- Consciousness and information integration.Berit Brogaard, Dimitria Electra Gatzia & Bartek Chomanski - 2021 - Synthese 198:763-792.details
|
|
Rosenthal on mental qualities.Alex Byrne - 2022 - In Josh Weisberg (ed.), Qualitative Consciousness: Themes From the Philosophy of David Rosenthal. New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Kinds of Consciousness.Jacob Berger - 2021 - In Benjamin D. Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.details
|
|
Smelling Molecular Structure.Benjamin D. Young - 2019 - In Steven Gouveia, Manuel Curado & Dena Shottenkirk (eds.), Perception, Cognition and Aesthetics. New York: Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy. pp. 64-84.details
|
|
Relational vs Adverbial Conceptions of Phenomenal Intentionality.David Bourget - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 137-166.details
|
|
Fregean Particularism.Susanna Schellenberg - forthcoming - In Dirk Kindermann, Peter van Elswyk, Andy Egan & Cameron Domenico Kirk-Giannini (eds.), Unstructured Content. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
How Reliably Misrepresenting Olfactory Experiences Justify True Beliefs.Angela Mendelovici - 2020 - In Dimitria Gatzia & Berit Brogaard (eds.), The Epistemology of Non-visual Perception. Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press. pp. 99-117.details
|
|
The Philosophy of Phenomenal Consciousness.Zoe Drayson - 2015 - In Drayson Zoe (ed.), The Constitution of Phenomenal Consciousness. pp. 273-292.details
|
|
Grounding, Analysis, and Russellian Monism.Philip Goff - 2019 - In Sam Coleman (ed.), The Knowledge Argument. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 198-222.details
|
|
Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
|
|
Gombrich and the Duck-Rabbit.Robert Eamon Briscoe - 2015 - In Michael Beaney, Brendan Harrington & Dominic Shaw (eds.), Aspect Perception After Wittgenstein: Seeing-as and Novelty. New York: Routledge. pp. 49-88.details
|
|
Nonhuman Animals: Not Necessarily Saints or Sinners.C. E. Abbate - 2014 - Between the Species 17 (1):1-30.details
|
|
Dimensions of Reliability in Phenomenal Judgment.Brentyn J. Ramm - 2016 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 23 (3-4):101-127.details
|
|
Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts on Metaphysics, Language and Mind / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Metafísica, Linguagem e Mente.Rodrigo Cid & Pedro Merlussi (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
|
|
Pictures Have Propositional Content.Alex Grzankowski - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (1):151-163.details
|
|
Giving Dualism its Due.William G. Lycan - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.details
|
|
Senses for senses.Brad Thompson - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):99 – 117.details
|
|
El problema de la consciencia en la filosofía contemporánea.Nicolás Alarcón Zambrano - 2018 - Logos: Revista de Lingüística, Filosofía y Literatura 28 (2):429-442.details
|
|
The Ability Hypothesis: An Empirically Based Defense.Mahdi Zakeri & Majid Ghasemi - 2016 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 30 (1):23-38.details
|
|
Perceiving Smellscapes.Benjamin D. Young - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):203-223.details
|
|
The Projective Consciousness Model and Phenomenal Selfhood.Kenneth Williford, Daniel Bennequin, Karl Friston & David Rudrauf - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.details
|
|
Retinal Images and Object Files: Towards Empirically Evaluating Philosophical Accounts of Visual Perspective.Assaf Weksler - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):91-103.details
|
|
Misrepresenting consciousness.Josh Weisberg - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (3):409 - 433.details
|
|
Same old, same old: The same-order representational theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor.Josh Weisberg - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):161-181.details
|
|
Knowing what we can do: actions, intentions, and the construction of phenomenal experience.Dave Ward, Tom Roberts & Andy Clark - 2011 - Synthese 181 (3):375-394.details
|
|
Sensory modalities and novel features of perceptual experiences.Douglas C. Wadle - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9841-9872.details
|
|
Colour hallucination: In defence of externalist representationalism.Elisabeth Lucia Waczek & Wolfgang Barz - 2022 - Analysis 82 (1):3-7.details
|
|
Sensations and the language of thought.Adam Vinueza - 2000 - Philosophical Psychology 13 (3):373-392.details
|
|
The Social Epistemology of Introspection.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (3):925-942.details
|
|
Shoemaker on phenomenal content.Brad Thompson - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (3):307--334.details
|
|
Representationalism and the argument from hallucination.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):384-412.details
|
|
Color constancy and Russellian representationalism.Brad Thompson - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):75-94.details
|
|
Inverting intentional content.R. Takenaga - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 110 (3):197-229.details
|
|
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
|
|
Nagel's case against physicalism.Pär Sundström - 2002 - SATS 3 (2):91-108.details
|
|
Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.details
|
|
Review of David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness. [REVIEW]Pär Sundström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):80-86.details
|
|
Colour and Consciousness: Untying the Metaphysical Knot.Pär Sundström - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (2):123 - 165.details
|
|
The Semantics of ‘What it’s like’ and the Nature of Consciousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1161-1198.details
|
|
The Consequences Of Intentionalism.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):247-270.details
|
|
The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
|
|
Is there a persuasive argument for an inner awareness theory of consciousness?Daniel Stoljar - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (4):1555-1575.details
|
|
Rethinking synesthesia.Michael Sollberger - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (2):171 - 187.details
|
|
Does Loudness Represent Sound Intensity? (Preprint).Kim Soland - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-27.details
|
|
The mental lives of zombies.Declan Smithies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):343-372.details
|
|
In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
|
|
Consciousness and Theory of Mind: a Common Theory?Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2016 - Theoria: Revista de Teoría, Historia y Fundamentos de la Ciencia 31 (1):73-89.details
|
|
Can Informational Theories Account for Metarepresentation?Miguel Ángel Sebastián & Marc Artiga - 2020 - Topoi 39 (1):81-94.details
|
|
Drop it like it’s HOT: a vicious regress for higher-order thought theories.Miguel Ángel Sebastián - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1563-1572.details
|
|
Distinguishing the senses.Michael Scott - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):257 – 262.details
|
|