- Varieties of Moral Naturalism.David Copp - 2012 - Filosofia Unisinos 13 (2 - suppl.).details
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The Possibility of Love Independent Reasons.Jussi Suikkanen - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (1):32-54.details
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Agency and Self‐Sufficiency in Fichte's Ethics.Michelle Kosch - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):348-380.details
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Pure Cognitivism and Beyond.Attila Tanyi - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):331-348.details
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No reason for identity: on the relation between motivating and normative reasons.Susanne Mantel - 2014 - Philosophical Explorations 17 (1):49-62.details
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Expressivism and Moore's Paradox.Jack Woods - 2014 - Philosophers' Imprint 14:1-12.details
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Acting for the Right Reasons, Abilities, and Obligation.Errol Lord - 2015 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 10. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Instrumental Rationality.Jonathan Way - 2013 - In Tim Crane (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia of Philsophy. Routledge.details
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Constitutivism about Practical Reasons.Paul Katsafanas - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 367-394.details
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The problem with the Frege–Geach problem.Nate Charlow - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):635-665.details
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Reasons for Belief, Reasons for Action, the Aim of Belief, and the Aim of Action.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - In Clayton Littlejohn & John Turri (eds.), Epistemic Norms: New Essays on Action, Belief, and Assertion. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Attitudes for Non-Cognitivists: Solving the Specification Problem.Gunnar Björnsson & Tristram McPherson - 2014 - Mind 123 (489):1-38.details
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There’s Some Fetish in Your Ethics: A limited defense of purity reasoning in moral discourse.Dan Demetriou - 2013 - Journal of Philosophical Research 38:377-404.details
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Recent Work on Motivational Internalism.Fredrik Björklund, Gunnar Björnsson, John Eriksson, Ragnar Francén Olinder & Caj Strandberg - 2012 - Analysis 72 (1):124-137.details
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Self knowledge and knowing other minds: The implicit / explicit distinction as a tool in understanding theory of mind.Tillmann Vierkant - 2012 - British Journal of Developmental Psychology 30 (1):141-155.details
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Norms and conventions.Nicholas Southwood & Lina Eriksson - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):195 - 217.details
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Divine Will Theory: Desires or Intentions?Christian Miller - 2013 - In L. Kvanvig Jonathan (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion. Oxford University Press.details
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Things That Make Things Reasonable.John Gibbons - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):335-361.details
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Errors upon errors: a reply to joyce.Stephen Finlay - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (3):535 - 547.details
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Moral Reality: A Defence of Moral Realism.Caj Strandberg - 2004 - Lund University.details
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Recent work on normativity.Stephen Finlay - 2010 - Analysis 70 (2):331-346.details
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What moral saints look like.Vanessa Carbonell - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):pp. 371-398.details
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Counterfactual desire as belief.J. Robert G. Williams - manuscriptdetails
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Recent work on ethical realism.William J. FitzPatrick - 2009 - Analysis 69 (4):746-760.details
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Desires as additional reasons? The case of tie-breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.details
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You gotta do what you gotta do.John Gibbons - 2009 - Noûs 43 (1):157-177.details
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Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.details
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Four Faces of Moral Realism.Stephen Finlay - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.details
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Debunking morality: Evolutionary naturalism and moral error theory.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2003 - Biology and Philosophy 18 (4):567-581.details
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Moral realism, normative reasons, and rational intelligibility.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Erkenntnis 57 (1):47-69.details
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Normative Appeals to the Natural.Pekka Väyrynen - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):279 - 314.details
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The hypothetical imperative?Mark Schroeder - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):357 – 372.details
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Are desires de dicto fetishistic?Jonas Olson - 2002 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):89 – 96.details
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After objectivity: An empirical study of moral judgment.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (1):3 – 26.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.details
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The Return of Moral Fictionalism.Nadeem J. Z. Hussain - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):149–188.details
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The Reasons that Matter.Stephen Finlay - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (1):1 – 20.details
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Prankster's ethics.Andy Egan & Brian Weatherson - 2004 - Philosophical Perspectives 18 (1):45–52.details
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Quasi-realism and fundamental moral error.Andy Egan - 2007 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 85 (2):205 – 219.details
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Mathematics and conceptual analysis.Antony Eagle - 2008 - Synthese 161 (1):67–88.details
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Moral unreason: The case of psychopathy.Heidi Lene Maibom - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.details
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Intentional action and intending: Recent empirical studies.Hugh J. McCann - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (6):737-748.details
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Metaethics and emotions research: A response to Prinz.Karen Jones - 2006 - Philosophical Explorations 9 (1):45-53.details
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How Humeans can make normative beliefs motivating.William Ratoff - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1245-1265.details
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One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.details
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Bipolar Obligations, Recognition Respect, and Second-Personal Morality.Jonas Vandieken - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):291-315.details
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How Should I Be? A Defense of Platonic Rational Egoism.Jyl Gentzler - 2015 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (1):39-67.details
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Tractatus practico-theoreticus.Nythamar De Oliveira - 2016 - Porto Alegre, Brazil: Editora Fi.details
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The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory.Jason Konek & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (509):69-107.details
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