- Emotional Phenomenology: A New Puzzle.Aarón Álvarez-González - forthcoming - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences:1-21.details
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Is Testimonial Knowledge Second-Hand Knowledge?Federico Luzzi - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):899-918.details
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Restorative Rigging and the Safe Indication Account.S. Luper - 2006 - Synthese 153 (1):161-170.details
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Dretske on knowledge closure.Steven Luper - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3):379 – 394.details
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Précis of The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2020 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 100 (2):452-456.details
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Linguistic understanding and knowledge.Guy Longworth - 2008 - Noûs 42 (1):50–79.details
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John Cook Wilson on the indefinability of knowledge.Guy Longworth & Simon Bastian Wimmer - 2022 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1547-1564.details
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The skeptic and the naïve realist.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):268-288.details
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Scepticisme, fidéisme et évidentialisme : oppositions et origines.Artūrs Logins - 2013 - Dialogue 51 (4):613-642.details
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Persistent burglars and knocks on doors: Causal indispensability of knowing vindicated.Artūrs Https://Orcidorg Logins - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 30 (4):1335-1357.details
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Mark McBride, Basic Knowledge and Conditions on Knowledge, Cambridge: Open Book Publishers, 2017, 228 pp., £16.95 , ISBN 978‐1‐78374‐283‐7. [REVIEW]Artūrs Logins - 2019 - Dialectica 73 (1-2):280-285.details
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Good News for the Disjunctivist about (one of) the Bad Cases.Heather Logue - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):105-133.details
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Epistemological Disjunctivism, written by Duncan Pritchard. [REVIEW]Heather Logue - 2015 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 5 (3):257-262.details
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Common Sense and Evidence: Some Neglected Arguments in Favour of E=K.Artūrs Logins - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):120-137.details
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Choice Points for a Theory of Normality.Annina J. Loets - 2022 - Mind 131 (521):159-191.details
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Who Cares What You Accurately Believe?Clayton Littlejohn - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):217-248.details
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The Russellian Retreat.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 113 (3pt3):293-320.details
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The Externalist’s Demon.Clayton Littlejohn - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (3):399-434.details
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Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):77-87.details
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Stop Making Sense? On a Puzzle about Rationality.Littlejohn Clayton - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:257-272.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons in advance.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophical Research.details
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Pritchard’s Reasons.Clayton Littlejohn - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:201-219.details
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No Evidence is False.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (2):145-159.details
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Should we be dogmatically conciliatory?Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1381-1398.details
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Moore's paradox and epistemic norms.Clayton Littlejohn - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):79 – 100.details
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Know Your Rights: On Warranted Assertion and Truth.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1355-1365.details
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Fake Barns and false dilemmas.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Episteme 11 (4):369-389.details
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Do you see what I know? On reasons, perceptual evidence, and epistemic status.Clayton Littlejohn - 2020 - Philosophical Issues 30 (1):205-220.details
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Defeating phenomenal conservatism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2011 - Analytic Philosophy 52 (1):35-48.details
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Could the grounds’s grounding the grounded ground the grounded?Jon Erling Litland - 2018 - Analysis 78 (1):56-65.details
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A note concerning justification and access.Clayton Littlejohn - 2013 - Episteme 10 (4):369-386.details
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Cut-off points for the rational believer.Lina Maria Lissia - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-19.details
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Argument Williamsona przeciwko KK-tezie.Grzegorz Lisowski - 2017 - Diametros 52:81-95.details
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Revelation and The Essentiality of Essence.Franck Lihoreau - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):69-75.details
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The knowledge norm of assertion: keep it simple.Max Lewis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12963-12984.details
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Moral Deference, Moral Assertion, and Pragmatics.Max Lewis - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):5-22.details
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What is ‘mental action’?Yair Levy - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (6):971-993.details
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The Solution to the Surprise Exam Paradox.Ken Levy - 2009 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (2):131-158.details
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Disjunctivism about intending.Yair Levy - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (2):161-180.details
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Epistemic logic without closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4751-4774.details
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In defense of reliabilism.Jarrett Leplin - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (1):31 - 42.details
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Probabilistic Antecedents and Conditional Attitudes.Benjamin Lennertz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (1):62-79.details
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Intentionality: Transparent, translucent, and opaque.Pierre Le Morvan - 2005 - Journal of Philosophical Research 30:283-302.details
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Epistemic means and ends: A reply to Hofmann.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):251-264.details
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Skepticism and epistemic asymmetry.Adam Leite - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):184-197.details
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How to Link Assertion and Knowledge Without Going Contextualist: A Reply to Derose’s "Assertion, Knowledge, and Context".Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 134 (2):111-129.details
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How to take skepticism seriously.Adam Leite - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):39 - 60.details
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Reconsidering the Alleged Cases of Knowledge from Falsehood.Kok Yong Lee - 2020 - Philosophical Investigations 44 (2):151-162.details
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On the Standards-Variantist Solution to Skepticism.Kok Yong Lee - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (3):173-198.details
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Fittingness first?: Reasons to withhold belief.Wooram Lee - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3565-3581.details
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