- Rationalization as performative pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2015 - Philosophical Psychology 28 (7):980-1000.details
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Rationalization, Evidence, and Pretense.Jason D'Cruz - 2014 - Ratio 28 (3):318-331.details
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Can the aim of belief ground epistemic normativity?Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (12):3181-3198.details
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Epistemic Instrumentalism and the Too Few Reasons Objection.Charles Côté-Bouchard - 2015 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 23 (3):337-355.details
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In defence of instrumentalism about epistemic normativity.Christopher Cowie - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):4003-4017.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Doxastic transparency and prescriptivity.Andrei Buleandra - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.details
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Doxastic Transparency and Prescriptivity.Andrei Buleandra - 2009 - Dialectica 63 (3):325-332.details
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Belief is Contingently Involuntary.Anthony Robert Booth - 2017 - Ratio 30 (2):107-121.details
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The aim of belief and the aim of science.Alexander Bird - 2019 - Theoria. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science 34 (2):171.details
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No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2020 - Episteme:1-16.details
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No Epistemic Norm or Aim Needed.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2022 - Episteme 19 (3):337-352.details
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On the normative significance of the aims of religious practice.Joona Auvinen - 2021 - Zygon 56 (1):118-138.details
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Weighing Aims in Doxastic Deliberation.C. J. Atkinson - 2019 - Synthese (5):4635-4650.details
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The Aim of Belief and Suspended Belief.C. J. Atkinson - 2021 - Philosophical Psychology 34 (4):581-606.details
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Defending Exclusivity.Sophie Archer - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):326-341.details
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Does belief (only) aim at the truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.details
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Debunking Doxastic Transparency.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2022 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 18 (1):(A3)5-24.details
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What Do We Aim At When We Believe?Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):369-392.details
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Obsessive-compulsive disorder and recalcitrant emotion: relocating the seat of irrationality.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Somogy Varga - 2024 - Philosophical Psychology 37 (3):658-683.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.D. S. Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219-246.details
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The Motivational Role of Belief.Neil Van Leeuwen - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (2):219 - 246.details
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A Problem for Deontic Doxastic Constitutivism.Davide Fassio - 2016 - Philosophical Papers 45 (3):343-364.details
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The Dual Aspects Theory of Truth.Benjamin Jarvis - 2012 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 42 (3-4):209-233.details
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Belief Attribution as Indirect Communication.Christopher Gauker - 2021 - In Ladislav Koreň, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Preston Stovall & Leo Townsend (eds.), Groups, Norms and Practices: Essays on Inferentialism and Collective Intentionality. Cham: Springer. pp. 173-187.details
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Higher-Order Defeat and Doxastic Resilience.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Understanding and Structure.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - In Stephen R. Grimm (ed.), Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Fictional persuasion, transparency, and the aim of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Lisa Bortolotti - 2017 - In Ema Sullivan-Bissett, Helen Bradley & Paul Noordhof (eds.), Art and Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 153-73.details
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Does doxastic transparency support evidentialism?Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Dialectica 62 (4):541-547.details
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Determinism and Judgment. A Critique of the Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom.Luca Zanetti - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):33-54.details
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Deflationism about Truth-Directedness.Luca Zanetti - 2023 - Manuscrito 46 (4):2022-0069.details
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A new argument for evidentialism?Masahiro Yamada - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):399-404.details
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Should I Believe the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):213-224.details
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Interpreting Quantum Theories.James Owen Weatherall - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):275-278.details
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The Communication Argument and the Pluralist Challenge.Shawn Tinghao Wang - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (5):384-399.details
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Transparency belongs to action, not to belief.Nikolai Viedge - forthcoming - South African Journal of Philosophy 37 (2):217-228.details
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In Search of Doxastic Involuntarism.Matthew Vermaire - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):615-631.details
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The transparent failure of norms to keep up standards of belief.Ema Sullivan-Bissett & Paul Noordhof - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1213-1227.details
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Explaining doxastic transparency: aim, norm, or function?Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3453-3476.details
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Aims and Exclusivity.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (3):721-731.details
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Weighing the aim of belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (3):395-405.details
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Weighing the Aim of Belief Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2017 - Logos and Episteme 8 (1):141-145.details
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Why Desire Reasoning is Developmentally Prior to Belief Reasoning.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & John Michael - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (5):526-549.details
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The Truth Norm and Guidance: a Reply to Glüer and Wikforss: Discussions.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2010 - Mind 119 (475):749-755.details
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The No Guidance Argument.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):279-283.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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An Instrumentalist Explanation of Pragmatic Encroachment.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - forthcoming - Analytic Philosophy.details
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Against Essential Mental Normativity Again.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - Dialogue 50 (2):333-346.details
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Against essential normativity of the mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.details
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