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The Basis of Debasing Scepticism.Joe Cunningham - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (4):813-833.details
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Responsibility for Reason-Giving: The Case of Individual Tainted Reasoning in Systemic Corruption.Emanuela Ceva & Lubomira Radoilska - 2018 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (4):789-809.details
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Are basic actors brainbound agents? Narrowing down solutions to the problem of probabilistic content for predictive perceivers.George Britten-Neish - 2021 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 21 (2):435-459.details
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The Feeling of Bodily Ownership.Adam Bradley - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):359-379.details
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From Freedom From to Freedom To: New Perspectives on Intentional Action.Sofia Bonicalzi & Patrick Haggard - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:459073.details
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Basic Self‐Awareness.Alexandre Billon - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):732-763.details
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Bodily Ownership, Psychological Ownership, and Psychopathology.José Luis Bermúdez - 2019 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (2):263-280.details
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Practical Knowledge without Luminosity.Bob Beddor & Carlotta Pavese - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):917-934.details
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What is it like to think about oneself? De Se thought and phenomenal intentionality.Kyle Banick - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (5):919-932.details
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From Consciousness to Self-Consciousness.Lynne Rudder Baker - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):19-38.details
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On not getting out of bed.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (6):1639-1666.details
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Just doing what I do: on the awareness of fluent agency.James M. Dow - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (1):155-177.details
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C. I. Lewis and the Benacerraf problem.Bob Fischer - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):154-165.details
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Practical Knowledge and Luminosity.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1237-1267.details
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Kinds of Consciousness.Jacob Berger - 2021 - In Benjamin D. Young & Carolyn Dicey Jennings (eds.), Mind, Cognition, and Neuroscience: A Philosophical Introduction. Routledge.details
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First Person and Minimal Self-Consciousness.Thor Grünbaum - 2012 - In Sofia Miguens & Gerhard Preyer (eds.), Consciousness and Subjectivity. [Place of publication not identified]: Ontos Verlag. pp. 273-296.details
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What Do Animals See? Intentionality, Objects and Kantian Nonconceptualism.Sacha Golob - 2020 - In John J. Callanan & Lucy Allais (eds.), Kant and Animals. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Embodied Agency.Hong Yu Wong - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):584-612.details
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Rule‐Following and Rule‐Breaking: Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein.Daniel Watts - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy (4):1159-1185.details
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Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2016 - Mind:fzw010.details
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Kierkegaard on Truth: One or Many?Daniel Watts - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):197-223.details
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Kierkegaard and the Search for Self‐Knowledge.Daniel Watts - 2011 - European Journal of Philosophy 21 (4):525-549.details
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Anscombe, la expresión de autoconciencia y la regla de autorreferencia.Javier Vidal - 2012 - Revista de filosofía (Chile) 68:133-154.details
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Perspectives on de se immunity.Víctor M. Verdejo - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10089-10107.details
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Knowledge Out of Control.Markos Valaris - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (3):733-753.details
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What We Do When We Judge.Josefa Toribio - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):345-367.details
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From Volitionalism to the Dual Aspect Theory of Action.Joshua Stuchlik - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):867-886.details
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II—Waking, Knowing, and Being Conscious.James Stazicker - 2019 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 93 (1):137-160.details
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The First-Person Plural and Immunity to Error.Joel Smith - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):141-167.details
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Selfish Reasons.Kieran Setiya - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2.details
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Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action.John Schwenkler - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (10):731-740.details
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Crossed Wires about Crossed Wires: Somatosensation and Immunity to Error through Misidentification.Léa Salje - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (1):35-56.details
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XIII—Self-Knowledge as a Personal Achievement.Ursula Renz - 2017 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 117 (3):253-272.details
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Metacognition.Joëlle Proust - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (11):989-998.details
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Mental action.Antonia Peacocke - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (6):e12741.details
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Embedded mental action in self-attribution of belief.Antonia Peacocke - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):353-377.details
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Practical knowledge first.Carlotta Pavese - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-18.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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Self-knowledge, agency and inner voices.L. O'Brien - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):93-108.details
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Revisiting the Argument for Non-Conceptual Self-Consciousness Based on the Meaning of “I”.Maik Niemeck - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1505-1523.details
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Modeling practical thinking.Matthew Mosdell - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (4):445-464.details
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The Demonstrative Model of first-person thought.Daniel Morgan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1795-1811.details
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Thinking about the body as subject.Daniel Morgan - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):435-457.details
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Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.details
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First-Person Thought.Daniel Morgan & Léa Salje - 2020 - Analysis 80 (1):148-163.details
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Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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Immunity to wh-misidentification.Aidan McGlynn - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2293-2313.details
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