- What if ? Questions about conditionals.Dorothy Edgington - 2003 - Mind and Language 18 (4):380–401.details
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Credence, Conditionals, Knowledge and Truth.Dorothy Edgington - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):332-342.details
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Confirmation in the Cognitive Sciences: The Problematic Case of Bayesian Models. [REVIEW]Frederick Eberhardt & David Danks - 2011 - Minds and Machines 21 (3):389-410.details
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Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability.Antony Eagle - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.details
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A causal theory of chance? [REVIEW]Antony Eagle - 2004 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (4):883-890.details
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The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.details
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Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.details
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Contradictory Information: Too Much of a Good Thing. [REVIEW]J. Michael Dunn - 2010 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (4):425 - 452.details
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Pettit on Preference for Prospects and Properties – Discussion.J. Dreier - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 124 (2):199-219.details
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The preface paradox revisited.Igor Douven - 2003 - Erkenntnis 59 (3):389 - 420.details
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Can the skepticism debate be resolved?Igor Douven - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):23 - 52.details
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Bootstrap Confirmation Made Quantitative.Igor Douven & Wouter Meijs - 2006 - Synthese 149 (1):97-132.details
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A new solution to the paradoxes of rational acceptability.Igor Douven - 2002 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (3):391-410.details
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Evidence: A Guide for the Uncertain.Kevin Dorst - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (3):586-632.details
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Opaque Sweetening and Transitivity.Ryan Doody - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (3):559-571.details
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If There Are No Diachronic Norms of Rationality, Why Does It Seem Like There Are?Ryan Doody - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (2):141-173.details
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Belief and certainty.Dylan Dodd - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4597-4621.details
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Logic of Change, Change of Logic.Hans van Ditmarsch, Brian Hill & Ondrej Majer - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):227 - 234.details
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Logic of change, change of logic.Hans Ditmarsch, Brian Hill & Ondrej Majer - 2009 - Synthese 171 (2):227-234.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Causal Reasoning.Michael Waldmann (ed.) - 2017 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Reconsidering Meaning in Life: A Philosophical Dialogue with Thaddeus Metz.Masahiro Morioka (ed.) - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Life, Waseda University.details
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Representation and Invariance of Scientific Structures.Patrick Suppes - 2002 - CSLI Publications (distributed by Chicago University Press).details
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Meaning and More Meaningful. A Modest Measure.Peter Baumann - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Life 5 (3):33-49.details
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Respect for others’ risk attitudes and the long-run future.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptdetails
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Rationality and the Structure of the Self Volume II: A Kantian Conception.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2013 - APRA Foundation.details
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Rationality and the Structure of the Self, Volume I: The Humean Conception.Adrian M. S. Piper - 2013 - APRA Foundation Berlin.details
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Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle.Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.) - 2004 - Dordrecht: Springer Verlag.details
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Causality and causal modelling in the social sciences.Federica Russo - 2009 - Springer, Dordrecht.details
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Inquiries Into Truth And Interpretation.Donald Davidson - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality and indeterminacy.Cristina Bicchieri - 2009 - In Harold Kincaid & Don Ross (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Economics. Oxford University Press. pp. 159.details
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The problem of induction.John Vickers - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Normative uncertainty and information value.Riley Harris - 2021 - Dissertation, University of Adelaidedetails
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Maximal cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - manuscriptdetails
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Resource Rationality.Thomas F. Icard - manuscriptdetails
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Pluralists about Pluralism? Versions of Explanatory Pluralism in Psychiatry.Jeroen Van Bouwel - 2014 - In M. C. Galavotti, D. Dieks, W. J. Gonzalez, S. Hartmann, Th Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), New Directions in Philosophy of Science (The Philosophy of Science in a European Perspective Series). Springer. pp. 105-119.details
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If We Can’t Tell What Theism Predicts, We Can’t Tell Whether God Exists: Skeptical Theism and Bayesian Arguments from Evil.Nevin Climenhaga - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion.details
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Peirce's contributions to Constructivism and Personal Construct Psychology: II. Science, Logic and Construction.Procter Harry - 2016 - Personal Construct Theory and Practice 13:210-265.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayesian conditioning, the reflection principle, and quantum decoherence.Christopher A. Fuchs & Rüdiger Schack - 2012 - In Yemima Ben-Menahem & Meir Hemmo (eds.), Probability in Physics. Springer. pp. 233--247.details
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Probability and chance.Michael Strevens - 2006 - In D. M. Borchert (ed.), Encyclopedia of Philosophy, second edition. Macmillan.details
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Entropy - A Guide for the Perplexed.Roman Frigg & Charlotte Werndl - 2011 - In Claus Beisbart & Stephan Hartmann (eds.), Probabilities in Physics. Oxford University Press. pp. 115-142.details
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Population Ethics under Risk.Gustaf Arrhenius & H. Orri Stefánsson - forthcoming - Social Choice and Welfare.details
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Permission to believe: Descriptive and prescriptive beliefs in the Clifford/James debate.Christopher Paul Lawrence - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Cape Towndetails
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The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - forthcoming - Philosophical Review.details
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Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Pragmatism.Cathy Legg & Christopher Hookway - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Formal Representations of Belief.Franz Huber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Interpretations of probability.Alan Hájek - 2007 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Pragmatism.Christopher Hookway - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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