If are such that δ is indestructibly supercompact and γ is measurable, then it must be the case that level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness fails. We prove a theorem which points to this result being best possible. Specifically, we show that relative to the existence of cardinals such that κ1 is λ‐supercompact and λ is inaccessible, there is a model for level by level inequivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness containing a supercompact cardinal in which κ’s (...) strong compactness, but not supercompactness, is indestructible under κ‐directed closed forcing. In this model, κ is the least strongly compact cardinal, and no cardinal is supercompact up to an inaccessible cardinal. (shrink)

We prove three theorems concerning Laver indestructibility, strong compactness, and measurability. We then state some related open questions.

Abstract.This paper is the second in a series of three culminating in an ordinal analysis of Π12-comprehension. Its objective is to present an ordinal analysis for the subsystem of second order arithmetic with Δ12-comprehension, bar induction and Π12-comprehension for formulae without set parameters. Couched in terms of Kripke-Platek set theory, KP, the latter system corresponds to KPi augmented by the assertion that there exists a stable ordinal, where KPi is KP with an additional axiom stating that every set is contained (...) in an admissible set. (shrink)

Vopěnka’s Principle is a natural large cardinal axiom that has recently found applications in category theory and algebraic topology. We show that Vopěnka’s Principle and Vopěnka cardinals are relatively consistent with a broad range of other principles known to be independent of standard (ZFC) set theory, such as the Generalised Continuum Hypothesis, and the existence of a definable well-order on the universe of all sets. We achieve this by showing that they are indestructible under a broad class of forcing constructions, (...) specifically, reverse Easton iterations of increasingly directed closed partial orders. (shrink)

Given a regular cardinal λ and λ many supercompact cardinals, we describe a type of forcing such that in the generic extension there is a cardinal κ with cofinality λ, the Singular Cardinal Hypothesis at κ fails, and the tree property holds at κ+.

We present a general construction of a □κ-sequence in Jensen's fine structural extender models. This construction yields a local definition of a canonical □κ-sequence as well as a characterization of those cardinals κ, for which the principle □κ fails. Such cardinals are called subcompact and can be described in terms of elementary embeddings. Our construction is carried out abstractly, making use only of a few fine structural properties of levels of the model, such as solidity and condensation.

We show that, assuming the consistency of a supercompact cardinal, the first inaccessible cardinal can satisfy a strong form of a Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic L, a logic introduced in [5] strictly between first order logic and second order logic. On the other hand we show that in the light of present day inner model technology, nothing short of a supercompact cardinal suffices for this result. In particular, we show that the Löwenheim–Skolem–Tarski theorem for the equicardinality logic at (...) κ implies the Singular Cardinals Hypothesis above κ as well as Projective Determinacy. (shrink)

Given a supercompact cardinal κ and a regular cardinal Λ < κ, we describe a type of forcing such that in the generic extension the cofinality of κ is Λ, there is a very good scale at κ, a bad scale at κ, and SCH at κ fails. When creating our model we have great freedom in assigning the value of 2κ, and so we can make SCH hold or fail arbitrarily badly.

We characterize some large cardinal properties, such as μ-measurability and P 2 (κ)-measurability, in terms of ultrafilters, and then explore the Rudin-Keisler (RK) relations between these ultrafilters and supercompact measures on P κ (2 κ ). This leads to the characterization of 2 κ -supercompactness in terms of a measure on measure sequences, and also to the study of a certain natural subset, Full κ , of P κ (2 κ ), whose elements code measures on cardinals less than κ. (...) The hypothesis that Full κ is stationary (a weaker assumption than 2 κ -supercompactness) is equivalent to a higher order Lowenheim-Skolem property, and settles a question about directed versus chain-type unions on P κ λ. (shrink)

