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  1. (1 other version)Seeing subjectivity: defending a perceptual account of other minds.Joel Krueger & Søren Overgaard - 2012 - ProtoSociology (47):239-262.
    The problem of other minds has a distinguished philosophical history stretching back more than two hundred years. Taken at face value, it is an epistemological question: it concerns how we can have knowledge of, or at least justified belief in, the existence of minds other than our own. In recent decades, philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, anthropologists and primatologists have debated a related question: how we actually go about attributing mental states to others (regardless of whether we ever achieve knowledge or rational (...)
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  • (1 other version)Taking empathy online.Lucy Osler - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    Despite its long history of investigating sociality, phenomenology has, to date, said little about online sociality. The phenomenological tradition typically claims that empathy is the fundamental way in which we experience others and their experiences. While empathy is discussed almost exclusively in the context of face-to-face interaction, I claim that we can empathetically perceive others and their experiences in certain online situations. Drawing upon the phenomenological distinction between the physical, objective body and the expressive, lived body, I: (i) highlight that (...)
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  • Second-Person Engagement, Self-Alienation, and Group-Identification.Dan Zahavi - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):251-260.
    One of the central questions within contemporary debates about collective intentionality concerns the notion and status of the we. The question, however, is by no means new. At the beginning of the last century, it was already intensively discussed in phenomenology. Whereas Heidegger argued that a focus on empathy is detrimental to a proper understanding of the we, and that the latter is more fundamental than any dyadic interaction, other phenomenologists, such as Stein, Walther and Husserl, insisted on the importance (...)
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  • Mind-making practices: the social infrastructure of self-knowing agency and responsibility.Victoria McGeer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):259-281.
    This paper is divided into two parts. In Section 1, I explore and defend a “regulative view” of folk-psychology as against the “standard view”. On the regulative view, folk-psychology is conceptualized in fundamentally interpersonal terms as a “mind-making” practice through which we come to form and regulate our minds in accordance with a rich array of socially shared and socially maintained sense-making norms. It is not, as the standard view maintains, simply an epistemic capacity for coming to know about the (...)
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  • Simulation, projection and empathy.Dan Zahavi - 2008 - Consciousness and Cognition 17 (2):514-522.
    Simulationists have recently started to employ the term "empathy" when characterizing our most basic understanding of other minds. I agree that empathy is crucial, but I think it is being misconstrued by the simulationists. Using some ideas to be found in Scheler's classical discussion of empathy, I will argue for a different understanding of the notion. More specifically, I will argue that there are basic levels of interpersonal understanding - in particular the understanding of emotional expressions - that are not (...)
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  • Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to Schutz.Dan Zahavi - 2010 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 53 (3):285-306.
    When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have—according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various thinkers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will contrast Lipps' account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of a revival in (...)
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  • Empathy and Other-Directed Intentionality.Dan Zahavi - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):129-142.
    The article explores and compares the accounts of empathy found in Lipps, Scheler, Stein and Husserl and argues that the three latter phenomenological thinkers offer a model of empathy, which is not only distinctly different from Lipps’, but which also diverge from the currently dominant models.
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  • Empathy, enaction, and shared musical experience.Joel Krueger - 2013 - In Tom Cochrane, Bernardino Fantini & Klaus R. Scherer (eds.), The Emotional Power of Music: Multidisciplinary perspectives on musical arousal, expression, and social control. Oxford University Press. pp. 177-196.
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  • Social Media Experiences of LGBTQ+ People: Enabling Feelings of Belonging.Gen Eickers - 2024 - Topoi.
    This paper explores how the social and affective lives of people with marginalized social identities are particularly affected by digital influences. Specifically, the paper examines whether and how social media enables LGBTQ+ people to experience feelings of belonging. It does so by drawing on literature from digital epistemology and phenomenology of the digital, and by presenting and analyzing the results of a qualitative study consisting of 25 interviews with LGBTQ+ people. The interviews were conducted to explore the social media experiences (...)
