Switch to: References

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Naturalism, Experience, and Hume’s ‘Science of Human Nature’.Benedict Smith - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (3):310-323.
    A standard interpretation of Hume’s naturalism is that it paved the way for a scientistic and ‘disenchanted’ conception of the world. My aim in this paper is to show that this is a restrictive reading of Hume, and it obscures a different and profitable interpretation of what Humean naturalism amounts to. The standard interpretation implies that Hume’s ‘science of human nature’ was a reductive investigation into our psychology. But, as Hume explains, the subject matter of this science is not restricted (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume on Identity in Part IV of Book I of the Treatise.Harold W. Noonan - 2010 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 13 (1):90-104.
    In Part IV of Book I of Hume’s Treatise Hume frequently appeals to an identity ascribing mechanism of the imagination. A psychological mechanism of which it is a special case, to ‘compleat the union’, is also prominent. These mechanisms belong to the imagination narrowly conceived according to a distinction in section ix of Part III. The role and significance of these mechanisms in the development of Hume’s scepticism is explored. Appreciation of their significance is also argued to cast light on (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Knowledge and Sensory Knowledge in Hume's Treatise.Graham Clay - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy 10.
    I argue that the Hume of the Treatise maintains an account of knowledge according to which (i) every instance of knowledge must be an immediately present perception (i.e., an impression or an idea); (ii) an object of this perception must be a token of a knowable relation; (iii) this token knowable relation must have parts of the instance of knowledge as relata (i.e., the same perception that has it as an object); and any perception that satisfies (i)-(iii) is an instance (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Integrating Hume’s Accounts of Belief and Justification.Louis E. Loeb - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303.
    Hume's claim that a state is a belief is often intertwined—though without his remarking on this fact—with epistemic approval of the state. This requires explanation. Beliefs, in Hume's view, are steady dispositions, nature's provision for a steady influence on the will and action. Hume's epistemic distinctions call attention to circumstances in which the presence of conflicting beliefs undermine a belief's influence and thereby its natural function. On one version of this interpretation, to say that a belief is justified, ceteris paribus, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Skepticism in Hume's Politics and Histories.Peter S. Fosl - 2018 - Araucaria 20 (40).
    This essay argues that Hume's political and historical thought is well read as skeptical and skeptical in a way that roots it deeply in the Hellenistic traditions of both Pyrrhonian and Academical thought. It deploys skeptical instruments to undermine political rationalism as well as theologically and metaphysically political ideologies. Hume's is politics of opinion and appearance. It labors to oppose faction and enthusiasm and generate suspension, balance, tranquility, and moderation. Because Hume advocate the use of reflectively generated but epistemically and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Locke, Hume, and Reid on the Objects of Belief.Lewis Powell - 2018 - History of Philosophy Quarterly 35 (1):21-38.
    The goal of this paper is show how an initially appealing objection to David Hume's account of judgment can only be put forward by philosophers who accept an account of judgment that has its own sizable share of problems. To demonstrate this, I situate the views of John Locke, David Hume, and Thomas Reid with respect to each other, so as to illustrate how the appealing objection is linked to unappealing features of Locke's account of judgment.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford University Press.
    It seems obvious that when higher-order evidence makes it rational for one to doubt that one’s own belief on some matter is rational, this can undermine the rationality of that belief. This is known as higher-order defeat. However, despite its intuitive plausibility, it has proved puzzling how higher-order defeat works, exactly. To highlight two prominent sources of puzzlement, higher-order defeat seems to defy being understood in terms of conditionalization; and higher-order defeat can sometimes place agents in what seem like epistemic (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Quasi-Realism and Inductive Scepticism in Hume’s Theory of Causation.Dominic K. Dimech - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):637-650.
    Interpreters of Hume on causation consider that an advantage of the ‘quasi-realist’ reading is that it does not commit him to scepticism or to an error theory about causal reasoning. It is unique to quasi-realism that it maintains this positive epistemic result together with a rejection of metaphysical realism about causation: the quasi-realist supplies an appropriate semantic theory in order to justify the practice of talking ‘as if’ there were causal powers in the world. In this paper, I problematise the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability, by Hannes Leitgeb.Michael G. Titelbaum - forthcoming - Mind:fzaa017.
