- Defending Understanding-Assent Links.Jared Warren - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9219-9236.details
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What’s wrong with epistemic trespassing?Joshua DiPaolo - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):223-243.details
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Why undermining evolutionary debunkers is not enough.Andrew del Rio - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7437-7452.details
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An Ecumenical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2019-2040.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Risk.Jesús Navarro - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1-22.details
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From the agent’s point of view: the case against disjunctivism about rationalisation.Edgar Phillips - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 24 (2):262-280.details
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Truth and Subjunctive Theories of Knwledge: No Luck?Johannes Stern - manuscriptdetails
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Probabilistic Proofs, Lottery Propositions, and Mathematical Knowledge.Yacin Hamami - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):77-89.details
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(1 other version)Don’t forget forgetting: the social epistemic importance of how we forget.Daniel J. Singer, Aaron Bramson, Patrick Grim, Bennett Holman, Karen Kovaka, Jiin Jung & William Berger - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5373-5394.details
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Logic and science: science and logic.Marcus Rossberg & Stewart Shapiro - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6429-6454.details
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Mechanistic reasoning and the problem of masking.Michael Wilde - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):1-16.details
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Inexact knowledge and dynamic introspection.Michael Cohen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5509-5531.details
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Delusional Evidence-Responsiveness.Carolina Flores - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6299-6330.details
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Realism, reliability, and epistemic possibility: on modally interpreting the Benacerraf–Field challenge.Brett Topey - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4415-4436.details
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(1 other version)Maximal Cluelessness.Andreas Mogensen - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):141-162.details
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What ignorance could not be.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2020 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 24 (2).details
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An Introduction to the Theory of Knowledge, written by O’Brien, D.María Dolores García-Arnaldos - 2020 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 23 (2):507-514.details
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The conceptual nature of imaginative content.Margherita Arcangeli - 2020 - Synthese (1-2).details
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Emotions, evidence, and safety.Christina H. Dietz - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):2027-2050.details
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Faith, Hope, and Justification.Elizabeth Jackson - 2022 - In Paul Silva & Luis R. G. Oliveira (eds.), Propositional and Doxastic Justification: New Essays on their Nature and Significance. New York: Routledge. pp. 201–216.details
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Two faces of rationality.Vishnu Sridharan - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):11103-11124.details
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Disagreement in a Group: Aggregation, Respect for Evidence, and Synergy.Anna-Maria A. Eder - 2020 - In Fernando Broncano-Berrocal & Adam Carter (eds.), The Epistemology of Group Disagreement. Routledge. pp. 184-210.details
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Revision, endorsement and the analysis of meaning.Paul-Mikhail Catapang Podosky & Kai Tanter - 2020 - Analysis 80 (4):693-704.details
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Unawareness and Implicit Belief.Edward J. R. Elliott - manuscriptdetails
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A working hypothesis for the logic of radical ignorance.Vincenzo Fano & Pierluigi Graziani - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):601-616.details
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Belief, Credence and Statistical Evidence.Davide Fassio & Jie Gao - 2020 - Theoria 86 (4):500-527.details
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Replies to Edgington, Pavese, and Campbell-Moore and Konek.Sarah Moss - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):356-370.details
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Taste, traits, and tendencies.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1183-1206.details
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What's the Point of Understanding?Michael Hannon - 2019 - In What's the Point of Knowledge? A Function-First Epistemology. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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A logic for factive ignorance.Ekaterina Kubyshkina & Mattia Petrolo - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5917-5928.details
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El conocimiento como una actividad colectiva.Angeles Eraña & Axel Barceló - 2016 - Tópicos 51 (51):9-35.details
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Against overconfidence: arguing for the accessibility of memorial justification.Jonathan Egeland - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):1-21.details
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Belief gambles in epistemic decision theory.Mattias Skipper - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):407-426.details
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Williamson, closure, and KK.Daniel Immerman - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3349-3373.details
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Probabilistic Knowledge in Action.Carlotta Pavese - 2020 - Analysis 80 (2):342-356.details
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A Defense of Hume's Dictum.Cameron Gibbs - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Massachusetts Amherstdetails
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Intellectual virtues and the epistemic value of truth.Duncan Pritchard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5515-5528.details
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(1 other version)Epistemologia Analítica, Vol .1: debates contemporâneos.Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues (ed.) - 2019 - Editora Fi.details
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Causal after all : a model of mental causation for dualists.Bram Vaassen - 2019 - Dissertation, Umeå Universitydetails
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The Epistemology of Folk Epistemology.Richard F. Kitchener - 2019 - Analysis 79 (3):521-530.details
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Publishing without belief.Alexandra Plakias - 2019 - Analysis 79 (4):638-646.details
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Conceptual evaluation: epistemic.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2019 - In Alexis Burgess, Herman Cappelen & David Plunkett (eds.), Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 304-332.details
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Perspectival Skeptical Theism.Jonathan Curtis Rutledge - 2019 - Faith and Philosophy 36 (2):244-264.details
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A representationalist reading of Kantian intuitions.Ayoob Shahmoradi - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2169-2191.details
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The Recent Renaissance of Acquaintance.Thomas Raleigh - 2019 - In Jonathan Knowles & Thomas Raleigh (eds.), Acquaintance: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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No Justificatory Closure without Truth.Francesco Praolini - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):715-726.details
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Fragmentation and Higher-Order Evidence.Daniel Greco - 2019 - In Mattias Skipper & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Higher-Order Evidence: New Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 84-104.details
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Evidence, Judgment, and Belief at Will.Blake Roeber - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):837-859.details
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The problems of transformative experience.Yoaav Isaacs - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1065-1084.details
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Escepticismo y anti-intelectualismo: una revisión del ideal socrático desde la perspectiva pirrónica.Jorge Ornelas - 2014 - Tópicos: Revista de Filosofía 46:175-202.details
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