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Means-end coherence, stringency, and subjective reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (2):223 - 248.details
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Instrumental mythology.Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (2):1-13.details
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Boulesic-Doxastic Logic.Daniel Rönnedal - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (3):83-132.details
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Unifying the requirements of rationality.Andrew Reisner - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (3):243-260.details
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What's wrong with Moore's argument?James Pryor - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):349–378.details
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Rational requirements and reasoning.Herlinde Pauer-Studer - 2014 - Economics and Philosophy 30 (3):513-528.details
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Instrumental normativity and the practicable good: A Murdochian constitutivist account.Evgenia Mylonaki - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):349-388.details
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¿Estamos racionalmente obligados a ser eficientes?Julen Ibarrondo Murguialday - 2018 - Análisis Filosófico 38 (2):157-181.details
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Against triggering accounts of robust reason-giving.Ezequiel H. Monti - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3731-3753.details
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The Scope of Instrumental Morality.Michael Moehler - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):431-451.details
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A reason to be rational.Carl David Https://Orcidorg191X Mildenberger - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (9-10):1008-1032.details
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Conjuring Ethics from Words.Jonathan McKeown-Green, Glen Pettigrove & Aness Webster - 2012 - Noûs 49 (1):71-93.details
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What is Good Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:153-174.details
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What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do.Errol Lord - 2017 - Mind 126 (504):1109-1154.details
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The real symmetry problem(s) for wide-scope accounts of rationality.Errol Lord - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-22.details
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The real symmetry problem for wide-scope accounts of rationality.Errol Lord - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):443-464.details
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The Coherent and the Rational.Errol Lord - 2014 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (2):151-175.details
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Having reasons and the factoring account.Errol Lord - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 149 (3):283 - 296.details
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Everything First.Errol Lord - 2023 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 97 (1):248-272.details
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The Real Myth of Coherence.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1211-1230.details
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The independence of (in)coherence.Wooram Lee - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6563-6584.details
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Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.details
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Preference‐Conditioned Necessities: Detachment and Practical Reasoning.Sven Lauer & Cleo Condoravdi - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):584-621.details
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You ought to ϕ only if you may believe that you ought to ϕ.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2016 - Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265):760-82.details
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Problems for Broome’s Cognitivist Account of Instrumental Reasoning.Jeppe Berggreen Høj - 2010 - Acta Analytica 25 (3):299-316.details
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Imperative Inference and Practical Rationality.Daniel W. Harris - 2021 - Philosophical Studies (4):1065-1090.details
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Knowledge and the Many Norms on Action.James Fritz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1191-1210.details
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Knowledge of Partial Awareness in Disorders of Consciousness: Implications for Ethical Evaluations?Orsolya Friedrich - 2011 - Neuroethics 6 (1):13-23.details
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What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
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The Property of Rationality: A Guide to What Rationality Requires?Julian Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):117-140.details
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One Ought Too Many.Stephen Finlay & Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):102-124.details
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Oughts and ends.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.details
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A Constitutive Account of 'Rationality Requires'.Julian Fink - 2014 - Erkenntnis (4):909-941.details
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What the doctor should do: perspectivist duties for objectivists about ought.Davide Fassio - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (5):1523-1544.details
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Not Just a Truthometer: Taking Oneself Seriously (but not Too Seriously) in Cases of Peer Disagreement.David Enoch - 2010 - Mind 119 (476):953-997.details
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Whither anankastics?Billy Dunaway & Alex Silk - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):75-94.details
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Which Reasons? Which Rationality?Daniel Fogal & Alex Worsnip - 2021 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 8.details
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Instrumental rationality.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:280-309.details
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Cognitivism about Practical Rationality.John Brunero - 2014 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 9:18-44.details
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Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.details
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Structural Rationality.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Alex Worsnip - 2023 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Asymmetry, Scope, and Rational Consistency.Julian Fink - 2010 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 10 (2):109-130.details
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Instrumental Rationality.John Brunero & Niko Kolodny - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The Eclipse of Instrumental Rationality.Kurt Sylvan - forthcoming - In The Routledge Handbook of Practical Reason.details
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Can There Be a Knowledge-First Ethics of Belief?Dennis Whitcomb - 2014 - In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vits (eds.), The Ethics of Belief: Individual and Social. Oxford University Press.details
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Instrumental Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2013 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy. Routledge.details
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Is it OK to Make Mistakes? Appraisal and False Normative Belief.Claire Field - 2019 - Dissertation, University of St Andrewsdetails
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The Humean theory of reasons.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 195--219.details
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The Rational Significance of Desire.Avery Archer - 2013 - Dissertation, Columbia Universitydetails
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