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There Is No Knowledge From Falsehood

Episteme 12 (1):53-74 (2015)

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  1. Justified Belief From Unjustified Belief.Peter Murphy - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (4):602-617.
    Under what conditions is a belief inferentially justified? A partial answer is found in Justification from Justification : a belief is inferentially justified only if all of the beliefs from which it is essentially inferred are justified. After reviewing some important features of JFJ, I offer a counterexample to it. Then I outline a positive suggestion for how to think about inferentially justified beliefs while still retaining a basing condition. I end by concluding that epistemologists need a model of inferentially (...)
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  • Knowledge, Despite Evidence to the Contrary.Rodrigo Borges - 2019 - In Cherie Braden, Rodrigo Borges & Branden Fitelson (eds.), Themes From Klein. Springer Verlag.
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  • Knowledge From Falsehood: An Experimental Study.John Turri - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):167-178.
    Thought: A Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.
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  • Revisiting Knowledge From Falsehood.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues - 2017 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 62 (3):705.
    Os defensores da teoria do Conhecimento a partir de Falsidade nos apresentam exemplos putativos de conhecimento inferencial nos quais um sujeito S, supostamente, adquire conhecimento através de uma inferência competente realizada a partir de uma falsidade. Se eles estiverem certos, teremos que enfrentar alguns problemas importantes para a epistemologia do raciocínio. No entanto, neste artigo, argumentarei que não há conhecimento a partir de falsidades, os casos apresentados pelos defensores de KFF não constituem casos de conhecimento inferencial genuíno e a reação (...)
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  • A Dilemma for the Knowledge Despite Falsehood Strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):166-182.
    One strategy for dealing with apparent cases of knowledge from falsehood is to deny that the knowledge actually is from a falsehood. Those endorsing such a move have suggested that cases of knowledge from falsehood are instead cases of knowledge despite falsehood. We here provide a dilemma for those wanting to reject the possibility of knowledge from falsehood. The dilemma is explained in part by examining recent attempts to deny that knowledge can be inferentially derived from falsehood.
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