Suppose $\kappa$ is a supercompact cardinal and $\lambda > \kappa$. We study the relationship between the partition property and the weak partition property for normal ultrafilters on $P_\kappa\lambda$. On the one hand, we show that the following statement is consistent, given an appropriate large cardinal assumption: The partition property and the weak partition property are equivalent, there are many normal ultrafilters that satisfy these properties, and there are many normal ultrafilters that do not satisfy these properties. On the other hand, (...) we consider the assumption that, for some $\lambda > \kappa$, there exists a normal ultrafilter $U$ on $P_\kappa\lambda$ such that $U$ satisfies the weak partition property but does not satisfy the partition property. We show that this assumption is implied by the assertion that there exists a cardinal $\gamma > \kappa$ such that $\gamma$ is $\gamma^+$-supercompact, and, assuming the GCH, it implies the assertion that there exists a cardinal $\gamma > \kappa$ such that $\gamma$ is a measurable cardinal with a normal ultrafilter concentrating on measurable cardinals. (shrink)

Using an idea developed in joint work with Shelah, we show how to redefine Laver's notion of forcing making a supercompact cardinal $\kappa$ indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing to give a new proof of the Kimchi-Magidor Theorem in which every compact cardinal in the universe satisfies certain indestructibility properties. Specifically, we show that if K is the class of supercompact cardinals in the ground model, then it is possible to force and construct a generic extension in which the only strongly (...) compact cardinals are the elements of K or their measurable limit points, every $\kappa \in K$ is a supercompact cardinal indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing, and every $\kappa$ a measurable limit point of K is a strongly compact cardinal indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing not changing $\wp$. We then derive as a corollary a model for the existence of a strongly compact cardinal $\kappa$ which is not $\kappa^+$ supercompact but which is indestructible under $\kappa$-directed closed forcing not changing $\wp and remains non-$\kappa^+$ supercompact after such a forcing has been done. (shrink)

Here, we analyse some recent applications of set theory to topology and argue that set theory is not only the closed domain where mathematics is usually founded, but also a flexible framework where imperfect intuitions can be precisely formalized and technically elaborated before they possibly migrate toward other branches. This apparently new role is mostly reminiscent of the one played by other external fields like theoretical physics, and we think that it could contribute to revitalize the interest in set theory (...) in the future. (shrink)

Combining techniques of the first author and Shelah with ideas of Magidor, we show how to get a model in which, for fixed but arbitrary finite n, the first n strongly compact cardinals κ 1 ,..., κ n are so that κ i for i = 1,..., n is both the i th measurable cardinal and κ + i supercompact. This generalizes an unpublished theorem of Magidor and answers a question of Apter and Shelah.

We show the consistency, relative to the appropriate supercompactness or strong compactness assumptions, of the existence of a non-supercompact strongly compact cardinal $\kappa _0$ (the least measurable cardinal) exhibiting properties which are impossible when $\kappa _0$ is supercompact. In particular, we construct models in which $\square _{\kappa ^+}$ holds for every inaccessible cardinal $\kappa $ except $\kappa _0$, GCH fails at every inaccessible cardinal except $\kappa _0$, and $\kappa _0$ is less than the least Woodin cardinal.

We define a generic Vopěnka cardinal to be an inaccessible cardinal \ such that for every first-order language \ of cardinality less than \ and every set \ of \-structures, if \ and every structure in \ has cardinality less than \, then an elementary embedding between two structures in \ exists in some generic extension of V. We investigate connections between generic Vopěnka cardinals in models of ZFC and the number and complexity of \-Suslin sets of reals in models (...) of ZF. In particular, we show that ZFC + is equiconsistent with ZF + \\) where \ is the pointclass of all \-Suslin sets of reals, and also with ZF + \\) + \\) where \ is the least ordinal that is not a surjective image of the reals. (shrink)

Penelope Maddy has recently addressed the set-theoretic multiverse, and expressed reservations on its status and merits ([Maddy, 2017]). The purpose of the paper is to examine her concerns, by using the interpretative framework of set-theoretic naturalism. I first distinguish three main forms of 'multiversism', and then I proceed to analyse Maddy's concerns. Among other things, I take into account salient aspects of multiverse-related mathematics , in particular, research programmes in set theory for which the use of the multiverse seems to (...) be crucial, and show how one may provide responses to Maddy's concerns based on a careful analysis of 'multiverse practice'. (shrink)

It is shown in this paper that it is consistent (relative to almost huge cardinals) for various club guessing ideals to be saturated.

