- Classical Theism, Arbitrary Creation, and Reason-Based Action.Joseph C. Schmid - 2022 - Sophia 61 (3):565-579.details
|
|
Can a Single Property Be Both Dispositional and Categorical? The “Partial Consideration Strategy”, Partially Considered.Robert Schroer - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):63-77.details
|
|
Against the Russellian open future.Anders J. Schoubye & Brian Rabern - 2017 - Mind 126 (504): 1217–1237.details
|
|
Anscombe's Intention: A Guide. [REVIEW]Benjamin Schulz - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (2):438-440.details
|
|
Two-Dimensional Paradox.Giorgio Sbardolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):605-617.details
|
|
Modal Scepticism, Unqualified Modality, and Modal Kinds.Andrea Sauchelli - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):403-409.details
|
|
Modal Fictionalism, Possible Worlds, and Artificiality.Andrea Sauchelli - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (4):411-21.details
|
|
Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge.Andrea Sauchelli - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):345-359.details
|
|
Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis versus Williamson on modal knowledge.Andrea Sauchelli - 2010 - Synthese 176 (3):345-359.details
|
|
Branching and Uncertainty.Simon Saunders & David Wallace - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):293-305.details
|
|
Temporal parts and complex predicates.Thomas Sattig - 2002 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):279–286.details
|
|
Identity in 4D.Thomas Sattig - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):179-195.details
|
|
Rigidity, General Terms, and Trivialization.Dan López de Sa - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):117 - 123.details
|
|
Thought and Talk in a Generous World.Alexander Sandgren - 2022 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9.details
|
|
Reference and Monstrosity.Paolo Santorio - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):359-406.details
|
|
Quinean worlds: Possibilist ontology in an extenionalist framework.Pedro Santos - 2014 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 89 (1):205-230.details
|
|
Puzzling Pierre and Intentional Identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):861-875.details
|
|
Mental time travel and the philosophy of memory.André Sant'Anna - 2018 - Unisinos Journal of Philosophy 1 (19):52-62.details
|
|
A metarepresentational theory of intentional identity.Alexander Sandgren - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3677-3695.details
|
|
Presentists Should Not Believe in Time Travel.Takeshi Sakon - 2021 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 53 (2):191-213.details
|
|
Presentism and the Triviality Objection.Takeshi Sakon - 2015 - Philosophia 43 (4):1089-1109.details
|
|
A Presentist Approach to (Ersatz) Possible Worlds.Takeshi Sakon - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (2):169-177.details
|
|
Conceivability, inconceivability and cartesian modal epistemology.Pierre Saint-Germier - 2016 - Synthese 195 (11):4785-4816.details
|
|
Still Against Divine Truthmaker Simplicity.Noël Blas Saenz - 2021 - Faith and Philosophy 38 (3):359-74.details
|
|
A grounding solution to the grounding problem.Noël B. Saenz - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2193-2214.details
|
|
Conservative Reduction of Biology.Christian Sachse - 2011 - Philosophia Naturalis 48 (1):33-65.details
|
|
Being without doing.Marcelo H. Sabatés - 2003 - Topoi 22 (2):111-125.details
|
|
Interactionism, haecceities, and the pairing argument.Bradford Saad - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (7):724-741.details
|
|
Grounding and ontological dependence.Henrik Rydéhn - 2021 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 6):1231-1256.details
|
|
There is no puzzle about change.Pablo Rychter - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (1):7-22.details
|
|
The Standard Objection to the Standard Account.Ryan Wasserman - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 111 (3):197 - 216.details
|
|
Possible Worlds and the Objective World.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2013 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):389-422.details
|
|
On Where Things Could Be.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (1):60-80.details
|
|
Actuality for Counterpart Theorists.Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2013 - Mind 122 (485):85-134.details
|
|
Ideological innocence.Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-22.details
|
|
In defense of linguistic ersatzism.Tony Roy - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 80 (3):217 - 242.details
|
|
Persistence through function preservation.David Rose - 2015 - Synthese 192 (1):97-146.details
|
|
In Defence of Ockhamism.Sven Rosenkranz - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (3):617-631.details
|
|
Folk Mereology is Teleological.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):238-270.details
|
|
Divided we fall.Jacob Ross - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):222-262.details
|
|
Why all classical theists should believe in physical premotions, but it doesn’t really matter.James Dominic Rooney - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 88 (2):139-166.details
|
|
Modality is Not Explainable by Essence.Carlos Romero - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):121-141.details
|
|
Supervaluational propositional content.Benjamin Rohrs - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
|
|
There Might Be Nothing: The Subtraction Argument Improved.G. Rodriguez-Pereyra - 1997 - Analysis 57 (3):159-166.details
|
|
Hunky Panentheism.Roberto Rodighiero - 2019 - Sophia 58 (4):581-596.details
|
|
How Things Might Have Been: Individuals, Kinds, and Essential Properties. [REVIEW]Sonia Roca-Royes - 2009 - Philosophical Review 118 (2):266-269.details
|
|
Genuine Modal Realism, the Humean thesis and advanced modalizing.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4669-4690.details
|
|
Conceivability and De Re Modal Knowledge.Sonia Roca-Royes - 2011 - Noûs 45 (1):22-49.details
|
|
To structure, or not to structure?Philip Robbins - 2004 - Synthese 139 (1):55-80.details
|
|
Topological supervenience: A mathematical framework for exploring supervenience.David Robson - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).details
|
|