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Seeing empty space.Louise Richardson - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):227-243.details
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Can I kill my younger self? Time travel and the retrosuicide paradox.Peter B. M. Vranas - 2009 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 90 (4):520-534.details
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The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Special Sciences, Conspiracy and the Better Best System Account of Lawhood.Jonathan Cohen & Craig Callender - 2010 - Erkenntnis 73 (3):427 - 447.details
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Counterfactuals.Dorothy Edgington - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):1-21.details
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The explanatory potential of artificial societies.Till Grüne-Yanoff - 2009 - Synthese 169 (3):539 - 555.details
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Reason and the grain of belief.Scott Sturgeon - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):139–165.details
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In defence of causal bases.Jan Hauska - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):23 – 43.details
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Whither internalism? How internalists should respond to the extended mind hypothesis.Gary Bartlett - 2008 - Metaphilosophy 39 (2):163–184.details
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The normative force of reasoning.Ralph Wedgwood - 2006 - Noûs 40 (4):660–686.details
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Sometimes the world is not enough: The pursuit of explanatory laws in a Humean world.Barry Ward - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (2):175–197.details
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The causal and unification approaches to explanation unified—causally.Michael Strevens - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):154–176.details
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Selection and explanation.Alexander Bird - 2007 - In Johannes Persson & Petri Ylikoski (eds.), Rethinking Explanation. Springer. pp. 131--136.details
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Vann McGee's counterexample to modus ponens.Christian Piller - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 82 (1):27 - 54.details
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Humean dispositionalism.Toby Handfield - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (1):113-126.details
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The mishap at Reichenbach fall: Singular vs. general causation.Christopher Hitchcock - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 78 (3):257 - 291.details
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A generalized probabilistic theory of causal relevance.Christopher Hitchcock - 1993 - Synthese 97 (3):335 - 364.details
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The role of contrast in causal and explanatory claims.Christopher Hitchcock - 1996 - Synthese 107 (3):395 - 419.details
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Defeating dr. evil with self-locating belief.Adam Elga - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2):383–396.details
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Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature part I: Humean supervenience.John Earman & John T. Roberts - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):1–22.details
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Contact with the nomic: A challenge for deniers of Humean supervenience about laws of nature part II: The epistemological argument for Humean supervenience.John Earman & John T. Roberts - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2):253–286.details
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Why P rather than q? The curiosities of fact and foil.Eric Barnes - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 73 (1):35 - 53.details
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The possibility of onion worlds: Rebutting an argument for structural universals.J. Robert G. Williams - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):193 – 203.details
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The psychology of scientific explanation.J. D. Trout - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):564–591.details
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Interpreting causality in the health sciences.Federica Russo & Jon Williamson - 2007 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 21 (2):157 – 170.details
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Modal realisms.Kris McDaniel - 2006 - Philosophical Perspectives 20 (1):303–331.details
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Structural equations and causation.Ned Hall - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):109 - 136.details
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Reversing the counterfactual analysis of causation.Alex Broadbent - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):169 – 189.details
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The big bad bug bites anti-realists about chance.Rachael Briggs - 2009 - Synthese 167 (1):81--92.details
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Counterfactuals and non-locality of quantum mechanics: The bedford–stapp version of the GHZ theorem.Tomasz Bigaj - 2007 - Foundations of Science 12 (1):85-108.details
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A relationalist's guide to error about color perception.Jonathan Cohen - 2007 - Noûs 41 (2):335–353.details
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On the threat of eliminativism.John O’Leary-Hawthorne - 1994 - Philosophical Studies 74 (3):325-46.details
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Local miracle compatibilism.Helen Beebee - 2003 - Noûs 37 (2):258-277.details
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Proportionality, causation, and exclusion.Thomas D. Bontly - 2005 - Philosophia 32 (1-4):331-348.details
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Mental Causation.Karen Bennett - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.details
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Maximality and microphysical supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.details
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An objective counterfactual theory of information.Jonathan Cohen & Aaron Meskin - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):333 – 352.details
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Higher-order intentionalism and higher-order acquaintance.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (3):289--324.details
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The Use and Misuse of Counterfactuals in Ethical Machine Learning.Atoosa Kasirzadeh & Andrew Smart - 2021 - In Atoosa Kasirzadeh & Andrew Smart (eds.), ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT 21).details
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Strong Determinism.Eddy Keming Chen - 2024 - Philosophers' Imprint 24 (1).details
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Causality and determination revisited.Dawa Ometto - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):14993-15013.details
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Governing Without A Fundamental Direction of Time: Minimal Primitivism about Laws of Nature.Eddy Keming Chen & Sheldon Goldstein - 2022 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem (ed.), Rethinking Laws of Nature. Springer. pp. 21-64.details
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Disagreement About Scientific Ontology.Bruno Borge - 2021 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie:1-17.details
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