    The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability, by LeitgebHannes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. xiv + 365.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume and Same‐Sex Marriage.Jeffry L. Ramsey & Olivia O'Connor - 2017 - Journal of Social Philosophy 48 (2):180-196.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Humes Old and New: Four Fashionable Falsehoods, and One Unfashionable Truth.Peter Millican - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):163-199.
    Hume has traditionally been understood as an inductive sceptic with positivist tendencies, reducing causation to regular succession and anticipating the modern distinctions between analytic and synthetic, deduction and induction. The dominant fashion in recent Hume scholarship is to reject all this, replacing the ‘Old Hume’ with various New alternatives. Here I aim to counter four of these revisionist readings, presenting instead a broadly traditional interpretation but with important nuances, based especially on Hume’s later works. He asked that we should treat (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Hume on the Imagination.Fabian Dorsch - 2015 - Rero Doc Digital Library:1-28.
    This is the original, longer draft for my entry on Hume in the 'The Routledge Hand- book of Philosophy of Imagination', edited by Amy Kind and published by Routledge in 2016 (see the separate entry). — Please always cite the Routledge version, unless there are passages concerned that did not make it into the Handbook for reasons of length. — -/- This chapter overviews Hume’s thoughts on the nature and the role of imagining, with an almost exclusive focus on the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume and Peirce on the Ultimate Stability of Belief.Ryan Pollock & David W. Agler - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):245-269.
    Louis Loeb has argued that Hume is pessimistic while Peirce is optimistic about the attainment of fully stable beliefs. In contrast, we argue that Hume was optimistic about such attainment but only if the scope of philosophical investigation is limited to first-order explanatory questions. Further, we argue that Peirce, after reformulating the pragmatic maxim to accommodate the reality of counterfactuals, was pessimistic about such attainment. Finally, we articulate and respond to Peirce's objection that Hume's skeptical arguments in T 1.4.1 and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Hume on the Distinction Between Primary and Secondary Qualities.Jani Hakkarainen - 2011 - In Dana Jalobeanu & Peter Anstey (eds.), Vanishing Matter and the Laws of Nature: Descartes and Beyond. London: Routledge. pp. 235-259.
    In this paper, I argue that Hume has an insight into the heart of most of “new philosophy” when he claims that according to it, proper sensibles are not Real properties of material substance and Real bodies. I call this tenet “the Proper Sensibles Principle” (PSP). In the second part of the paper, I defend the interpretation - mainly against Don Garrett’s doubts - that the PSP is a rational tenet in Hume’s view and he thus endorses it. Its rationality (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • I—Peter Millican: Humes Old and New Four Fashionable Falsehoods, and One Unfashionable Truth.Peter Millican & Helen Beebee - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):163-199.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Hume on External Existence: A Sceptical Predicament.Dominic K. Dimech - 2018 - Dissertation, University of Sydney
    This thesis investigates Hume’s philosophy of external existence in relation to, and within the context of, his philosophy of scepticism. In his two main works on metaphysics – A Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40) and the first Enquiry (first ed. 1748) – Hume encounters a predicament pertaining to the unreflective, ‘vulgar’ attribution of external existence to mental perceptions and the ‘philosophical’ distinction between perceptions and objects. I argue that we should understand this predicament as follows: the vulgar opinion is our (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume e as bases científicas da tese de que não há acaso no mundo.Silvio Seno Chibeni - 2012 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 16 (2):229-254.
    http://dx.doi.org/10.5007/1808-1711.2012v16n2p229 Tanto no Tratado da Natureza Humana como na Investigação sobre o Entendimento Humano , Hume mostra-se convencido de que “não há acaso no mundo”, e que “aquilo que o vulgo chama de acaso não passa de uma causa secreta e escondida”. Essa tese desempenha papel crucial em sua análise do livre-arbítrio e, conseguintemente, da responsabilidade moral; é também um elemento importante em sua discussão sobre os milagres. No entanto, o próprio Hume ofereceu, no Tratado , um argumento convincente para (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Understanding.John P. Wright - 2013 - In James A. Harris (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of British Philosophy in the Eighteenth Century. Oxford University Press. pp. 148-70.
