- The Game of Belief.Barry Maguire & Jack Woods - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):211-249.details
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On the Epistemic Costs of Friendship: Against the Encroachment View.Catherine Rioux - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):247-264.details
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Rational epistemic akrasia for the ambivalent pragmatist.Neil Sinhababu - 2021 - In Berit Brogaard & Dimitria Electra Gatzia (eds.), The Philosophy and Psychology of Ambivalence: Being of Two Minds. New York: Routledge.details
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Beyond accuracy: Epistemic flaws with statistical generalizations.Jessie Munton - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):228-240.details
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The Rejection of Consequentializing.Daniel Muñoz - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (2):79-96.details
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Epistemic and Aesthetic Conflict.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (4):457-479.details
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Cogito and Moore.David James Barnett - 2023 - Synthese 202 (1):1-27.details
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Pragmatic Reasons for Belief.Andrew Reisner - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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L'empiètement pragmatique est-il pragmatiste ?Melanie Sarzano - 2020 - Klēsis Revue Philosophique 45.details
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Ought to believe vs. ought to reflect.Anthony Robert Booth - 2020 - In Kevin McCain & Scott Stapleford (eds.), Epistemic Duties: New Arguments, New Angles. Routledge.details
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On believing indirectly for practical reasons.Sebastian Schmidt - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1795-1819.details
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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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No Hope for Conciliationism.Jonathan Dixon - 2024 - Synthese 203 (148):1-30.details
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Real Talk on the Metaphysics of Gender.Robin Dembroff - 2018 - Philosophical Topics 46 (2):21-50.details
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Accuracy and ur-prior conditionalization.Nilanjan Das - 2019 - Review of Symbolic Logic 12 (1):62-96.details
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Suspending Judgment is Something You Do.Lindsay Crawford - 2022 - Episteme 19 (4):561-577.details
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The Ineliminability of Epistemic Rationality.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 103 (3):501-517.details
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Akratic (epistemic) modesty.David Christensen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2191-2214.details
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Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):57-72.details
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Moral Encroachment and Positive Profiling.Lisa Cassell - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-21.details
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Why are Epistemic Reasons Normative?Laura Frances Callahan - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Epistemic Existentialism.Laura Frances Callahan - 2021 - Episteme:1-16.details
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The Cognitive Demands of Friendship.Anna Brinkerhoff - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):101-123.details
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Reasons for Belief in Context.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Episteme:1-16.details
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Why Reid was no dogmatist.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Synthese 196 (11):4511-4525.details
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Why Every Belief is a Choice: Descartes’ Doxastic Voluntarism Reconsidered.Mark Boespflug - 2023 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 31 (2):158-178.details
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The Legacy of Reid's Common Sense in Analytic Epistemology.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17 (1):23-37.details
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A Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Selim Berker - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (4):427-470.details
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Discussion of Susanna Siegel's “Can perceptual experiences be rational?”.Ori Beck, Mazviita Chirimuuta, T. Raja Rosenhagen, Susanna Siegel, Declan Smithies & Alison Springle - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):175-190.details
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Practical reasons to believe, epistemic reasons to act, and the baffled action theorist.Nomy Arpaly - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):22-32.details
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Epistemic freedom revisited.Gregory Antill - 2020 - Synthese 197 (2):793-815.details
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Epistemic Normativity is Independent of our Goals.Alex Worsnip - forthcoming - In Ernest Sosa, Matthias Steup, John Turri & Blake Roeber (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, 3rd edition. Wiley-Blackwell.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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The Ethics of Attention: an argument and a framework.Sebastian Watzl - 2022 - In Sophie Archer (ed.), Salience: A Philosophical Inquiry. New York, NY: Routledge.details
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Evidentialism and Moral Encroachment.Georgi Gardiner - 2018 - In McCain Kevin (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. Cham: Springer Verlag.details
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Justifying the principle of indifference.Jon Williamson - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (3):559-586.details
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Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
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A Defense of Impurist Permissivism.Jenny Yi-Chen Wu - 2023 - Episteme:1-21.details
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Can Pragmatists Be Moderate?Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (3):531-558.details
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There are no epistemic norms of inquiry.David Thorstad - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-24.details
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The ethics of believing out loud.Heather Spradley - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):1-15.details
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Unifying Epistemic and Practical Rationality.Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):136-157.details
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Evidentialism doesn’t make an exception for belief.Keshav Singh - 2021 - Synthese 198 (6):5477-5494.details
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Replies to Beck, Chirimuuta, Rosenhagen, Smithies, and Springle.Susanna Siegel - 2018 - Analytic Philosophy 59 (1):175-190.details
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Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
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Permissive Situations and Direct Doxastic Control.Blake Roeber - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (2):415-431.details
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Pragmatic Skepticism.Susanna Rinard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):434-453.details
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Eliminating epistemic rationality#.Susanna Rinard - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):3-18.details
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Believing for Practical Reasons.Susanna Rinard - 2018 - Noûs (4):763-784.details
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