- Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
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Hinge commitments vis-à-vis the transmission problem.Ladislav Koreň - 2015 - Synthese 192 (8):2513-2534.details
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Forms of Luminosity: Epistemic Modality and Hyperintensionality in Mathematics.David Elohim - 2017 - Dissertation, Arché, University of St Andrewsdetails
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Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.details
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On Doxastic Justification and Properly Basing One’s Beliefs.Paul Silva - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):945-955.details
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If Dogmatists Have a Problem with Cognitive Penetration, You Do Too.Chris Tucker - 2014 - Dialectica 68 (1):35-62.details
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On the Truth-Conduciveness of Coherence.William Roche - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):647-665.details
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Internalism, externalism, and epistemic source circularity.Ian David MacMillan - unknowndetails
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The epistemic force of perceptual experience.Susanna Schellenberg - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (1):87-100.details
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Confirmation, transitivity, and Moore: the Screening-Off Approach.William Roche & Tomoji Shogenji - 2013 - Philosophical Studies (3):1-21.details
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A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.details
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In defence of dogmatism.Luca Moretti - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):261-282.details
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How To Be Conservative: A Partial Defense of Epistemic Conservatism.Paul Silva - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (3):501-514.details
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The Bayesian explanation of transmission failure.Geoff Pynn - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1519-1531.details
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When warrant transmits and when it doesn’t: towards a general framework.Luca Moretti & Tommaso Piazza - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2481-2503.details
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Silins’s Liberalism.Matthew Kotzen - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 159 (1):61-68.details
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How to take skepticism seriously.Adam Leite - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 148 (1):39 - 60.details
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When Transmission Fails.Chris Tucker - 2010 - Philosophical Review 119 (4):497-529.details
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Wright, Okasha and Chandler on transmission failure.Luca Moretti - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):217-234.details
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On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation.Peter Kung - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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The epistemic insignificance of phenomenal force.Lu Teng - 2024 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):55-76.details
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The Dynamic Strategy of Common Sense Against Radical Revisionism.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):141-162.details
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THE CONTOURS OF FREE WILL SCEPTICISM.Simon Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - Dissertation, Oxford Universitydetails
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Absolutism, Relativism and Metaepistemology.J. Adam Carter & Robin McKenna - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1139-1159.details
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What We All Know: Community in Moore's "A Defence of Common Sense".Wim Vanrie - 2021 - Journal of the History of Philosophy 59 (4):629-651.details
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Justification As A Loaded Notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Immunity, thought insertion, and the first-person concept.Michele Palmira - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (12):3833-3860.details
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Antiscepticism and Easy Justification.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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The Bayesian Objection.Luca Moretti - 2020 - In Seemings and Epistemic Justification: how appearances justify beliefs. Cham: Springer.details
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Varieties of Inference?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2018 - Philosophical Issues 28 (1):221-254.details
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Seeing White and Wrong: Reid on the Role of Sensations in Perception, with a Focus on Color Perception.Lucas Thorpe - 2015 - In Thomas Reid on Mind, Knowledge, and Value (Mind Association Occasional Series). Oxford University Press. pp. 100-123.details
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Inferential seemings and the problem of reflective awareness.Luca Moretti - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (2):253-271.details
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Meta-epistemic defeat.J. Adam Carter - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2877-2896.details
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Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.details
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Situating Cornerstone Propositions.Patrice Philie - 2012 - Open Journal of Philosophy 2 (4):260-267.details
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Entitlement and Epistemic Upgrading.Alexander C. R. Oldemeier - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):436-446.details
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Possibility, Necessity and Probability: A Meditation on Underdetermination and Justification. [REVIEW]Elia Zardini - 2013 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):639-667.details
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Cornerstones: You’d better believe them.Giorgio Volpe - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):1-23.details
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Bootstrap and rollback: generalizing epistemic circularity.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):395-413.details
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Evidentialism and skeptical arguments.Dylan Dodd - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):337-352.details
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Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.details
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An Ecumenical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2019-2040.details
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Ethical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6943-6965.details
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Axel Arturo Barceló Aspeitia, Falibilidad y normatividad: un análisis filosófico de la suerte. [REVIEW]Alfonso Anaya - 2020 - Critica 52 (155):73-82.details
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Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs.Mark Walker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2163-2183.details
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Self-Defeating Beliefs and Misleading Reasons.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2019 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 27 (1):57-72.details
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Failures of Warrant Transmission: The Role of Presupposition.Thomas Lockhart - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):535-557.details
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Bootstrapping and dogmatism.Tim Butzer - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (8):2083-2103.details
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