- (1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics, Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 205.details
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Higher Order Evidence.David Christensen - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (1):185–215.details
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You just believe that because….Roger White - 2010 - Philosophical Perspectives 24 (1):573-615.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as evidence: The epistemology of controversy.David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):756-767.details
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Epistemological puzzles about disagreement.Richard Feldman - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Epistemology futures. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 216-236.details
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Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.David Christensen - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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The vanishing argument from queerness.Lee Shepski - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3):371 – 387.details
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Evidentialism.Richard Feldman & Earl Conee - 1985 - Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.details
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(1 other version)Peer disagreement and higher order evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - In Alvin I. Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb (eds.), Social Epistemology: Essential Readings. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 183--217.details
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(1 other version)Epistemic permissiveness.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):445–459.details
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Respecting the evidence.Richard Feldman - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):95–119.details
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(1 other version)Reflection and disagreement.Adam Elga - 2007 - Noûs 41 (3):478–502.details
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(1 other version)Epistemology of disagreement: The good news.David Christensen - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (2):187-217.details
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(1 other version)Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Authoritatively Normative Concepts.Tristram McPherson - 2010 - In Russ Shafer-Landau (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemology.Richard Feldman - 2003 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 68 (2):429-429.details
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(1 other version)Disagreement as Evidence: The Epistemology of Controversy. [REVIEW]David Christensen - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):754-767.details
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(1 other version)Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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(1 other version)Evidence: Fundamental concepts and the phenomenal conception.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (5):933-955.details
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(1 other version)Evidence.Thomas Kelly - 2006 - Philosophy Compass.details
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How to Disagree about How to Disagree.Adam Elga - 2010 - In Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 175-186.details
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(1 other version)Ethical Non-Naturalism and the Metaphysics of Supervenience.Tristram McPherson - 2012 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 7.details
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Uniqueness, Evidence, and Rationality.Nathan Ballantyne & E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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The Puzzle of Metacoherence.Michael Huemer - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 82 (1):1-21.details
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