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  • (1 other version)Mutual Recognition in Human-Robot Interaction: a Deflationary Account.Ingar Brinck & Christian Balkenius - 2020 - Philosophy and Technology 33 (1):53-70.
    Mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires that the robot is susceptible to similar environmental cues and behavior patterns as humans are. Recognition, or the acknowledgement of the other as individual, is fundamental to mutually adaptive interaction between humans. We discuss what recognition involves and its behavioral manifestations, and describe the benefits of implementing it in HRI.
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  • Self and other: from pure ego to co-constituted we.Dan Zahavi - 2015 - Continental Philosophy Review 48 (2):143-160.
    In recent years, the social dimensions of selfhood have been discussed widely. Can you be a self on your own or only together with others? Is selfhood a built-in feature of experience or rather socially constructed? Does a strong emphasis on the first-personal character of consciousness prohibit a satisfactory account of intersubjectivity or is the former rather a necessary requirement for the latter? These questions are explored in the following contribution.
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  • (1 other version)Taking empathy online.Lucy Osler - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (1):302-329.
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  • Husserl's noema and the internalism‐externalism debate.Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):42-66.
    In a number of papers, Hubert Dreyfus and Ronald McIntyre have claimed that Husserl is an internalist. In this paper, it is argued that their interpretation is based on two questionable assumptions: (1) that Husserl's noema should be interpreted along Fregean lines, and (2) that Husserl's transcendental methodology commits him to some form of methodological solipsism. Both of these assumptions are criticized on the basis of the most recent Husserl-research. It is shown that Husserl's concept of noema can be interpreted (...)
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  • The phenomenology and development of social perspectives.Thomas Fuchs - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):655-683.
    The paper first gives a conceptual distinction of the first, second and third person perspectives in social cognition research and connects them to the major present theories of understanding others (simulation, interaction and theory theory). It then argues for a foundational role of second person interactions for the development of social perspectives. To support this thesis, the paper analyzes in detail how infants, in particular through triangular interactions with persons and objects, expand their understanding of perspectives and arrive at a (...)
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  • (1 other version)Mutual Recognition in Human-Robot Interaction: a Deflationary Account.Ingar Brinck & Christian Balkenius - 2018 - Philosophy and Technology 1 (1):53-70.
    Mutually adaptive interaction involves the robot as a partner as opposed to a tool, and requires that the robot is susceptible to similar environmental cues and behavior patterns as humans are. Recognition, or the acknowledgement of the other as individual, is fundamental to mutually adaptive interaction between humans. We discuss what recognition involves and its behavioral manifestations, and describe the benefits of implementing it in HRI.
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  • The uncanny mirror: A re-framing of mirror self-experience.Philippe Rochat & Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2):204-213.
    Mirror self-experience is re-casted away from the cognitivist interpretation that has dominated discussions on the issue since the establishment of the mirror mark test. Ideas formulated by Merleau-Ponty on mirror self-experience point to the profoundly unsettling encounter with one’s specular double. These ideas, together with developmental evidence are re-visited to provide a new, psychologically and phenomenologically more valid account of mirror self-experience: an experience associated with deep wariness.
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  • Acting Oneself as Another: An Actor’s Empathy for her Character.Shaun Gallagher & Julia Gallagher - 2020 - Topoi 39 (4):779-790.
    What does it mean for an actor to empathize with the character she is playing? We review different theories of empathy and of acting. We then consider the notion of “twofoldness”, which has been used to characterize the observer or audience perspective on the relation between actor and character. This same kind of twofoldness or double attunement applies from the perspective of the actor herself who must, at certain points of preparation, distinguish between the character portrayed and her own portrayal (...)
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  • Healing online? Social anxiety and emotion regulation in pandemic experience.Anna Bortolan - 2023 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (5).
    During the pandemic of Covid-19, internet-based communication became for many the primary, or only, means of interaction with others, and it has been argued that this had a host of negative effects on emotional and mental health. However, some people with a lived experience of mental ill-health also perceived improvements to their wellbeing during the period in which social activities were moved online. In this paper, I explore the possibility that some of these improvements are due to the partial “disembodiment” (...)
