In this paper, I both propose and discuss a novel account of truthmaking. I begin by showing what truthmaking is not: it is not grounding and it is not correspondence. I then show what truthmaking is by offering an account that appeals both to grounding and what I call ‘deep correspondence’. After I present the account and show that it is an account that unifies, I put it to work by showing how it can overcome an objection to truthmaking, how (...) we can get truthmaking from correspondence, what it says about truthmaker necessitation, and how it can explain a connection between truthmaker maximalism and pluralism about truth. (shrink)

Primitives are both important and unavoidable, and which set of primitives we endorse will greatly shape our theories and how those theories provide solutions to the problems that we take to be important. After introducing the notion of a primitive posit, I discuss the different kinds of primitives that we might posit. Following Cowling (2013), I distinguish between ontological and ideological primitives, and, following Benovsky (2013) between functional and content views of primitives. I then propose that these two distinctions cut (...) across each other leading to four types of primitive posits. I then argue that theoretical virtues should be taken to be meta-theoretical ideological primitives. I close with some reflections on the global nature of comparing sets of primitives. (shrink)

Explanation has played myriad roles in truthmaker theory. The notion of explanation is sometimes thought to give content to the very idea of truthmaking, and is sometimes used as a weapon to undermine the entire point of truthmaker theory. I argue that the notion of explanation is dialectically useless in truthmaker theory: while it’s true that truthmaking offers a form of explanation, this claim is theoretically unilluminating, and leaves truthmaker theorists vulnerable to various kinds of attack. I advocate an alternative (...) approach to truthmaker theory that downplays the role of explanation, and show how it releases the enterprise from a variety of problematic commitments that have troubled truthmaker theorists. The “ontology-first” approach to truthmaking that I advocate not only restores the initial impulse behind truthmaking, but also has a number of theoretical advantages. Most prominently, it dodges the infamous problem of negative existentials, and lessens truthmaker theory’s dependence on contentious intuitive judgments about both explanation and truthmaking. (shrink)

Kit Fine, the leading proponent of the metaphysical project of grounding theory, has offered a number of potentially devastating objections to truthmaker theory, the branch of metaphysics dedicated to exploring the ontological grounds for truths. In this paper I show what presuppositions about truthmaker theory Fine’s objections are based upon, and why they are false. I discuss four objections that Fine raises, and demonstrate how truthmaker theorists may respond to them. I then showcase the positive contribution that truthmaker theory can (...) make to metaphysics, including its ability to speak to a core metaphysical topic (the ontological grounds for truths) that Fine’s approach to grounding must ultimately remain silent on. I conclude by exploring what I take to be the best option when it comes to understanding how truthmaking and grounding fit together. (shrink)

Ontological dependence is a relation—or, more accurately, a family of relations—between entities or beings. For there are various ways in which one being may be said to depend upon one or more other beings, in a sense of “depend” that is distinctly metaphysical in character and that may be contrasted, thus, with various causal senses of this word. More specifically, a being may be said to depend, in such a sense, upon one or more other beings for its existence or (...) for its identity. Some varieties of ontological dependence may be analyzed in modal terms—that is, in terms of distinctly metaphysical notions of possibility and necessity—while others seem to demand an analysis in terms of the notion of essence. The latter varieties of ontological dependence may accordingly be called species of essential dependence. Notions of ontological dependence are frequently called upon by metaphysicians in their proposed analyses of other metaphysically important notions, such as the notion of substance. (shrink)

This thesis explores attempts to characterise the structure of reality. Three notions stand out: Lewisian naturalness, Sider’s ‘structure’, and grounding, where the latter has become the most popular way to characterise the structure of reality in the contemporary literature. I argue that none of these notions, as they are currently understood, are suited for limning the metaphysical structure of reality. In the first part of the thesis I argue that, by the lights of the relevant theories, both naturalness and structure (...) fall short of the theoretical role carved out for those posits. In the second part of the thesis I present two challenges to the ‘orthodox’ conception of grounding. The first contests the standard assumption that grounding is asymmetric, both by citing what I take to be best described as symmetric instances of grounding, and by developing and arguing for a new theory of metaphysical structure – ‘metaphysical interdependence’ – which takes grounding to be nonsymmetric. The second challenge concerns the relationship between grounding and explanation, and leads to a dilemma for the grounding theorist. My proposed resolution to the dilemma is to adopt an antirealist approach to grounding, which I further motivate and develop in the final chapter. (shrink)

