- A Better World.Ryan Preston-Roedder - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):629-644.details
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Intentions, akrasia, and mere permissibility.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):588-611.details
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(1 other version)Doxastic Correctness.Pascal Engel - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):199-216.details
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Doxastic Correctness.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 87 (1):217-234.details
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Gender Issues in Corporate Leadership.Devora Shapiro & Marilea Bramer - 2013 - Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics:1177-1189.details
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Reflections on Human Rights and Power.Pablo Gilabert - 2018 - In Adam Etinson (ed.), Human Rights: Moral or Political? Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 375-399.details
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Irreducibly Normative Properties.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10:216–244.details
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Objectivism and Prospectivism about Rightness.Elinor Mason - 2013 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 7 (2):1-22.details
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Book Review: The Domain of Reasons. [REVIEW]Andrew Reisner - 2013 - Philosophical Review 122 (4):661-664.details
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Disagreement: Ethics and Elsewhere.Folke Tersman - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (1):55-72.details
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Akrasia and Uncertainty.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 20 (4):483–505.details
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Don’t panic: Self-authorship without obscure metaphysics1.Adina L. Roskies - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):323-342.details
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Using informed consent to save trust.Nir Eyal - 2014 - Journal of Medical Ethics 40 (7):437-444.details
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Parfit on Reasons and Rule Consequentialism.Douglas W. Portmore - 1998 - In Martina Herrmann (ed.), Reading Parfit. Springer Netherlands.details
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A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'.Julian Fink - 2014 - Erkenntnis (4):909-941.details
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Constructivism in Ethics.Carla Bagnoli (ed.) - 2013 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
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Grounding practical normativity: going hybrid.Ruth Chang - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):163-187.details
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(1 other version)Commitment, Reasons, and the Will.Ruth Chang - 2013 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 8. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 74-113.details
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Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.details
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Defending David Lewis’s modal reduction.Barry Maguire - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (1):129-147.details
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Normative Reasons Contextualism.Tim Henning - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (3):593-624.details
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Law and Morality at War.Adil Ahmad Haque - 2014 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 8 (1):79-97.details
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Reasons as explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.details
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Shapelessness in Context.Pekka Väyrynen - 2012 - Noûs 48 (3):573-593.details
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The Superintelligent Will: Motivation and Instrumental Rationality in Advanced Artificial Agents. [REVIEW]Nick Bostrom - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (2):71-85.details
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Hedonic Tone and the Heterogeneity of Pleasure.Ivar Labukt - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (2):172-199.details
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Neosentimentalism and the valence of attitudes.Katie McShane - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):747-765.details
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Is a Universal Morality possible?Ferenc Horcher (ed.) - 2015 - L’Harmattan Publishing.details
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A New Hope for Philosophers' Appeal to Intuition.Damián Enrique Szmuc - 2012 - Essays in Philosophy 13 (1):336-353.details
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Uncertainty behind the Veil of Ignorance.A. Faik Kurtulmus - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (1):41-62.details
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Value and reasons to favour.Jonathan Way - 2013 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 8.details
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"Ought" and the Perspective of the Agent.Benjamin Kiesewitter - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 5 (3):1-24.details
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Can Reasons be Self-Undermining?Rob Van Someren Greve - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (2):411-414.details
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Who is Morally Liable to be Killed in War. [REVIEW]J. McMahan - 2011 - Analysis 71 (3):544-559.details
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Explaining the Instrumental Principle.Jonathan Way - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):487-506.details
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The distinctive feeling theory of pleasure.Ben Bramble - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):201-217.details
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Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.details
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Normativism, Anti-Normativism and Humanist Pragmatism: Stephen P. Turner: Explaining the Normative. Polity Press, Cambridge, 2010, pbk. $24.95, hbk. $69.95, 228 pp + index.Maksymilian Del Mar - 2010 - Human Studies 33 (2-3):305-323.details
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Moral Blameworthiness and the Reactive Attitudes.Leonard Kahn - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (2):131-142.details
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Aggregating Causal Judgments.Richard Bradley, Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2014 - Philosophy of Science 81 (4):491-515.details
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(2 other versions)Kinds of consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Boston: Wiley Periodicals. pp. 257-272.details
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Against quietist normative realism.Tristram McPherson - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):223-240.details
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Assessment Sensitivity: Relative Truth and its Applications.John MacFarlane - 2014 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Normative Wahrheiten ohne Ontologie? Derek Parfit und der „neue“ Non-Naturalismus.Markus Rüther - 2016 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 3 (2):187-220.details
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Informed Altruism and Utilitarianism.Brian John Rosebury - 2021 - Social Theory and Practice 47 (4):717-746.details
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(1 other version)In defense of future tuesday indifference: Ideally coherent eccentrics and the contingency of what matters.Sharon Street - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):273-298.details
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Putting particularism in its place.Joshua Gert - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (3):312-324.details
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The Paradox of Graded Justification.Logins Arturs - forthcoming - Episteme:1-32.details
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(1 other version)The Mirage of Motivation Reason Internalism.Saleh Afroogh - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 56:1-19.details
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What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
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