- Irrational Intentionality.Benjamin L. S. Nelson - manuscriptdetails
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Justice and the Meritocratic State.Thomas Mulligan - 2018 - New York: Routledge.details
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A holistic understanding of scientific methodology.S. Mate - 2022 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 36 (3-4):263-289.details
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How a Modern-day Hume Can Reject a Desire Categorically: A Perplexity and a Theoretically Modest Proposal.Regan Lance Reitsma - 2014 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):48-66.details
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Malfunctions.Paul Sheldon Davies - 2000 - Biology and Philosophy 15 (1):19-38.details
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A Puzzle About Knowledge, Blame, and Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (4):493-503.details
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Expression and Indication in Ethics and Political Philosophy.Dustin Crummett - 2019 - Res Publica 25 (3):387-406.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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Moral sentiments and reciprocal obligations: The case for pension fund investment in community development.Gordon L. Clark - 2000 - Ethics, Place and Environment 3 (1):7 – 24.details
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Assertion, Belief, and Context.Roger Clarke - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4951-4977.details
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Towards empathy: a human-centred analysis of rationality, ethics and praxis in systems development.Peter J. Carew & Larry Stapleton - 2014 - AI and Society 29 (2):149-166.details
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A choice for 'me' or for 'us'? Using we-reasoning to predict cooperation and coordination in games.David J. Butler - 2012 - Theory and Decision 73 (1):53-76.details
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Interactive virtue and vice in systems of arguments: a logocratic analysis. [REVIEW]Scott Brewer - 2020 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 28 (1):151-179.details
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Foundational Frames: Descartes and Rand.Stephen Boydstun - 2019 - Journal of Ayn Rand Studies 19 (1):1-37.details
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Non-Bayesian Inference: Causal Structure Trumps Correlation.Bénédicte Bes, Steven Sloman, Christopher G. Lucas & Éric Raufaste - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (7):1178-1203.details
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Rational Intransitive Preferences.Peter Baumann - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):3-28.details
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Unintentional Trolling: How Subjects Express Their Prejudices Through Made-up Stories.René Baston & Benedict Kenyah-Damptey - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 34 (4):667-682.details
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Trust, Trade, and Moral Progress.Jonny Anomaly - 2017 - Social Philosophy and Policy 34 (2):89-107.details
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Race Research and the Ethics of Belief.Jonny Anomaly - 2017 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 14 (2):287-297.details
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Make‐or‐Break: Chasing Risky Goals or Settling for Safe Rewards?Pantelis P. Analytis, Charley M. Wu & Alexandros Gelastopoulos - 2019 - Cognitive Science 43 (7):e12743.details
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The natural frequency hypothesis and evolutionary arguments.Yuichi Amitani - 2015 - Mind and Society 15 (1):1-19.details
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The Frequency Hypothesis and Evolutionary Arguments.Yuichi Amitani - 2008 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 41 (1):79-94.details
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Formal models of coherence and legal epistemology.Amalia Amaya - 2007 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 15 (4):429-447.details
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Getting it right.Kristoffer Ahlstrom-Vij & Stephen R. Grimm - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):329-347.details
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Expressivism about delusion attribution.Sam Wilkinson - 2020 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 16 (2):59-77.details
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Epistemic Normativity is Independent of our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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Rationality and its contexts.Timothy Lane - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 3-13.details
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Is depressive rumination rational?Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 121-145.details
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Cognitive automata and the law: Electronic contracting and the intentionality of software agents. [REVIEW]Giovanni Sartor - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (4):253-290.details
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Uncertainty, Rationality, and Agency.Wiebe van der Hoek - 2006 - Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer.details
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The Rediscovery of Common Sense Philosophy.Stephen Boulter - 2007 - Basingstoke, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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The Sunk Costs Fallacy or Argument from Waste.Douglas Walton - 2002 - Argumentation 16 (4):473-503.details
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Teleological Justification of Argumentation Schemes.Douglas Walton & Giovanni Sartor - 2013 - Argumentation 27 (2):111-142.details
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Varieties of Pragmatic Encroachment.Hamid Vahid - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (1):25-41.details
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Entitlement and the Epistemic Status of Cornerstone Beliefs.Hamid Vahid - 2017 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 94 (1-2):126-137.details
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Précis of simple heuristics that make us Smart.Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer - 2000 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 23 (5):727-741.details
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The Stability of Belief: How Rational Belief Coheres with Probability, by Hannes Leitgeb.Michael G. Titelbaum - 2021 - Mind 130 (519):1006-1017.details
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The rational character of belief and the argument for mental anomalism.E. C. Tiffany - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 103 (3):258-314.details
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Was Peirce a Genuine Anti-Psychologist in Logic?Claudine Tiercelin - 2017 - European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (1).details
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Historical Epistemology or History of Epistemology? The Case of the Relation Between Perception and Judgment: Dedicated to Günther Patzig on his 85th birthday.Thomas Sturm - 2011 - Erkenntnis 75 (3):303-324.details
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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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Innate ideas as a naturalistic source of metaphysical knowledge.Steve Stewart-Williams - 2005 - Biology and Philosophy 20 (4):791-814.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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Reasons without principles.Herman E. Stark - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):143 – 167.details
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Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.details
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Demons, Deceivers And Liars: Newcomb’s Malin Génie. [REVIEW]Peter Slezak - 2006 - Theory and Decision 61 (3):277-303.details
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Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):136-157.details
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Faulty judgment, expert opinion, and decision-making capacity.Michel Silberfeld & David Checkland - 1999 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 20 (4):377-393.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809.details
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