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  • Empathy.Karsten Stueber - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
    Despite its linguistic roots in ancient Greek, the concept of empathy is of recent intellectual heritage. Yet its history has been varied and colorful, a fact that is also mirrored in the multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. In its philosophical heyday at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, empathy had been hailed as the primary means for gaining knowledge of other minds and as the method (...)
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  • Medicine and the individual: is phenomenology the answer?Tania L. Gergel - 2012 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):1102-1109.
    The issue of how to incorporate the individual's first‐hand experience of illness into broader medical understanding is a major question in medical theory and practice. In a philosophical context, phenomenology, with its emphasis on the subject's perception of phenomena as the basis for knowledge and its questioning of naturalism, seems an obvious candidate for addressing these issues. This is a review of current phenomenological approaches to medicine, looking at what has motivated this philosophical approach, the main problems it faces and (...)
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  • Sociality and the life–mind continuity thesis.Tom Froese & Ezequiel A. Di Paolo - 2009 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (4):439-463.
    The life–mind continuity thesis holds that mind is prefigured in life and that mind belongs to life. The biggest challenge faced by proponents of this thesis is to show how an explanatory framework that accounts for basic biological processes can be systematically extended to incorporate the highest reaches of human cognition. We suggest that this apparent ‘cognitive gap’ between minimal and human forms of life appears insurmountable largely because of the methodological individualism that is prevalent in cognitive science. Accordingly, a (...)
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  • Empathy and the extended mind.Joel W. Krueger - 2009 - Zygon 44 (3):675-698.
    I draw upon the conceptual resources of the extended mind thesis to analyze empathy and interpersonal understanding. Against the dominant mentalistic paradigm, I argue that empathy is fundamentally an extended bodily activity and that much of our social understanding happens outside of the head. First, I look at how the two dominant models of interpersonal understanding, theory theory and simulation theory, portray the cognitive link between folk psychology and empathy. Next, I challenge their internalist orthodoxy and offer an alternative "extended" (...)
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  • Direct Perception and Simulation: Stein’s Account of Empathy.Monika Dullstein - 2013 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (2):333-350.
    The notion of empathy has been explicated in different ways in the current debate on how to understand others. Whereas defenders of simulation-based approaches claim that empathy involves some kind of isomorphism between the empathizer’s and the target’s mental state, defenders of the phenomenological account vehemently deny this and claim that empathy allows us to directly perceive someone else’s mental states. Although these views are typically presented as being opposed, I argue that at least one version of a simulation-based approach—the (...)
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  • Intentionality: Some Lessons from the History of the Problem from Brentano to the Present.Dermot Moran - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):317-358.
    Intentionality (‘directedness’, ‘aboutness’) is both a central topic in contemporary philosophy of mind, phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, and one of the themes with which both analytic and Continental philosophers have separately engaged starting from Brentano and Edmund Husserl’s ground-breaking Logical Investigations (1901) through Roderick M. Chisholm, Daniel C. Dennett’s The Intentional Stance, John Searle’s Intentionality, to the recent work of Tim Crane, Robert Brandom, Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, among many others. In this paper, I shall review recent discussions (...)
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  • Empathy, Embodiment and.Dan Zahavi - unknown
    When it comes to understanding the nature of social cognition, we have— according to the standard view—a choice between the simulation theory, the theory-theory or some hybrid between the two. The aim of this paper is to argue that there are, in fact, other options available, and that one such option has been articulated by various think- ers belonging to the phenomenological tradition. More specifically, the paper will con- trast Lipps’ account of empathy—an account that has recently undergone something of (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.Shaun Gallagher & Francisco J. Varela - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):93-132.
    In recent years there has been some hard-won but still limited agreement that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences. This realization comes in the wake of dismissive gestures made by philosophers of mind who mistakenly associate phenomenological method with untrained psychological introspection (e.g., Dennett 1991). For very different reasons, resistance is also found on the phenomenological side of this issue. There are many thinkers well versed in the Husserlian tradition who are not willing to (...)
