- Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.details
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Animalism is Either False of Uninteresting (Perhaps Both).Matt Duncan - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):187-200.details
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There is no actual problem of other minds.Benjamin Nelson - manuscriptdetails
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Are basic actors brainbound agents? Narrowing down solutions to the problem of probabilistic content for predictive perceivers.George Britten-Neish - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):435-459.details
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Kinds of Consciousness.Jacob Berger - 2021 - In Benjamin D. Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.details
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The shape of agency: Control, action, skill, knowledge.Joshua Shepherd - 2021 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
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Alienation or regress: on the non-inferential character of agential knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1757-1768.details
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Some Reflections on Conventions.Carlo Penco & Massimiliano Vignolo - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 19 (3):375-402.details
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Disjunctivism about intending.Yair Levy - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):161-180.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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The Basis of Debasing Scepticism.Joe Cunningham - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):813-833.details
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A new argument for the phenomenal approach to personal persistence.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):2031-2049.details
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The transparency method and knowing our reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):613-621.details
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Free Will, Causality, and Neuroscience.Bernard Feltz, Marcus Missal & Andrew Sims (eds.) - 2019 - Leiden: Brill.details
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What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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A Renewed Challenge to Anti-criterialism.Matt Duncan - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (1):165-182.details
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What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2020 - In John J. Callanan & Lucy Allais (eds.), Kant and Animals. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.details
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Modeling practical thinking.Matthew Mosdell - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (4):445-464.details
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Self-Consciousness.Joel Smith - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2016 - European Journal of Philosophy 24 (4).details
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Ethics and the Nature of Action.Heine A. Holmen - 2011 - Dissertation, University of Oslodetails
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Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.details
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XIII—Self‐Knowledge, Transparency, and Self‐Authorship.Sacha Golob - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (3pt3):235-253.details
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De se thoughts and immunity to error through misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3311-3333.details
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The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.details
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We are acquainted with ourselves.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2531-2549.details
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I Think Therefore I Persist.Matt Duncan - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (4):740-756.details
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In the eye of another: comments on Christopher Peacocke’s ‘Interpersonal self-consciousness’.M. G. F. Martin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):25-38.details
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Really Trying or Merely Trying.Paul Faulkner - 2014 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 41 (3):363-380.details
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Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.details
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From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.details
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Seeing what I am Doing.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):295-318.details
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Kierkegaard and the Search for Self‐Knowledge.Daniel Watts - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):525-549.details
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Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Priority of Intentional Action: From Developmental to Conceptual Priority.Yair Levy - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.details
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Urges.Ashley Shaw - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (2):151–191.details
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Practical Reason in Historical and Systematic Perspective.James Conant & Dawa Ometto (eds.) - 2023 - De Gruyter.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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Introspection, Transparency, and Desire.Michael Roche - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (3):132-154.details
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The Problem of First-Person Aboutness.Jessica Pepp - 2019 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy (57):521-541.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:459073.details
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Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):197-223.details
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