    The article discusses the varying conceptions of the faculty of ‘the understanding’ in 18th-century British philosophy and logic. Topics include the distinction between the understanding and the will, the traditional division of three acts of understanding and its critics, the naturalizing of human understanding, conceiving of the limits of human understanding, British innatism and the critique of empiricist conceptions of the understanding, and reconceiving the understanding and the elimination of scepticism. Authors discussed include Richard Price, James Harris, Zachary Mayne, Edward (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Descartes on Will and Suspension of Judgment: Affectivity of the Reasons for Doubt.Jan Forsman - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: pp. 38-58.
    In this paper, I join the so-called voluntarism debate on Descartes’s theory of will and judgment, arguing for an indirect doxastic voluntarism reading of Descartes, as opposed to a classic, or direct doxastic voluntarism. More specifically, I examine the question whether Descartes thinks the will can have a direct and full control over one’s suspension of judgment. Descartes was a doxastic voluntarist, maintaining that the will has some kind of control over one’s doxastic states, such as belief and doubt. According (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Conceiving Without Concepts: Reid Vs. The Way of Ideas.Lewis Powell - 2013 - ProtoSociology 30:221-237.
    Thomas Reid is notorious for rejecting the orthodox theory of conception (OTC), according to which conceiving of an object involves a mental relationship to an idea of that object. In this paper, I examine the question of what this rejection amounts to, when we limit our attention to bare conception (rather than the more widely discussed case of perception). I present some of the purported advantages of OTC, and assess whether they provide a genuine basis for preferring OTC to a (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • A Spinozist Aesthetics of Affect and Its Political Implications.Christopher Davidson - 2017 - In Gábor Boros, Judit Szalai & Oliver Istvan Toth (eds.), The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy. Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press. pp. 185-206.
    Spinoza rarely refers to art. However, there are extensive resources for a Spinozist aesthetics in his discussion of health in the Ethics and of social affects in his political works. There have been recently been a few essays linking Spinoza and art, but this essay additionally fuses Spinoza’s politics to an affective aesthetics. Spinoza’s statements that art makes us healthier (Ethics 4p54Sch; Emendation section 17) form the foundation of an aesthetics. In Spinoza’s definition, “health” is caused by external objects that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Pyrrhonian and Naturalistic Themes in the Final Writings of Wittgenstein.Indrani Bhattacharjee - unknown
    The following inquiry pursues two interlinked aims. The first is to understand Wittgenstein's idea of non-foundational certainty in the context of a reading of On Certainty that emphasizes its Pyrrhonian elements. The second is to read Wittgenstein's remarks on idealism/radical skepticism in On Certainty in parallel with the discussion of rule-following in Philosophical Investigations in order to demonstrate an underlying similarity of philosophical concerns and methods. I argue that for the later Wittgenstein, what is held certain in a given context (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Uma teoria naturalista da justificação das crenças na epistemologia de David Hume.Claudiney José de Souza - 2014 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 18 (2):227.
    One of the first difficulties in interpreting Hume’s epistemological writings concerns precisely the meaning of the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’. In this article it is shown, initially, how, from a humean point of view, the traditional epistemic criterion to define ‘knowledge’ and ‘belief’ appears very restrictive. Hume’s theory of causal belief is then briefly reviewed in the light of epistemological naturalism of the Michael J. Costa and Louis E. Loeb. Finally, it is submitted that the examination of all these topics (...)
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.
    This essay develops a joint theory of rational (all-or-nothing) belief and degrees of belief. The theory is based on three assumptions: the logical closure of rational belief; the axioms of probability for rational degrees of belief; and the so-called Lockean thesis, in which the concepts of rational belief and rational degree of belief figure simultaneously. In spite of what is commonly believed, this essay will show that this combination of principles is satisfiable (and indeed nontrivially so) and that the principles (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   85 citations  
  • Hume's Dual Criteria for Memory.Maité Cruz - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (2):336-358.
    In his brief treatment of memory, Hume characterizes memory using two kinds of criteria: ideas’ phenomenal character and their correspondence to the past experiences from which they derived. These criteria have seemed so perplexing to interpreters, both individually and jointly, that Hume’s account of memory is commonly considered one of the weakest parts of his philosophical system. This paper defends Hume’s criteria by showing that they achieve two theoretical aims: a scientific classification of ideas and a definition of ‘memory.’ In (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume's Dispositional Account of the Self.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (4):644-657.