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  • Empathy, Group Identity, and the Mechanisms of Exclusion: An Investigation into the Limits of Empathy.Thomas Fuchs - 2019 - Topoi 38 (1):239-250.
    There is a conspicuous tendency of humans to experience empathy and sympathy preferentially towards members of their own group, whereas empathetic feelings towards outgroup members or strangers are often reduced or even missing. This may culminate in a “dissociation of empathy”: a historical example are the cases of Nazi perpetrators who behaved as compassionate family men on the one hand, yet committed crimes of utter cruelty against Jews on the other. The paper aims at explaining such phenomena and at determining (...)
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  • Artificial Consciousness and Artificial Ethics: Between Realism and Social Relationism.Steve Torrance - 2014 - Philosophy and Technology 27 (1):9-29.
    I compare a ‘realist’ with a ‘social–relational’ perspective on our judgments of the moral status of artificial agents (AAs). I develop a realist position according to which the moral status of a being—particularly in relation to moral patiency attribution—is closely bound up with that being’s ability to experience states of conscious satisfaction or suffering (CSS). For a realist, both moral status and experiential capacity are objective properties of agents. A social relationist denies the existence of any such objective properties in (...)
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  • The time of the self.Dan Zahavi - 2012 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 84 (1):143-159.
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  • Turning back to experience in Cognitive Linguistics via phenomenology.Jordan Zlatev - 2016 - Cognitive Linguistics 27 (4):559-572.
    Name der Zeitschrift: Cognitive Linguistics Jahrgang: 27 Heft: 4 Seiten: 559-572.
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  • (2 other versions)Redrawing the Map and Resetting the Time: Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.Shaun Gallagher & Francisco J. Varela - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (Supplement):93-132.
    e argue that phenomenology can be of central and positive importance to the cognitive sciences, and that it can also learn from the empirical research conducted in those sciences. We discuss the project of naturalizing phenomenology and how this can be best accomplished. We provide several examples of how phenomenology and the cognitive sciences can integrate their research. Specifically, we consider issues related to embodied cognition and intersubjectivity. We provide a detailed analysis of issues related to time-consciousness, with reference to (...)
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  • Empathy, Emotional Sharing and Feelings in Stein’s Early Work.Íngrid Vendrell Ferran - 2015 - Human Studies 38 (4):481-502.
    This paper is devoted to the study of the emotions in Edith Stein’s early work On the Problem of Empathy. After presenting her work embedded in the tradition of the early phenomenology of the emotions, I shall elaborate the four dimensions of the emotional experience according to this authoress, the link between emotions and values and the phenomenon of the living body. I argue that Stein’s account on empathy remains incomplete as long as we ignore the complex phenomenology of emotions (...)
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  • The Interview: Data Collection in Descriptive Phenomenological Human Scientific Research.Magnus Englander - 2012 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (1):13-35.
    In this article, interviewing from a descriptive, phenomenological, human scientific perspective is examined. Methodological issues are raised in relation to evaluative criteria as well as reflective matters that concern the phenomenological researcher. The data collection issues covered are 1) the selection of participants, 2) the number of participants in a study, 3) the interviewer and the questions, and 4) data collection procedures. Certain conclusions were drawn indicating that phenomenological research methods cannot be evaluated on the basis of an empiricist theory (...)
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  • Order, experience, and critique: The phenomenological method in political and legal theory.Sophie Loidolt - 2021 - Continental Philosophy Review 54 (2):153-170.
    The paper investigates phenomenology’s possibilities to describe, reflect and critically analyse political and legal orders. It presents a “toolbox” of methodological reflections, tools and topics, by relating to the classics of the tradition and to the emerging movement of “critical phenomenology,” as well as by touching upon current issues such as experiences of rightlessness, experiences in the digital lifeworld, and experiences of the public sphere. It is argued that phenomenology provides us with a dynamic methodological framework that emphasizes correlational, co-constitutional, (...)
