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Reference and Description. The Case against Two-Dimensionalism.[author unknown] - 2006 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):406-408.details
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Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.details
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Max Black's objection to mind-body identity.Ned Block - 2006 - Oxford Studies in Metaphysics 2:3-78.details
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Epiphenomenal qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.details
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Is Conceivability a Guide to Possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1–42.details
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Is conceivability a guide to possibility?Stephen Yablo - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1):1-42.details
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Transparent experience and the availability of qualia.Brian Loar - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The content and epistemology of phenomenal belief.David Chalmers - 2002 - In Aleksandar Jokic & Quentin Smith (eds.), Consciousness: New Philosophical Perspectives. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 220--72.details
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Ontological novelty, emergence, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 2006 - In Günter Abel (ed.), Kreativität. pp. 371-399.details
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What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 2004 - In Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas (eds.), Metaphysics: A Guide and Anthology. Oxford University Press UK.details
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The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.details
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The Epistemic View of Subjectivity.Scott Sturgeon - 1994 - Journal of Philosophy 91 (5):221-235.details
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Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
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The argument from diaphanousness.Daniel Stoljar - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 30 (Supplement):341--90.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Reference and Description: The Case Against Two-Dimensionalism.Scott Soames - 2005 - Princeton: Princeton University Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.details
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The unreliability of naive introspection.Eric Schwitzgebel - 2006 - Philosophical Review 117 (2):245-273.details
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Thinking about Consciousness.Diana Raffman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):171-186.details
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Précis of Thinking about Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):143-143.details
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Philosophical Naturalism. Philosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1993 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.details
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Precis of Philosophical NaturalismPhilosophical Naturalism.David Papineau - 1996 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 56 (3):657.details
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Physicalism, consciousness and the antipathetic fallacy.David Papineau - 1993 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 71 (2):169-83.details
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A Physicalist Manifesto: Thoroughly Modem Materialism. [REVIEW]Andrew Botterell - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (1):125-128.details
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The content of perceptual experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosopical Quarterly 44 (175):190-205.details
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The Content of Perceptual Experience.John McDowell - 1994 - Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175):190.details
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The transparency of experience.Michael G. F. Martin - 2002 - Mind and Language 17 (4):376-425.details
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Phenomenal states.Brian Loar - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:81-108.details
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An Argument for the Identity Theory.David K. Lewis - 1966 - Journal of Philosophy 63 (1):17-25.details
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Zombies and Consciousness.José Luis Bermúdez - 2007 - Philosophical Quarterly 57 (227):306-308.details
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Mind and Illusion.Frank Jackson - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:251-271.details
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Armchair metaphysics.Frank Jackson - 1994 - In John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Michaelis Michael (eds.), Philosophy in Mind. Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 23--42.details
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The intrinsic quality of experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.details
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Conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 23:242-256.details
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Conceptual role semantics.Gilbert Harman - 1982 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 28 (April):242-56.details
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A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Alan Millar - 1992 - Philosophical Quarterly 42 (168):367-372.details
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A Theory of Content and Other Essays.Jerry A. Fodor - 1990 - MIT Press.details
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Concepts: Where Cognitive Science Went Wrong.Jerry A. Fodor - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.details
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Explaining Behaviour: Reasons in a World of Causes.Andy Clark - 1990 - Philosophical Quarterly 40 (158):95-102.details
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Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1993 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4):905-910.details
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Consciousness Explained.Daniel C. Dennett - 1991 - Penguin Books.details
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The Philosophical Writings of Descartes: Volume 1.John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch (eds.) - 1629 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Conceptual analysis and reductive explanation.David J. Chalmers & Frank Jackson - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (3):315-61.details
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The Philosophical Writings of Descartes.John Carriero, Paul Hoffman, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff & Dugald Murdoch - 1990 - Philosophical Review 99 (1):93.details
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Individualism and self-knowledge.Tyler Burge - 1988 - Journal of Philosophy 85 (November):649-63.details
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The Harder Problem of Consciousness.Ned Block - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (8):391.details
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Functional role and truth conditions.Ned Block - 1988 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 88 (1):157-181.details
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Conceptual Analysis, Dualism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ned Block & Robert Stalnaker - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (1):1-46.details
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