- Luminosity in the stream of consciousness.David Jenkins - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1549-1562.details
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Knowledge and Explanation.C. S. Jenkins - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (2):137-164.details
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Knowing Our Own Hearts: Self‐Reporting and the Science of Love.C. S. I. Jenkins - 2016 - Philosophical Issues 26 (1):226-242.details
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Factive and nonfactive mental state attribution.Jennifer Nagel - 2017 - Mind and Language 32 (5):525-544.details
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Epistemic and Aesthetic Conflict.Zoe Jenkin - 2023 - British Journal of Aesthetics 63 (4):457-479.details
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Crossmodal Basing.Zoe Jenkin - 2022 - Mind 131 (524):1163-1194.details
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Eyewitness evaluation through inference to the best explanation.Hylke Jellema - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-29.details
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Representing as Adapting.Benjamin Jarvis - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (1):17-39.details
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Knowability as De Re Modality: A Certain Solution to Fitch Paradox.Tomasz Jarmużek, Krzysztof Krawczyk & Rafał Palczewski - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (4):291-313.details
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Intentionalism and change blindness.Greg Janzen - 2008 - Philosophia 36 (3):355-366.details
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Hallucinating real things.Steven P. James - 2014 - Synthese 191 (15):3711-3732.details
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Epistemic and non-Epistemic Theories of Remembering.Steven James - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly:109-127.details
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Norms of Testimony in Broad Interdisciplinarity: The Case of Quantum Mechanics in Critical Theory.Rasmus Jaksland - 2020 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 52 (1):35-61.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese (Suppl 8):1-19.details
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Knowing how things might have been.Mark Jago - 2018 - Synthese 198 (S8):1981-1999.details
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Contextualism and the knowledge norm of assertion.Christoph Jäger - 2012 - Analysis 72 (3):491-498.details
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Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
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Probing the Mind of God: Divine Beliefs and Credences.Elizabeth Jackson & Justin Mooney - 2022 - Religious Studies 58 (1):S61–S75.details
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How Belief-Credence Dualism Explains Away Pragmatic Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):511-533.details
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Belief, Credence, and Evidence.Elizabeth Jackson - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):5073-5092.details
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Belief, Credence, and Moral Encroachment.Elizabeth Jackson & James Fritz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1387–1408.details
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Are knowledge ascriptions sensitive to social context?Alexander Jackson - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3):8579-8610.details
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A Defense of Intrapersonal Belief Permissivism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2021 - Episteme 18 (2):313–327.details
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Truth and Falsity in Communication: Assertion, Denial, and Interpretation.Kensuke Ito - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):1-18.details
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Updating without evidence.Yoaav Isaacs & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):576-599.details
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The problems of transformative experience.Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1065-1084.details
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Multiple Universes and Self-Locating Evidence.Yoaav Isaacs, John Hawthorne & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2022 - Philosophical Review 131 (3):241-294.details
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Decision Theory without Luminosity.Yoaav Isaacs & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Mind 133 (530):346-376.details
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Duty and knowledge.Yoaav Isaacs - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):95-110.details
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Mind‐wandering: A philosophical guide.Zachary C. Irving & Aaron Glasser - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (1):e12644.details
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The epistemology of thought experiments without exceptionalist ingredients.Paul O. Irikefe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-29.details
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A fresh look at the expertise reply to the variation problem.Paul Oghenovo Irikefe - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (6):840-867.details
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Weak Assertion.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (277):741-770.details
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Inferential Deflationism.Luca Incurvati & Julian J. Schlöder - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (4):529-578.details
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Sense, Communication, and Rational Engagement.Imogen Dickie & Gurpreet Rattan - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (2):131-151.details
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Williamson, closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
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The paradigm response to skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-16.details
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Question closure to solve the surprise test.Daniel Immerman - 2017 - Synthese 194 (11):4583-4596.details
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Sensitivity, Reflective Knowledge, and Skepticism.Daniel Immerman - 2016 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 6 (4):351-367.details
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Knowledge-to-fact arguments can deliver knowledge.Daniel Immerman - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):52-56.details
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In Defense of the Rational Credibility Account: A Reply to Casalegno.Christoph Kelp Igor Douven - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (2):289-297.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Justification is potential knowledge.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2014 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44 (2):184-206.details
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Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.details
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A Philosophically Neutral Semantics for Perception Sentences.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2022 - Theoria 88:532-544.details
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Modal Fragmentalism.Samuele Iaquinto - 2020 - The Philosophical Quarterly 70:570-587.details
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Outline of a Logic of Knowledge of Acquaintance.Samuele Iaquinto & Giuseppe Spolaore - 2019 - Analysis 79:52-61.details
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TxW Epistemic Modality.Andrea Iacona - 2012 - Logic and Philosophy of Science 10:3-14.details
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Warranted assertability maneuvers and the rules of assertion.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (4):460-469.details
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Beyond Millianism.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):423 - 436.details
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