- The redundancy problem: From knowledge-infallibilism to knowledge-minimalism.Stephen Hetherington - 2018 - Synthese 195 (11):4683-4702.details
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The legend of the justified true belief analysis.Julien Dutant - 2015 - Philosophical Perspectives 29 (1):95-145.details
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Warrant without truth?E. J. Coffman - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):173-194.details
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The folly of trying to define knowledge.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2007 - Analysis 67 (3):214-219.details
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The basing relation and the impossibility of the debasing demon.Patrick Bondy & J. Adam Carter - 2018 - American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (3):203.details
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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Methodology.Herman Cappelen, Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2016 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.details
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Anti-luck epistemology and the Gettier problem.Duncan Pritchard - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (1):93-111.details
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Was lehrt uns das Gettier-Problem über das Verhältnis zwischen Intuitionen und Begriffsanalysen?Geert Keil - 2013 - In Gerhard Ernst & Lisa Marani (eds.), Das Gettierproblem. Eine Bilanz nach 50 Jahren. Münster: mentis. pp. 107-144.details
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Philosophical thought experiments as heuristics for theory discovery.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Sara Kier Praëm - 2015 - Synthese 192 (9):2827-2842.details
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(1 other version)Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Gettier Problem.Mark McEvoy - 2014 - Synthese 191 (17):4115-4130.details
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From Virtue Epistemology to Abilism: Theoretical and Empirical Developments.John Turri - 2016 - In Judy Dodge Cummings (ed.), Hillary Clinton. Essential Library. pp. 315-330.details
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Can virtue epistemology capitalize on jtb's appeal?E. J. Coffman - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):199-222.details
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Achieving epistemic descent.Brett Andrew Coppenger - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Iowadetails
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Accuracy, Coherence and Evidence.Branden Fitelson & Kenny Easwaran - 2015 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 5:61-96.details
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Fallibilism.Baron Reed - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):585-596.details
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The folk conception of knowledge.Christina Starmans & Ori Friedman - 2012 - Cognition 124 (3):272-283.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge: Value on the Cheap.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (2):249-263.details
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Warrant Does Entail Truth.Andrew Moon - 2012 - Synthese 184 (3):287-297.details
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The information effect: constructive memory, testimony, and epistemic luck.Kourken Michaelian - 2013 - Synthese 190 (12):2429-2456.details
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Manifest Failure: The Gettier Problem Solved.John Turri - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Intuitions and Experiments: A Defense of the Case Method in Epistemology.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):495-527.details
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Epistemic Luck.Joshue Orozco - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (1):11-21.details
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A Simple Theory of Introspection.Declan Smithies - 2012 - In Declan Smithies & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), Introspection and Consciousness. , US: Oxford University Press.details
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Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge.Anne Newstead - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier Science. pp. 183.details
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Infallibilism and Gettier’s Legacy.Daniel Howard-Snyder - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (2):304 - 327.details
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Virtue epistemology and epistemic luck.Duncan Pritchard - 2003 - Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130.details
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(1 other version)The analysis of knowledge.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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On the logical unsolvability of the Gettier problem.L. Floridi - 2004 - Synthese 142 (1):61 - 79.details
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The aim of belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.details
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Epistemische Ungerechtigkeiten.Hilkje Charlotte Hänel - 2024 - De Gruyter.details
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Précis of The Range of Reasons.Daniel Whiting - 2023 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):1-7.details
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Epistemic Gradualism Versus Epistemic Absolutism.Changsheng Lai - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):186-207.details
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(1 other version)Knowledge as Justified True Belief.Job de Grefte - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (2):531-549.details
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Evolutionary anamnesis.James Toomey - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (6):1–20.details
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Acting and believing on the basis of reasons.Christopher Blake-Turner - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 17 (1):e12797.details
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The Cake Theory of Credit.Jaakko Hirvelä & Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2021 - Philosophical Topics 49 (2):347-369.details
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Virtue epistemology and the Gettier dilemma.Ian M. Church - 2021 - Metaphilosophy 52 (5):681-695.details
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No Justification for Smith’s Incidentally True Beliefs.Alfred Schramm - 2022 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 99 (2):273–292.details
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The Parallel Goods of Knowledge and Achievement.Thomas Hurka - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (3):589-608.details
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Knowledge, safety, and Gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):37-52.details
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Generalized Update Semantics.Simon Goldstein - 2019 - Mind 128 (511):795-835.details
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Resolving the Gettier Problem in the Smith Case: The Donnellan Linguistic Approach.Joseph Martin M. Jose & Mabaquiao Jr - 2018 - Kritike 12 (2):108-125.details
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Hintikka’s Socratic Epistemology Meets Gettier’s Counterexamples.John Ian K. Boongaling - 2017 - Kriterion - Journal of Philosophy 31 (3):25-56.details
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A dilemma for the knowledge despite falsehood strategy.Christopher Buford & Christopher Michael Cloos - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):166-182.details
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A Probabilistic Defense of Proper De Jure Objections to Theism.Brian C. Barnett - 2019details
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Epistemic justification and epistemic luck.Job de Grefte - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3821-3836.details
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Bad Luck for the Anti‐Luck Epistemologist.Rodrigo Borges - 2016 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 54 (4):463-479.details
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(1 other version) Causal Tracking Reliabilism and the Lottery Problem.Mark Mcevoy - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 86 (1):73-92.details
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Knowledge is normal belief.B. Ball - 2013 - Analysis 73 (1):69-76.details
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(3 other versions)Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3715-3729.details
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