- Reasons, Rationalization, and Rationality.Erhan Demircioglu - 2021 - Philosophia 51 (1):113-137.details
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McGinn on delusion and imagination. [REVIEW]Gregory Currie & Nicholas Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Books 47 (4):306-313.details
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Morgan’s Quaker gun and the species of belief.Devin Sanchez Curry - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):119-144.details
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The ins and outs of conscious belief.Sam Coleman - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):517-548.details
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Replies to: Commentators.Annalisa Coliva - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (2):343-352.details
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Self-deception and shifting degrees of belief.Chi Yin Chan & Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (8):1204-1220.details
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Vices of the Mind: A Reply to ALFANO, PLAKIAS, TANESINI, and VIGANI.Quassim Cassam - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (5):881-888.details
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Disclaiming epistemic Akrasia: arguments and commentaries.Veronica S. Campos - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).details
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Belief through Thick and Thin.Wesley Buckwalter, David Rose & John Turri - 2015 - Noûs 49 (4):748-775.details
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Clearing conceptual space for cognitivist motivational internalism.Danielle Bromwich - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (3):343 - 367.details
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Unendorsed Beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (1):49-68.details
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Précis of Delusions and Other Irrational Beliefs.Lisa Bortolotti - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):1-4.details
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Nikolaj Nottelmann (ed.), New Essays on Belief: Constitution, Content and Structure, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, xii + 258 pp., GBP 55 (Hardback), ISBN 9781137026514. [REVIEW]Lisa Bortolotti & Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):141-146.details
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In Defence of Modest Doxasticism about Delusions.Lisa Bortolotti - 2012 - Neuroethics 5 (1):39-53.details
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Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.details
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Dissonance and Irrationality: A Criticism of The In‐Between Account of Dissonance Cases.Cristina Borgoni - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (1):48-57.details
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Physical Intentionality, Extrinsicness, and the Direction of Causation.William A. Bauer - 2016 - Acta Analytica 31 (4):397-417.details
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Powers and the Pantheistic Problem of Unity.William A. Bauer - 2019 - Sophia 58 (4):563-580.details
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If You Can't Change What You Believe, You Don't Believe It.Grace Helton - 2018 - Noûs 54 (3):501-526.details
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Why ‘believes’ is not a vague predicate.Sophie Archer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3029-3048.details
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Chimpanzee mind reading: Don't stop believing.Kristin Andrews - 2017 - Philosophy Compass 12 (1):e12394.details
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A Minimalist Threshold for Epistemically Irrational Beliefs.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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Delusions and Dispositionalism about Belief.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Mind and Language 26 (5):596-628.details
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Alienated Belief.David Hunter - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (2):221-240.details
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Beliefs as Self-Verifying Fictions.Angela Mendelovici - forthcoming - In Eric Schwitzgebel & Jonathan Jong (eds.), What is Belief? Oxford University Press.details
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A puzzle about epistemic akrasia.Daniel Greco - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):201-219.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.details
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The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind Volume 1. Oxford University Press. pp. 36-57.details
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The Point of Political Belief.Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder - 2021 - In Michael Hannon & Jeroen de Ridder (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Political Epistemology. New York: Routledge.details
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Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Greco - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 84-104.details
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Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Lisa Bortolotti - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73.details
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Reasons and Causes in Psychiatry: Ideas from Donald Davidson’s Work.Elisabetta Lalumera - 2018 - In Annalisa Coliva, Paolo Leonardi & Sebastiano Moruzzi (eds.), Eva Picardi on Language, Analysis and History. Londra, Regno Unito: Palgrave. pp. 281-296.details
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Constitutivism, belief, and emotion.Larry A. Herzberg - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):455-482.details
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In defense of a pragmatic picture of belief.Aaron Zimmerman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (2):449-457.details
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Noncomparabilism in epistemology.Mark Emerson Wunderlich - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (2):133 - 151.details
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Why Double-Check?Elise Woodard - forthcoming - Episteme:1-24.details
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Faith and disbelief.Robert K. Whitaker - 2019 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 85 (2):149-172.details
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Common-sense functionalism and the extended mind.Jack Wadham - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (262):136-151.details
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Managing Mismatch Between Belief and Behavior.Maura Tumulty - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (3):261-292.details
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Delusions and Not-Quite-Beliefs.Maura Tumulty - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):29-37.details
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Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.details
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Disagreement and Attitudinal Relativism.Jack Spencer - 2016 - Mind 125 (498):511-539.details
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Intending, believing, and supposing at will.Joshua Shepherd - 2018 - Ratio 31 (3):321-330.details
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Phenomenal dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980.details
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Mad Belief?Eric Schwitzgebel - 2011 - Neuroethics 5 (1):13-17.details
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Knowing Your Own Beliefs.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):41-62.details
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A Phenomenal, Dispositional Account of Belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2002 - Noûs 36 (2):249-275.details
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Acting contrary to our professed beliefs or the gulf between occurrent judgment and dispositional belief.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2010 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 91 (4):531-553.details
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Toward a Post-Kantian Constructivism.Jack Samuel - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 9 (53):1449–1484.details
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