- The New Internalism About Prudential Value.Anthony Kelley - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-15.details
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Alienation, Engagement, and Welfare.James Fanciullo - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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A defence of the desire theory of well-being.Atus Mariqueo-Russell - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Southamptondetails
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Well-being and the problem of unstable desires.Atus Mariqueo-Russell - 2023 - Utilitas 35 (4):260-276.details
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Alienation, Resonance, and Experience in Theories of Well-Being.Andrew Alwood - 2023 - Philosophia 51 (4):2225-2240.details
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Well-Being as Need Satisfaction.Marlowe Fardell - 2022 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 21 (3).details
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Artifactual Normativity.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Synthese 200 (126):1-19.details
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Overriding Adolescent Refusals of Treatment.Anthony Skelton, Lisa Forsberg & Isra Black - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 20 (3):221-247.details
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Structuring Wellbeing.Christopher Frugé - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):564-580.details
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A Defense of Basic Prudential Hedonism.Joe Nelson - 2020 - Dissertation, Duke Universitydetails
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Well-Being as Harmony.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2020 - In David Kaspar (ed.), Explorations in Ethics. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 117-140.details
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Subjective Moral Biases & Fallacies: Developing Scientifically & Practically Adequate Moral Analogues of Cognitive Heuristics & Biases.Mark H. Herman - 2019 - Dissertation, Bowling Green State Universitydetails
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The Welfare-Nihilist Arguments against Judgment Subjectivism.Anthony Bernard Kelley - 2021 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 19 (3):291-310.details
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Internal Reasons and the Boy Who Cried Wolf.Samuel Asarnow - 2019 - Ethics 130 (1):32-58.details
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The Case for Stance Dependent Reasons.David Sobel - 2019 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 15 (2).details
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Against Contextualism about Prudential Discourse.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):699-720.details
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On Two Interpretations of the Desire-Satisfaction Theory of Prudential Value.Joseph van Weelden - 2019 - Utilitas 31 (2):137-156.details
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(1 other version)Taking Prudence Seriously.Guy Fletcher - 2019 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 14. Oxford University Press. pp. 70-94.details
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Which Desires Are Relevant to Well‐Being?Chris Heathwood - 2017 - Noûs 53 (3):664-688.details
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The Reasoning View and Defeasible Practical Reasoning.Samuel Asarnow - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):614-636.details
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Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Deflationary Normative Pluralism.Evan Tiffany - 2007 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 33 (sup1):231-262.details
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Objectivity/Subjectivity of Values.Jason R. Raibley - 2014 - In Alex C. Michalos (ed.), Encyclopedia of Quality of Life and Well-Being Research. Springer. pp. 4438-4443.details
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Desire-Fulfillment Theory.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - In Guy Fletcher (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Well-Being. New York,: Routledge. pp. 135-147.details
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(1 other version)Well-Being, Time, and Dementia.Jennifer Hawkins - 2014 - Ethics 124 (3):507-542.details
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Subjectivism without Desire.Dale Dorsey - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (3):407-442.details
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Desire-satisfaction and Welfare as Temporal.Dale Dorsey - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (1):151-171.details
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Resisting buck-passing accounts of prudential value.Guy Fletcher - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):77-91.details
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Explanation, Internalism, and Reasons for Action.David Sobel - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):218.details
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(1 other version)Relational good and the multiplicity problem.Connie S. Rosati - 2009 - Philosophical Issues 19 (1):205-234.details
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Happiness, the self and human flourishing.Daniel M. Haybron - 2008 - Utilitas 20 (1):21-49.details
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The attractions and delights of goodness.By Jyl Gentzler - 2004 - Philosophical Quarterly 54 (216):353–367.details
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Between internalism and externalism in ethics.Evan Simpson - 1999 - Philosophical Quarterly 49 (195):201-214.details
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Agency and the open question argument.Connie S. Rosati - 2003 - Ethics 113 (3):490-527.details
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Prudential Perfectionism: A Refinement.Dale Dorsey - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-19.details
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Offloading and Mistakes in Artifacts and Value.Christopher Frugé - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
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Hedonic Consciousness and Moral Status.Declan Smithies - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind.details
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Telic Perfectionism and the Badness of Pain.Antti Kauppinen - forthcoming - In Mauro Rossi & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Perspectives on Ill-Being. Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Welfare Bads and Other Failures of Reason.Antti Kauppinen - 2022 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 46:251-279.details
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Perfectionist Preferentism.Donald W. Bruckner - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):127-138.details
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Why Be a Subjectivist about Wellbeing?Peter Königs - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (2):165-179.details
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Normative principles and the nature of mind-dependence.Justin Morton - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (4):1153-1176.details
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The Disjunctive Hybrid Theory of Prudential Value: An Inclusive Approach to the Good Life.Joseph Van Weelden - 2018 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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Scales for Scope: A New Solution to the Scope Problem for Pro-Attitude-Based Well-Being.Hasko von Kriegstein - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):417-438.details
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Virtue Ethics and the Problem of Indirection: A Pluralistic Value-Centred Approach: Christine Swanton.Christine Swanton - 1997 - Utilitas 9 (2):167-181.details
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Against Welfare Subjectivism.Eden Lin - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):354-377.details
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Internalizm racji do działania a granice relatywizmu.Tomasz Żuradzki - 2010 - Etyka 43:20-39.details
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The Missing-Desires Objection to Hybrid Theories of Well-Being.William Lauinger - 2013 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 51 (2):270-295.details
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Internalism about a person’s good: don’t believe it.Alexander Sarch - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):161-184.details
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(1 other version)The Entanglement Problem and Idealization in Moral Philosophy.Olle Risberg - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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