This is an article whose intended scope is to deal with the question of infinity in formal mathematics, mainly in the context of the theory of large cardinals as it has developed over time since Cantor’s introduction of the theory of transfinite numbers in the late nineteenth century. A special focus has been given to this theory’s interrelation with the forcing theory, introduced by P. Cohen in his lectures of 1963 and further extended and deepened since then, which leads to (...) a development and further refinement of the theory of large cardinals ultimately touching, especially in view of the discussion in the last section, on the metatheoretical nature of infinity. The whole undertaking, which takes into account major stages of the research in large cardinals theory, tries to present a defensible argumentation against an ontology of infinity actually rooted in the notion of subjectivity within the world. This means that rather than talking of a general ontology of infinity in the ideal platonic or in the aristotelian sense of potentiality, even in the alternative sense of an ontology of the event in A. Badiou’s sense, one can argue from a subjective point of view about the impossibility of defining cardinalities greater than the first uncountable one \ that would correspond to a distinct existence in real world terms or would be supported by a mathematical intuition in terms of reciprocity with experience. The argumentation from the particular standpoint includes also certain comments on the delimitative character of Gödel’s constructive universe L and the influence of the constructive approach in narrowing the breadth of an ‘ontology’ of infinity. (shrink)

We show from an abstract comparison principle that the Mitchell order is linear on sufficiently strong ultrafilters: normal ultrafilters, Dodd solid ultrafilters, and assuming GCH, generalized normal ultrafilters. This gives a conditional answer to the well-known question of whether a [Formula: see text]-supercompact cardinal [Formula: see text] must carry more than one normal measure of order 0. Conditioned on a very plausible iteration hypothesis, the answer is no, since the Ultrapower Axiom holds in the canonical inner models at the finite (...) levels of supercompactness. (shrink)

§1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is, in general, to report the state of the art of ordinal analysis and, in particular, the recent success in obtaining an ordinal analysis for the system of-analysis, which is the subsystem of formal second order arithmetic, Z2, with comprehension confined to-formulae. The same techniques can be used to provide ordinal analyses for theories that are reducible to iterated-comprehension, e.g.,-comprehension. The details will be laid out in [28].Ordinal-theoretic proof theory came into existence in (...) 1936, springing forth from Gentzen's head in the course of his consistency proof of arithmetic. Gentzen fostered hopes that with sufficiently large constructive ordinals one could establish the consistency of analysis, i.e., Z2. Considerable progress has been made in proof theory since Gentzen's tragic death on August 4th, 1945, but an ordinal analysis of Z2is still something to be sought. However, for reasons that cannot be explained here,-comprehension appears to be the main stumbling block on the road to understanding full comprehension, giving hope for an ordinal analysis of Z2in the foreseeable future.Roughly speaking,ordinally informativeproof theory attaches ordinals in a recursive representation system to proofs in a given formal system; transformations on proofs to certain canonical forms are then partially mirrored by operations on the associated ordinals. Among other things, ordinal analysis of a formal system serves to characterize its provably recursive ordinals, functions and functionals and can yield both conservation and combinatorial independence results. (shrink)

In [1] and [2] there is a development of a class theory, whose axioms were formulated by Bernays and based on a reflection principle. See [3]. These axioms are formulated in first order logic with ∈:Extensionality.Class specification. Ifϕis a formula andAis not free inϕ, thenNote that “xis a set“ can be written as “∃u”.Subsets.Note also that “B⊆A” can be written as “∀x”.Reflection principle. Ifϕis a formula, thenwhere “uis a transitive set” is the formula “∃v ∧ ∀x∀y” andϕPuis the formulaϕrelativized to (...) subsets ofu.Foundation.Choice for sets.We denote byB1the theory with axioms to.The existence of weakly compact and-indescribable cardinals for everynis established inB1by the method of defining all metamathematical concepts forB1in a weaker theory of classes where the natural numbers can be defined and using the reflection principle to reflect the satisfaction relation; see [1]. There is a proof of the consistency ofB1assuming the existence of a measurable cardinal; see [4] and [5]. In [6] several set and class theories with reflection principles are developed. In them, the existence of inaccessible cardinals and some kinds of indescribable cardinals can be proved; and also there is a generalization of indescribability for higher-order languages using only class parameters.The purpose of this work is to develop higher order reflection principles, including higher order parameters, in order to obtain other large cardinals. (shrink)

We prove, assuming the existence of large cardinals, the relative consistency of the existence of strongly saturated ideals on small cardinals. We also give some information about the problem, how many σ-additive, 0-1-valued measures over a small cardinal are necessary, such that every subset of the cardinal is measurable in at least one of them.