    This paper will argue that Hume's notion of the self in Book 2 of the Treatise seems subject to two constraints. First, it should be a succession of perceptions [THN 2.2.1.2, 2.1.2.3]. Second, it should be durable in virtue of the roles that it plays with regard to pride and humility, as well as to normativity. However, I argue that these two constraints are in tension, since our perceptions are too transient to play these roles. I argue that this notion (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • The Necessity of “Necessity”: Hume’s Psychology of Sophisticated Causal Inference.Abraham Sesshu Roth - 2011 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 41 (2):263-287.
    Much of what Hume calls probable reasoning is deliberate and reflective. Since there are aspects to Hume’s psychology that tempt some commentators to think, on the contrary, that for Hume all such reasoning is simple and immediate, I will be concerned to emphasize Hume’s recognition of the sophisticated sort of probable reasoning (section I). Though some of the details of my case may be new, the overall point of this section should not be news to recent scholarship. But once we (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume on Curiosity.Axel Gelfert - 2013 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 21 (4):711-732.
    Hume concludes Book II of his Treatise of Human Nature with a section on the passion of curiosity, ‘that love of truth, which was the first source of all our enquiries’. At first sight, this characterisation of curiosity – as the motivating factor in that specifically human activity that is the pursuit of knowledge – may seem unoriginal. However, when Hume speaks of the ‘source of all our enquiries’, he is referring both to the universal human pursuit of knowledge and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations  
  • Full & Partial Belief.Konstantin Genin - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 437-498.
    Download  
    Translate
     
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.
    Much has been written about Kemp Smith's famous problem regarding the tension between Hume's naturalism and his scepticism. However, most commentators have focused their attention on the Treatise; those who address the Enquiry often take it to express essentially the same message as the Treatise. When Hume's scepticism in the Enquiry has been investigated in its own right, commentators have tended to focus on Hume's inductive scepticism in Sections 4 and 5. All in all, it seems that Section 12 has (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • The Concept of Affectivity in Early Modern Philosophy.Boros Gábor, Szalai Judit & Toth Oliver Istvan (eds.) - 2017 - Budapest, Hungary: Eötvös Loránd University Press.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • ‘Naturalism’ and ‘Skepticism’ in Hume'sTreatise of Human Nature.Sean Greenberg - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):721-733.
    Hume begins the Treatise of Human Nature by announcing the goal of developing a science of man; by the end of Book 1 of the Treatise, the science of man seems to founder in doubt. Underlying the tension between Hume's constructive ambition – his 'naturalism'– and his doubts about that ambition – his 'skepticism'– is the question of whether Hume is justified in continuing his philosophical project. In this paper, I explain how this question emerges in the final section of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Strength of Mind and the Calm and Violent Passions.Elizabeth S. Radcliffe - 2015 - Res Philosophica 92 (3):1-21.
    Hume’s distinction between the calm and violent passions is one whose boundaries are not entirely clear. However, it is crucial to understanding his motivational theory and to identifying an unusual virtue he calls “strength of mind,” the motivational prevalence of the calm passions over the violent. In this paper, I investigate the boundaries of the calm passions and consider the constitution of strength of mind and why Hume regards it as an admirable trait. These are provocative issues for two reasons. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Hume's Positive Argument on Induction.Hsueh Qu - 2014 - Noûs 48 (4):595-625.
    Discussion on whether Hume's treatment of induction is descriptive or normative has usually centred on Hume's negative argument, somewhat neglecting the positive argument. In this paper, I will buck this trend, focusing on the positive argument. First, I argue that Hume's positive and negative arguments should be read as addressing the same issues . I then argue that Hume's positive argument in the Enquiry is normative in nature; drawing on his discussion of scepticism in Section 12 of the Enquiry, I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.
    I introduce and argue for the importance of a cognitive state that I call alief. An alief is, to a reasonable approximation, an innate or habitual propensity to respond to an apparent stimulus in a particular way. Recognizing the role that alief plays in our cognitive repertoire provides a framework for understanding reactions that are governed by nonconscious or automatic mechanisms, which in turn brings into proper relief the role played by reactions that are subject to conscious regulation and deliberate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   113 citations  
  • Hume on Education.O'Brien Dan - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (S1):619-642.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Excuses for Hume's Skepticism.Yuval Avnur - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 92 (2):264-306.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   3 citations