- Beyond Millianism.Leo Iacono - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (3):423 - 436.details
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Credible Futures.Andrea Iacona & Samuele Iaquinto - 2021 - Synthese 199:10953-10968.details
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Knowledge of Future Contingents.Andrea Iacona - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):447-467.details
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The most general factive stative attitude.John Hyman - 2014 - Analysis 74 (4):561-565.details
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The unity of knowledge.John Hyman - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Knowledge and evidence.John Hyman - 2006 - Mind 115 (460):891-916.details
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II—Knowledge and Belief.John Hyman - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):267-288.details
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Superconditioning.Simon M. Huttegger - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):811-833.details
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The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement.Thomas Hurka - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):589-608.details
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Uniqueness, Rationality, and the Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (1):57-75.details
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No Excuses: Against the Knowledge Norm of Belief.Nick Hughes - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):157-166.details
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Luminosity Failure, Normative Guidance and the Principle ‘Ought-Implies-Can’.Nick Hughes - 2018 - Utilitas 30 (4):439-457.details
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Epistemology without guidance.Nick Hughes - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):163-196.details
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Dilemmic Epistemology.Nick Hughes - 2019 - Synthese 196 (10):4059-4090.details
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Consistency and evidence.Nick Hughes - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):333-338.details
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Compassionate phenomenal conservatism.Michael Huemer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (1):30–55.details
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New foundations for counterfactuals.Franz Huber - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2167-2193.details
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One Desire Too Many.Nathan Robert Howard - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 102 (2):302-317.details
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Know-how-first anti-intellectualism: Williamson against Williamson.M. Hosein & M. A. Khalaj - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-30.details
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Understanding as a Source of Justification.Joachim Horvath - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):509-534.details
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Philosophical Analysis: The Concept Grounding View.Joachim Horvath - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):724-750.details
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Ordering effects, updating effects, and the specter of global skepticism.Zachary Horne & Jonathan Livengood - 2017 - Synthese 194 (4):1189-1218.details
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Levity.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Mind 118 (471):555-581.details
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Is Epistemic Competence a Skill?David Horst - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (3):509-523.details
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How Reasoning Aims at Truth.David Horst - 2021 - Noûs 55 (1):221-241.details
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Actions and accidents.David Horst - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (3):300-325.details
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An argument concerning the unknowable.Leon Horsten - 2009 - Analysis 69 (2):240-242.details
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Uttering Moorean Sentences and the pragmatics of belief reports.Frank Hong - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):1879-1895.details
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Thinking, Guessing, and Believing.Ben Holguin - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22 (1):1-34.details
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Knowledge by constraint.Ben Holguín - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):1-28.details
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Facts, Factives, and Contrafactives.Richard Holton - 2017 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 91 (1):245-266.details
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Indicative conditionals without iterative epistemology.Ben Holguín - 2019 - Noûs 55 (3):560-580.details
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Information dynamics and uniform substitution.Wesley H. Holliday, Tomohiro Hoshi & Thomas F. Icard Iii - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):31-55.details
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Epistemic Closure and Epistemic Logic I: Relevant Alternatives and Subjunctivism.Wesley H. Holliday - 2015 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (1):1-62.details
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What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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Justification, excuse, and proof beyond reasonable doubt.Hock Lai Ho - 2021 - Philosophical Issues 31 (1):146-166.details
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Three kinds of reliabilism.Frank Hofmann - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (1):59 - 80.details
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Two Norms of Intention: a Vindication of Williamson’s Knowledge-Action Analogy.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):1-10.details
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Knowledge norms of belief and belief formation: When the time is ripe to actualize one's epistemic potential.Frank Hofmann - 2021 - Ratio 34 (4):277-285.details
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Is Evidence Normative?Frank Hofmann - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):667-684.details
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The Fall of “Adams' Thesis”?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 21 (2):145-161.details
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A Tale of Two Epistemologies?Alan Hájek & Hanti Lin - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (2):207-232.details
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On Virtue, Credit and Safety.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (1):98-120.details
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Justification and the knowledge-connection.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (6):1973-1995.details
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How to stay safe while extending the mind.Jaakko Hirvelä - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):4065-4081.details
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Does the unity of reason imply that epistemic justification is factive?Jaakko Hirvelä - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):691-700.details
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 50 (4):661-688.details
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Understanding Why.Alison Hills - 2015 - Noûs 49 (2):661-688.details
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Hawthorne’s Lottery Puzzle and the Nature of Belief.Christopher S. Hill & Joshua Schechter - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):120-122.details
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From Isolation to Skepticism.Scott Hill - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (3):649-668.details
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