- Close Error, Visual Perception, and Neural Phase: A Critique of the Modal Approach to Knowledge.Adam Michael Bricker - 2021 - Theoria 87 (5):1123-1152.details
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Practical reasoning and degrees of outright belief.Moritz Schulz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8069-8090.details
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Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):667-684.details
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Lucky Ignorance, Modality and Lack of Knowledge.Oscar A. Piedrahita - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (3).details
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Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Knowledge‐norms in a common‐law crucible.Cosim Sayid - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):261-276.details
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Scientific Conclusions Need Not Be Accurate, Justified, or Believed by their Authors.Haixin Dang & Liam Kofi Bright - 2021 - Synthese 199:8187–8203.details
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Does Success Entail Ability?David Boylan - 2021 - Noûs 56 (3):570-601.details
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Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1-22.details
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THE FUNDAMENTAL EPISTEMIC GOOD: TRUTH OR KNOWLEDGE? (ФУНДАМЕНТАЛЬНОЕ ЭПИСТЕМИЧЕСКОЕ БЛАГО: ИСТИНА ИЛИ ЗНАНИЕ?).Francois-Igor Pris - 2021 - ФИЛОСОФИЯ НАУКИ 1 (88):30-44.details
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From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.details
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Perceptual presentation and the Myth of the Given.Alfonso Anaya - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7453-7476.details
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No Infelicity for the Infallibilist.Giada Fratantonio - 2021 - Theoria (5):1307-1321.details
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Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
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Ghazālī's Transformative Answer to Scepticism.Reza Hadisi - 2021 - Theoria 88 (1):109-142.details
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Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Anti-Realism and Modal-Epistemic Collapse: Reply to Marton.Jan Heylen - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):397-408.details
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Human Foreknowledge.Fabrizio Cariani - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):50-69.details
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Not So Phenomenal!John Hawthorne & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (1):1-43.details
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The Causal Theory of Knowledge Revisited: An Interventionist Approach.Job Grefte & Alexander Gebharter - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):193-202.details
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Blame as performance. [REVIEW]Mona Simion - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):7595-7614.details
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Resistance to evidence and the duty to believe.Mona Simion - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):203-216.details
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Logic and science: science and logic.Marcus Rossberg & Stewart Shapiro - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6429-6454.details
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Introspection Is Signal Detection.Jorge Morales - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Do we really need a knowledge-based decision theory?Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7031-7059.details
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Fragmentation and Old Evidence.Will Fleisher - 2023 - Episteme 20 (3):542-567.details
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Perception and probability.Alex Byrne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (2):1-21.details
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Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis (2):1-19.details
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Externalism Explained.Clayton Littlejohn - 2023 - In Luis R. G. Oliveira (ed.), Externalism about Knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Reasons As Evidence Against Ought-Nots.Kok Yong Lee - 2021 - Philosophical Papers 49 (3):431-455.details
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An epistemic modal norm of practical reasoning.Tim Henning - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6665-6686.details
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Counterfactual Contamination.Simon Goldstein & John Hawthorne - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):262-278.details
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From Joint Attention to Common Knowledge.Michael Wilby - 2020 - Journal of Mind and Behavior 41 (3 and 4):293-306.details
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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
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Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
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Be modest: you're living on the edge.Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Analysis 81 (4):611-621.details
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Reasons Against Belief: A Theory of Epistemic Defeat.Tim Loughrist - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Nebraska - Lincolndetails
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Acquaintance.Matt Duncan - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (3):e12727.details
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Debunking, Epistemic Achievement, and Undermining Defeat.Michael Klenk - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):43-60.details
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An expressivist solution to Moorean paradoxes.Wolfgang Freitag & Nadja-Mira Yolcu - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5001-5024.details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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Hedging and the ignorance norm on inquiry.Yasha Sapir & Peter van Elswyk - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5837-5859.details
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The normality of error.Sam Carter & Simon Goldstein - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2509-2533.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and the Threshold Problem.Simon Langford - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):173-188.details
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Emotion, Epistemic Assessability, and Double Intentionality.Tricia Magalotti & Uriah Kriegel - 2021 - Topoi 41 (1):183-194.details
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Gaslighting, First- and Second-Order.Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky - 2021 - Hypatia 36 (1):207-227.details
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The distinctive character of knowledge.Jennifer Nagel - forthcoming - Behavioral and Brain Sciences.details
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Justified Group Belief, Group Knowledge and Being in a Position to Know.Jakob Koscholke - 2020 - Episteme 20 (1):1-8.details
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