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  • The phenomenology of empathy: a Steinian emotional account.Fredrik Svenaeus - 2016 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (2):227-245.
    This paper presents a phenomenological account of empathy inspired by the proposal put forward by Edith Stein in her book On the Problem of Empathy, published originally 1917. By way of explicating Stein’s views, the paper aims to present a characterization of empathy that is in some aspects similar to, but yet essentially different from contemporary simulationist theories of empathy. An attempt is made to show that Stein’s proposal articulates the essential ingredients and steps involved in empathy and that her (...)
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  • Edith Stein and the Contemporary Psychological Study of Empathy.Michael Larkin & Rita W. Meneses - 2012 - Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 43 (2):151-184.
    Illuminated by the writings of Edith Stein, this paper presents a model of empathy as a very particular intersubjective understanding. This is commonly a view absent from psychology literature. For Stein, empathy is the experience of experientially and directly knowing another person’s experience, as it unfolds in the present, together with the awareness of the ‘otherness’ of that experience. It can be conceptually distinguished, in terms of process and experience, from current models that propose that empathic understandings are ‘intellectual’ experiences (...)
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  • Violence as violation of experiential structures.Thiemo Breyer - 2017 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 16 (4):737-751.
    Violence has become a prominent topic in recent phenomenological investigations. In this paper, I wish to contribute to this ongoing discourse by looking at violence in a literal sense as violation of experiential structures, insofar as it is intentionally, purposefully, and strategically imposed on a subject by another agent. Phenomenology provides the descriptive methodology for elucidating such structures. The violation can take the form of a radicalization, in which one of the aspects of polar experiential spectra becomes predominant, i.e. the (...)
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  • (2 other versions)Getting interaction theory (IT) together: Integrating developmental, phenomenological, enactive, and dynamical approaches to social interaction.Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher - 2012 - Interaction Studies 13 (3):436-468.
    We argue that progress in our scientific understanding of the `social mind' is hampered by a number of unfounded assumptions. We single out the widely shared assumption that social behavior depends solely on the capacities of an individual agent. In contrast, both developmental and phenomenological studies suggest that the personal-level capacity for detached `social cognition' (conceived as a process of theorizing about and/or simulating another mind) is a secondary achievement that is dependent on more immediate processes of embodied social interaction. (...)
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  • The virtual bodily self: Mentalisation of the body as revealed in anosognosia for hemiplegia.Aikaterini Fotopoulou - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 33:500-510.
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality and phenomenality: A phenomenological take on the hard problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Supplementary Volume 29:63-92.
    In his book The Conscious Mind David Chalmers introduced a by now familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection (Chalmers, 1996, 4, 1995, 200). All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means (...)
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  • The problem of other minds: Wittgenstein's phenomenological perspective.Søren Overgaard - 2006 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (1):53-73.
    This paper discusses Wittgenstein's take on the problem of other minds. In opposition to certain widespread views that I collect under the heading of the “No Problem Interpretation,” I argue that Wittgenstein does address some problem of other minds. However, Wittgenstein's problem is not the traditional epistemological problem of other minds; rather, it is more reminiscent of the issue of intersubjectivity as it emerges in the writings of phenomenologists such as Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger. This is one sense in which (...)
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  • Empathy’s blind spot.Jan Slaby - 2014 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 17 (2):249-258.
    The aim of this paper is to mount a philosophical challenge to the currently highly visible research and discourse on empathy. The notion of empathetic perspective-shifting—a conceptually demanding, high-level construal of empathy in humans that arguably captures the core meaning of the term—is criticized from the standpoint of a philosophy of normatively accountable agency. Empathy in this demanding sense fails to achieve a true understanding of the other and instead risks to impose the empathizer’s self-constitutive agency upon the person empathized (...)
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  • False-belief understanding and the phenomenological critics of folk psychology.Mitchell Herschbach - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (12):33-56.
