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The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Introduction.Vivian Mizrahi & Martine Nida-Rumelin - 2006 - Dialectica 60 (3):209-222.details
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The Varieties of Instantiation.Umrao Sethi - 2021 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 7 (3):417-437.details
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Another Look at Mode Intentionalism.Jonathan Mitchell - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (6):2519-2546.details
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The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'.Berit Brogaard - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (7):455-468.details
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Colour constancy and Fregean representationalism.Boyd Millar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (1):219-231.details
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Externalism, architecturalism, and epistemic warrant.Martin Davies - 1998 - In Crispin Wright, Barry C. Smith & Cynthia Macdonald (eds.), Knowing Our Own Minds. Oxford University Press. pp. 321-363.details
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Either / or.Alex Byrne & Heather Logue - 2008 - In Adrian Haddock & Fiona Macpherson (eds.), Disjunctivism: perception, action, knowledge. Oxford University Press. pp. 57-94.details
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Sensory qualities, sensible qualities, sensational qualities.Alex Byrne - 2009 - In Brian McLaughlin, Ansgar Beckermann & Sven Walter (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy of mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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The path not taken.Daniel Dennett - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):252-253.details
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Productance physicalism and a posteriori necessity.Don Dedrick - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):28-29.details
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Orange laser beams are not illusory: The need for a plurality of “real” color ontologies.Lieven Decock & Jaap van Brakel - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):27-28.details
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Individualism and perceptual content.Martin Davies - 1991 - Mind 100 (399):461-84.details
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Color and a priori knowledge.Brian Cutter - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (1):293-315.details
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Reidian Moral Perception.Terence Cuneo - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (2):229 - 258.details
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Modest nonconceptualism: Epistemology, phenomenology, and content. [REVIEW]Joe Cunningham - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2):205-208.details
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Two conceptions of conceptualism and nonconceptualism.T. M. Crowther - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):245-276.details
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The Waterfall Illusion.Tim Crane - 1988 - Analysis 48 (June):142-47.details
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The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics.Tim Crane - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.details
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Perceptual Demonstrative Thought: A Property-Dependent Theory.Sean Crawford - 2020 - Topoi 39 (2):439-457.details
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True color only exists in the eye of the observer.Frans W. Cornelissen, Eli Brenner & Jeroen Smeets - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):26-27.details
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The Argument from the finer‐grained content of colour experiences A redefinition of its role within the debate between McDowell and non‐conceptual theorists.Annalisa Coliva - 2003 - Dialectica 57 (1):57-70.details
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Perceptual variation, realism, and relativization, or: How I learned to stop worrying and love variations in color vision.Jonathan Cohen - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):25-26.details
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Perception and computation.Jonathan Cohen - 2010 - Philosophical Issues 20 (1):96-124.details
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Ecological considerations support color physicalism.James J. Clark - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):24-25.details
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Fallacies or analyses?Jennifer Church - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):251--2.details
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Sensorimotor expectations and the visual field.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 17):3991-4006.details
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Odors, Objects and Olfaction.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (1):81-94.details
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Naïve Realism and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dan Cavedon-Taylor - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (3):391-412.details
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Representing the Mind as Such in Infancy.Peter Carruthers - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (4):765-781.details
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The epistemic significance of experience.Alex Byrne - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173:947-67.details
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Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.details
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How hard are the sceptical paradoxes?Alex Byrne - 2004 - Noûs 38 (2):299–325.details
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Hallucination and Its Objects.Alex Byrne & Riccardo Manzotti - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):327-359.details
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Do Colours Look Like Dispositions? Reply to Langsam and Others.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Quarterly 51 (203):238-245.details
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Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.details
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Color realism redux.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):52-59.details
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“Color realism” shows a subjectivist' mode of thinking.Michael H. Brill - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):23-24.details
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Self-location and agency.Bill Brewer - 1992 - Mind 101 (401):17-34.details
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I—The Presidential Address: The Objectivity of Perception.Bill Brewer - 2021 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 121 (1):1-20.details
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Experience and Reason in Perception.Bill Brewer - 1998 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 43:203-227.details
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Consciousness and content in perception.Bill Brewer - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):41-54.details
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On a confusion about a function of consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.details
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How many concepts of consciousness?Ned Block - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):272-287.details
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The scrambler: An argument against representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):pp. 215-236.details
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The Scrambler: An Argument Against Representationalism.Stephen Biggs - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (2):215-236.details
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La théorie représentationnelle de la conscience phénoménale et le problème des apparences visuelles.Paul Bernier - 2013 - Dialogue 52 (1):1-23.details
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