- What is Reasoning?Conor McHugh & Jonathan Way - 2018 - Mind 127 (505):167-196.details
|
|
In Defense of Practical Reasons for Belief.Stephanie Leary - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):529-542.details
|
|
Teleology and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2016 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 11:214-240.details
|
|
Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
|
|
Reasons as Premises of Good Reasoning.Jonathan Way - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (2).details
|
|
The Truth in Gnosticism.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Análisis. Revista de Investigación Filosófica.details
|
|
Reasons as the Unity Among the Varieties of Goodness.Rach Cosker-Rowland - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (2):200-227.details
|
|
(1 other version)Ought, Agents, and Actions.Mark Schroeder - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):1-41.details
|
|
How reasons are sensitive to available evidence.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 90-114.details
|
|
The Varieties of Normativity.Derek Clayton Baker - 2018 - In Tristram Colin McPherson & David Plunkett (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Metaethics. New York: Routledge. pp. 567-581.details
|
|
Normativity without Cartesian privilege.Amia Srinivasan - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):273-299.details
|
|
Subjective and Objective Reasons.Andrew Sepielli - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Nietzsche’s meta-axiology: against the skeptical readings.Andrew Huddleston - 2014 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 22 (2):322-342.details
|
|
A very good reason to reject the buck-passing account.Alex Gregory - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):287-303.details
|
|
Irreducibly Normative Properties.Chris Heathwood - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 10:216–244.details
|
|
(1 other version)Duties of Love.R. Jay Wallace - 2012 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 86 (1):175-198.details
|
|
Contextualism in Ethics.Gunnar Björnsson - 2013 - In Hugh LaFollette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Hoboken, NJ: Blackwell.details
|
|
(1 other version)Too Much Morality.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - In Paul Bloomfield (ed.), Morality and Self-Interest. New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Four Faces of Moral Realism.Stephen Finlay - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (6):820-849.details
|
|
What ought probably means, and why you can’t detach it.Stephen Finlay - 2009 - Synthese 177 (1):67 - 89.details
|
|
Oughts and ends.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):315 - 340.details
|
|
Why Reasons Are Explanations.Stephen Finlay - 2024 - Philosophia 52 (4):1001-1014.details
|
|
Against the Fundamentality of GOOD.Nandi Theunissen - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Normativity, prudence and welfare.Michael Ridge - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1213-1235.details
|
|
Categorizing Art.Kiyohiro Sen - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Tokyodetails
|
|
Is it Good Enough to be Good Qua Human? The Normative Independence of Attributive Goodness.Casey S. Elliott - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-24.details
|
|
The balance and weight of reasons.Nicholas Makins - 2023 - Theoria 89 (5):592-606.details
|
|
The vices of naturalist neo‐Aristotelian virtue ethics.David Carr - 2023 - Philosophical Investigations 46 (4):414-429.details
|
|
(1 other version)Reductive Evidentialism and the Normativity of Logic.Nader Shoaibi - 2023 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1:1-10.details
|
|
Review of Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality. [REVIEW]Benjamin Kiesewetter - forthcoming - Mind.details
|
|
The Weight of Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2573-2596.details
|
|
Ignorance and awareness.Paul Silva & Robert Weston Siscoe - 2024 - Noûs 58 (1):225-243.details
|
|
Merely statistical evidence: when and why it justifies belief.Paul Silva - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2639-2664.details
|
|
Law and the Metaethics of Discord.Katja Vogt - 2022 - Ancient Philosophy Today 4 (Supplement):3-23.details
|
|
Lacking, needing, and wanting.David Hunter - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (2):143-160.details
|
|
Against and for Ethical Naturalism Or: How Not To "Naturalize" Ethics.Berit Brogaard & Michael Slote - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):327-352.details
|
|
Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
|
|
Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
|
|
In Defense of Constitutivism About Epistemic Normativity.David Horst - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (2):232-258.details
|
|
Epistemic Responsibility in Business: An Integrative Framework for an Epistemic Ethics.Erwan Lamy - 2022 - Journal of Business Ethics 183 (1):1-14.details
|
|
(1 other version)Well‐being, part 1: The concept of well‐being.Eden Lin - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (2):e12813.details
|
|
Collective Reasons and Agent-Relativity.Alexander Dietz - 2022 - Utilitas 34 (1):57-69.details
|
|
There Are No Purely Aesthetic Obligations.John Dyck - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):592-612.details
|
|
Conceptions of Epistemic Value.Timothy Perrine - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):213-231.details
|
|
Practical conflicts as a problem for epistemic reductionism about practical reasons.Benjamin Kiesewetter & Jan Gertken - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (3):677-686.details
|
|
Explaining Normative Reasons.Daniel Fogal & Olle Risberg - 2023 - Noûs 57 (1):51-80.details
|
|
Are epistemic reasons normative?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):670-695.details
|
|
Value Invariabilism and Two Distinctions in Value.Zak A. Kopeikin - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):45-63.details
|
|
On Goodness, by David Conan Wolfsdorf. [REVIEW]Mahrad Almotahari - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):326-337.details
|
|
Harm as Negative Prudential Value: A Non-Comparative Account of Harm.Tanya de Villiers-Botha - 2020 - SATS 21 (1):21-38.details
|
|