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Permissivism, Underdetermination, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson & Margaret Greta Turnbull - 2024 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 358–370.details
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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Is Epistemology Autonomous?Daniel Greco - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Metaepistemology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Justifications and excuses in epistemology.Daniel Greco - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):517-537.details
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The ordinary language argument against skepticism—pragmatized.Sinan Dogramaci - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):879-896.details
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The Practical Origins of Ideas: Genealogy as Conceptual Reverse-Engineering (Open Access).Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Permissive Metaepistemology.David Thorstad - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):907-926.details
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Peer Disagreement and the Bridge Principle.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1213-1223.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and the Impossibility of Self-Misleading Evidence.Mattias Skipper - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Belief and Credence: Why the Attitude-Type Matters.Elizabeth Grace Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2477-2496.details
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A subjectivist’s guide to deterministic chance.J. Dmitri Gallow - 2021 - Synthese 198 (5):4339-4372.details
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Subjective Probability and its Dynamics.Alan Hajek & Julia Staffel - 2021 - In Markus Knauff & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), The Handbook of Rationality. London: MIT Press.details
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The Self-Undermining Arguments from Disagreement.Eric Sampson - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 14:23-46.details
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