In this paper we introduce the Wholeness Axiom , which asserts that there is a nontrivial elementary embedding from V to itself. We formalize the axiom in the language {∈, j } , adding to the usual axioms of ZFC all instances of Separation, but no instance of Replacement, for j -formulas, as well as axioms that ensure that j is a nontrivial elementary embedding from the universe to itself. We show that WA has consistency strength strictly between I 3 (...) and the existence of a cardinal that is super- n -huge for every n . ZFC + WA is used as a background theory for studying generalizations of Laver sequences. We define the notion of Laver sequence for general classes E consisting of elementary embeddings of the form i :V β → M , where M is transitive, and use five globally defined large cardinal notions – strong, supercompact, extendible, super-almost-huge, superhuge – for examples and special cases of the main results. Assuming WA at the beginning, and eventually refining the hypothesis as far as possible, we prove the existence of a strong form of Laver sequence for a broad range of classes E that include the five large cardinal types mentioned. We show that if κ is globally superstrong, if E is Laver-closed at beth fixed points, and if there are superstrong embeddings i with critical point κ and arbitrarily large targets such that E is weakly compatible with i , then our standard constructions are E -Laver at κ . , there is an extendible Laver sequence at κ .) In addition, in most cases our Laver sequences can be made special if E is upward λ -closed for sufficiently many λ. (shrink)

We construct two models in which the least strongly compact cardinal κ is also the least strong cardinal. In each of these models, κ satisfies indestructibility properties for both its strong compactness and strongness.

We force and construct a model in which level by level equivalence between strong compactness and supercompactness holds, along with a strong form of diamond and a version of square consistent with supercompactness. This generalises a result due to the first author. There are no restrictions in our model on the structure of the class of supercompact cardinals.

We show that it is consistent, relative to n ∈ ω supercompact cardinals, for the strongly compact and measurable Woodin cardinals to coincide precisely. In particular, it is consistent for the first n strongly compact cardinals to be the first n measurable Woodin cardinals, with no cardinal above the n th strongly compact cardinal being measurable. In addition, we show that it is consistent, relative to a proper class of supercompact cardinals, for the strongly compact cardinals and the cardinals which (...) are both strong cardinals and Woodin cardinals to coincide precisely. We also show how the techniques employed can be used to prove additional theorems about possible relationships between Woodin cardinals and strongly compact cardinals. (shrink)

We give an extender characterization of a very strong elementary embedding between transitive models of set theory, whose existence is known as the axiom I2. As an application, we show that the positive solution of a partition problem raised by Magidor would refute it.

We present a survey of combinatorial set theory relevant to the study of singular cardinals and their successors. The topics covered include diamonds, squares, club guessing, forcing axioms, and PCF theory.

§1. Introduction. The purpose of this paper is, in general, to report the state of the art of ordinal analysis and, in particular, the recent success in obtaining an ordinal analysis for the system of -analysis, which is the subsystem of formal second order arithmetic, Z2, with comprehension confined to -formulae. The same techniques can be used to provide ordinal analyses for theories that are reducible to iterated -comprehension, e.g., -comprehension. The details will be laid out in [28].Ordinal-theoretic proof theory (...) came into existence in 1936, springing forth from Gentzen's head in the course of his consistency proof of arithmetic. Gentzen fostered hopes that with sufficiently large constructive ordinals one could establish the consistency of analysis, i.e., Z2. Considerable progress has been made in proof theory since Gentzen's tragic death on August 4th, 1945, but an ordinal analysis of Z2 is still something to be sought. However, for reasons that cannot be explained here, -comprehension appears to be the main stumbling block on the road to understanding full comprehension, giving hope for an ordinal analysis of Z2 in the foreseeable future.Roughly speaking, ordinally informative proof theory attaches ordinals in a recursive representation system to proofs in a given formal system; transformations on proofs to certain canonical forms are then partially mirrored by operations on the associated ordinals. Among other things, ordinal analysis of a formal system serves to characterize its provably recursive ordinals, functions and functionals and can yield both conservation and combinatorial independence results. (shrink)