    The dominant account of human social understanding is that we possess a 'folk psychology', that we understand and can interact with other people because we appreciate their mental states. Recently, however, philosophers from the phenomenological tradition have called into question the scope of the folk psychological account and argued for the importance of 'online', non-mentalistic forms of social understanding. In this paper I critically evaluate the arguments of these phenomenological critics, arguing that folk psychology plays a larger role in human (...)
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  • (1 other version)Intentionality and Phenomenality: Phenomenological Take on the Hard Problem.Dan Zahavi - 2003 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 33 (sup1):63-92.
    In his bookThe Conscious MindDavid Chalmers introduced a now-familiar distinction between the hard problem and the easy problems of consciousness. The easy problems are those concerned with the question of how the mind can process information, react to environmental stimuli, and exhibit such capacities as discrimination, categorization, and introspection. All of these abilities are impressive, but they are, according to Chalmers, not metaphysically baffling, since they can all be tackled by means of the standard repertoire of cognitive science and explained (...)
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  • The Role of Second-Person Information in the Development of Social Understanding.Chris Moore & John Barresi - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Philosophical Issues: Phenomenology.Evan Thompson & Dan Zahavi - 2007 - In Morris Moscovitch, Philip Zelazo & Evan Thompson (eds.), Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 67-87.
    Current scientific research on consciousness aims to understand how consciousness arises from the workings of the brain and body, as well as the relations between conscious experience and cognitive processing. Clearly, to make progress in these areas, researchers cannot avoid a range of conceptual issues about the nature and structure of consciousness, such as the following: What is the relation between intentionality and consciousness? What is the relation between self-awareness and consciousness? What is the temporal structure of conscious experience? What (...)
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  • Living-into, living-with: A Schutzian account of the player/character relationship.Rebecca A. Hardesty - 2016 - Glimpse 17:27-34.
    Games Studies reveals the performative nature of playing a character in a virtual-game-world (Nitsche 2008, p.205; Pearce 2006, p.1; Taylor 2002, p.48). Tbe Player/Character relationship is typically understood in terms of the player’s in-game “presence” (Boellstorff 2008, p.89; Schroeder 2002, p.6). This gives the appearance that living-into a game-world is an all-or- nothing affair: either the player is “present” in the game-world, or they are not. I argue that, in fact, a constitutive phenomenology reveals the Player/Character relationship to be a (...)
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  • Vulnerability to psychosis, I-thou intersubjectivity and the praecox-feeling.Somogy Varga - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):131-143.
    Psychotic and prodromal states are characterized by distortions of intersubjectivity, and a number of psychopathologists see in the concrete I-You frame of the clinical encounter the manifestation of such impairment. Rümke has coined the term of ‘praecox-feeling’, designated to describe a feeling of unease emanating in the interviewer that reflects the detachment of the patient and the failure of an ‘affective exchange.’ While the reliability of the praecox-feeling as a diagnostic tool has since been established, the explanation and theoretical framing (...)
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  • Empathy and Direct Social Perception: A Phenomenological Proposal. [REVIEW]Dan Zahavi - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (3):541-558.
    Quite a number of the philosophical arguments and objections currently being launched against simulation (ST) based and theory-theory (TT) based approaches to mindreading have a phenomenological heritage in that they draw on ideas found in the work of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Stein, Gurwitsch, Scheler and Schutz. Within the last couple of years, a number of ST and TT proponents have started to react and respond to what one for the sake of simplicity might call the phenomenological proposal (PP). This (...)
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  • Heidegger’s embodied others: on critiques of the body and ‘intersubjectivity’ in Being and Time.Meindert E. Peters - 2019 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 18 (2):441-458.
    In this article, I respond to important questions raised by Gallagher and Jacobson in the field of cognitive science about face-to-face interactions in Heidegger’s account of ‘intersubjectivity’ in Being and Time. They have criticized his account for a lack of attention to primary intersubjectivity, or immediate, face-to-face interactions; he favours, they argue, embodied interactions via objects. I argue that the same assumption underlies their argument as did earlier critiques of a lack of an account of the body in Heidegger ; (...)
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