The phrase ‘in virtue of’ is a mainstay of metaphysical discourse. In recent years, many philosophers have argued that we should understand this phrase, as metaphysicians use it, in terms of a concept of metaphysical dependence called ‘grounding’.This dissertation explores a range of central issues in the theory of grounding. Chapter 1 introduces the intuitive concept of grounding and discusses some compulsory questions in the theory of grounding. Chapter 2 focusses on scepticism on grounding, according to which the recent philosophical (...) interest in the topic is misguided. In chapter 3 I discuss grounding’s explanatory roles. Chapter 4 focusses on the claim that if an entity is grounded then it is an ontological free lunch. Chapter 5 discusses and rejects the claim that groundingis a relation between facts. This conclusion raises a problem: if grounding is not a relation between facts it becomes difficult to specify the connections between grounding and explanation and grounding and necessity. But not only is it desirable to specify these relations, it is essential for establishing that grounding is able to play the explanatory roles that are discussed in chapter 3. Chapter 6 responds to this problem by outlining an approach to grounding based on David Lewis’s (2003) theory of truthmaking. Against this backdrop I discuss, in chapter 7, some issues in the logic of grounding. (shrink)

Ostrich presentists maintain that we can use all the expressive resources of the tensed language to provide an explanation of why true claims about the past are true, without thereby paying any price in terms of ontology or basic ideology. I clarify the position by making a distinction between three kinds of explanation, which has general interest and applicability. I then criticize the ostrich position because it requires an unconstrained version of the third form of explanation, which is out of (...) place in metaphysics. (shrink)

Truthmaking non-maximalism usually assumes that some truths do not have truthmakers. I suggest, however, that non-maximalism can be understood more specifically, and that different types of non-maximalism can be distinguished. To do so, I refer to two positions. The first is deflationary truthmaking, some of whose proponents assume that no truths have truthmakers. The second distinguishes between truths that do not have truthmakers but depend on being, and truths that do not have truthmakers and moreover do not depend on being. (...) Given the combinations of these positions, I propose a new classification indicating the positions available to a non-maximalist. I argue that one of these positions is particularly worth adopting because of its advantages over the other options. (shrink)

Mark Jago has introduced a short Fitch-style argument for truthmaker maximalism – the thesis that every truth has a truthmaker. In response to Jago, Trueman argues that the Fitch-style reasoning allows us to prove the opposite – no truth has a truthmaker. In the article, we consider the debates between Jago’s truthmaker maximalism and Trueman’s truthmaker nihilism. Also, we introduce a short Grim-style argument against Jago’s truthmaker maximalism.

Separatists about grounding take explanations to be separate from their corresponding grounding-facts. Grounding-facts are supposed to underlie, or back, such explanations. However, the backing relation hasn’t received much attention in the literature. The aim of this paper is to provide an informative definition of backing. First, I examine two prominent proposals: backing as explaining (Kovacs 2017; 2019a) and backing as grounding (see Sjölin Wirling 2020). Finally, I put forward my own proposal. I argue that under plausible assumptions about the role (...) of backing and the nature of explanation, backing should be understood as a form of truthmaking, minimally construed. (shrink)