We generalize the ultrapower in a way suitable for choiceless set theory. Given an ultrafilter, forcing is used to construct an extended ultrapower of the universe, designed so that the fundamental theorem of ultrapowers holds even in the absence of the axiom of choice. If, in addition, we assume DC, then an extended ultrapower of the universe by a countably complete ultrafilter must be well-founded. As an application, we prove the Vopěnka-Hrbáček theorem from ZF + DC only (the proof of (...) Vopěnka and Hrbáček used the full axiom of choice): if there exists a strongly compact cardinal, then the universe is not constructible from a set. The same method shows that, in L[ 2 ω ], there cannot exist a θ-compact cardinal less than θ (where θ is the least cardinal onto which the continuum cannot be mapped); a similar result can be proven for other models of the form L[ A ]. The result for L[ 2 ω ] is of particular interest in connection with the axiom of determinacy. The extended ultrapower construction of this paper is an improved version of the author's earlier pseudo-ultrapower method, making use of forcing rather than the omitting types theorem. (shrink)

We prove that in all Mitchell-Steel core models, □ κ holds for all κ. (See Theorem 2.). From this we obtain new consistency strength lower bounds for the failure of □ κ if κ is either singular and countably closed, weakly compact, or measurable. (Corallaries 5, 8, and 9.) Jensen introduced a large cardinal property that we call subcompactness; it lies between superstrength and supercompactness in the large cardinal hierarchy. We prove that in all Jensen core models, □ κ holds (...) iff κ is not subcompact. (See Theorem 15; the only if direction is essentially due to Jensen.). (shrink)

We study the effects of Vopěnka's principle on properties of model theoretic logics. We show that Vopěnka's principle is equivalent to the assumption that every finitely generated logic has a compact cardinal. We show also that it is equivalent to the assumption that every such logic has a global Hanf number.

Suppose that U and U' are normal ultrafilters associated with some supercompact cardinal. How may we compare U and U'? In what ways are they similar, and in what ways are they different? Partial answers are given in [1], [2], [3], [5], [6], and [7]. In this paper, we continue this study. In [6], Menas introduced a combinatorial principle χ(U) of normal ultrafilters U associated with supercompact cardinals, and showed that normal ultrafilters satisfying this property also satisfying this property also (...) satisfy a partition property. In [5], Kunen and Pelletier showed that this partition property for U does not imply χ (U). Using results from [3], we present a different method of finding such normal ultrafilters which satisfy the partition property but do not satisfy χ (U). Our method yields a large collection of such normal ultrafilters. (shrink)

We prove, relative to suitable hypotheses, that it is consistent for there to be unboundedly many measurable cardinals each of which possesses a large degree of strong compactness, and that it is consistent to assume that the least measurable is partially strongly compact and that the second measurable is strongly compact. These results partially answer questions of Magidor on the relationship of strong compactness to measurability.

We ask, when is a property of a model a logical property? According to the so-called Tarski–Sher criterion this is the case when the property is preserved by isomorphisms. We relate this to model-theoretic characteristics of abstract logics in which the model class is definable. This results in a graded concept of logicality in the terminology of Sagi [46]. We investigate which characteristics of logics, such as variants of the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, Completeness theorem, and absoluteness, are relevant from the logicality (...) point of view, continuing earlier work by Bonnay, Feferman, and Sagi. We suggest that a logic is the more logical the closer it is to first order logic. We also offer a refinement of the result of McGee that logical properties of models can be expressed in $L_{\infty \infty }$ if the expression is allowed to depend on the cardinality of the model, based on replacing $L_{\infty \infty }$ by a “tamer” logic. (shrink)

We argue against Foreman’s proposal to settle the continuum hypothesis and other classical independent questions via the adoption of generic large cardinal axioms.