O desenvolvimento da filosofia acadêmica no Brasil é direcionada, entre vários fatores, pelas investigações dos diversos Grupos de Trabalho (GTs) da Associação Nacional de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia (ANPOF). Esses GTs se dividem de acordo com a temática investigada. O GT de Metafísica Analítica é relativamente novo e ainda tem poucos membros, mas os temas nele trabalhados são variados e todos centrais no debate metafísico contemporâneo internacional. A sua investigação se caracteriza pelo rigor lógico e conceitual com o qual aborda esses (...) tradicionais tópicos da metafísica. Embora os assuntos tratados tenham sido, em sua grande maioria, tópicos abordados e discutidos em reuniões remotas do GT, nem todos os membros do nosso grupo estão aqui representados. Esperamos apresentar seus trabalhos em futuros livros. Por enquanto, queremos apenas divulgar ao público acadêmico algumas de nossas produções, trabalhadas e produzidas exclusivamente para este livro. Segundo a caracterização tradicional, com a qual plenamente concordamos, a metafísica se ocupa com a natureza mais íntima e geral da realidade. Essa metafísica é, por um lado, ambiciosa: não pretende apenas expor a realidade segundo o modo como ela se apresenta para nós, mas como ela é ‘em si mesma’. Por outro lado, ela é modesta: ela sabe da sua dívida para com as outras disciplinas, especialmente lógica, linguagem e epistemologia. Além disso, ela se entende como sempre tentativa, provisória, aberta a críticas e revisões. Neste livro, tratamos temas como as categorias ontológicas fundamentais e as suas relações de dependência e de fundamentalidade, a natureza da composição mereológica, da persistência temporal e do próprio tempo, a natureza dos objetos abstratos e dos mundos possíveis, as naturezas do mundo quântico, da causalidade nômica do mundo físico, e, finalmente, de um dos objetos mais característicos da presença humana no nosso mundo físico, que é o objeto de arte. É claro que essa coletânea está longe de apresentar exaustivamente todos os tópicos da metafísica. Tentamos selecionar e organizar os textos da forma mais fluida possível, de modo que eles possam levar tanto a uma reflexão específica quanto a uma reflexão geral sobre a natureza da realidade. Ainda que tenha uma inerente incompletude, o livro serve à finalidade de levar o/a estudante de graduação e pós-graduação a refletir sobre temas contemporâneos da Metafísica Analítica. Justamente por ter esse objetivo de formentar a pesquisa em metafísica analítica nacional, optamos por traduzir muitos termos do inglês que ainda não tem uma tradução canônica, a fim de evitar anglicismos e contribuir para uma leitura mais natural. Muito mais do que leitores complacentes, esse livro pede por leitores críticos, debatedores corajosos, que estejam dispostos a contribuir e a propor novas teorias e argumentos. Agradecemos a todos os membros do GT de Metafísica Analítica da ANPOF e a todos os autores deste livro, que decidiram apresentar publicamente suas pesquisas à academia; aos membros do Grupo de Pesquisa Investigação Filosófica, que decidiram pela publicação deste livro; à Pró-Reitoria de PósGraduação e Pesquisa da Universidade Federal do Amapá, que o financiou; e ao NEPFIL Online e à Editora da UFPel, que o editaram e publicaram. [Guido Imaguire e Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid, Organizadores] . (shrink)

This paper is concerned with the relation between two important metaphysical notions, ‘truthmaking’ and ‘grounding’. I begin by considering various ways in which truthmaking could be explicated in terms of grounding, noting both strengths and weaknesses of these analyses. I go on to articulate a problem for any attempt to analyze truthmaking in terms of a generic and primitive notion of grounding based on differences we find among examples of grounding. Finally, I outline a more complex view of how truthmaking (...) and grounding could relate. On the view explored, truthmaking is a species of grounding differentiated from other species of grounding by the unique form of dependence it involves. (shrink)

Appeals to metaphysics have lately come to ascendancy in analytic legal philosophy. Over the last 20 years or so, a new discourse framework has emerged in analytic legal metaphysics that focusses on the explanatory question of how law is made. By any measure the most influential refinement of this question is to be found in Mark Greenberg's seminal 2004 article How Facts Make Law. This essay tries to exert some pressure on this familiar question by posing the categorial question of (...) what type of entities different theories of law take up as ontologically basic for their inquiry. The essay singles out four exemplary avenues for answering the categorial question. Introducing a categorial instead of explanatory lens is an overdue step in the process of updating the metaphysical toolbox of contemporary analytic theories of law. The categorial question of what kind of entity law is ismeant to complement the explanatory question of how law is made in a way that makes disagreements about the metaphysical-explanatory demands of theories of law more tractable or amenable to principled adjudication. (shrink)

This article for the Stanford Encyclopedia for Philosophy provides a state of the art survey and assessment of the contemporary debate about truth-makers, covering both the case for and against truth-makers. It explores 4 interrelated questions about truth-makers, (1) What is it to be a truth-maker? (2) Which range, or ranges, of truths are eligible to be made true (if any are)? (3) What kinds of entities are truth-makers? (4) What is the motivation for adopting a theory of truth-makers? And (...) adds that there's another question to often put aside by metaphysicians but has critical consequences for truth-makers: (5) What are the truth-bearers? (shrink)

Some truthmaker theorists posit a distinctive kind of entity to solve the problem of providing ontological grounding for negative truths. Recently, A. M. Griffith has raised a general objection against these alleged truthmakers based on an explanatory constraint on truthmaking and the existence condition of these entities. This paper counters the objection by placing it on the horns of a dilemma: the argument must either specify that the existence condition in question is a conceptual matter or insist that the condition (...) is of properly metaphysical substance. I first argue that the former horn cannot be pursued because it makes the objection irrelevant to the alleged claims of truthmaking. I then argue that the latter horn is also highly problematic because simply insisting on the claim begs the question; appreciating this point leads proponents and opponents of the alleged truthmakers to a substantial debate about the metaphysical nature of these entities and the overall theoretical benefit of their postulation. The discussion shows that Griffith's argument fails to establish its conclusion and reveals what is actually required to argue for/against a particular proposal to provide ontological grounding for negative truths. (shrink)