- (2 other versions)Symposium: On What there is.P. T. Geach, A. J. Ayer & W. V. Quine - 1948 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 25 (1):125-160.details
|
|
(2 other versions)On Conservativeness and Incompleteness.Hartry Field - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (5):239-260.details
|
|
Indispensability and Practice.Penelope Maddy - 1992 - Journal of Philosophy 89 (6):275.details
|
|
There is No Easy Road to Nominalism.M. Colyvan - 2010 - Mind 119 (474):285-306.details
|
|
(1 other version)Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism.Jody Azzouni - 2004 - New York, US: OUP Usa.details
|
|
What is Mathematical Truth?Hilary Putnam - 1979 - In Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Mathematics, Matter and Method. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 60--78.details
|
|
(5 other versions)Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.details
|
|
(1 other version)Abstract Objects: A Case Study.Stephen Yablo - 2002 - Noûs 36 (s1):220 - 240.details
|
|
Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate.Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.) - 2005 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
|
|
Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.details
|
|
(1 other version)Word and Object.Willard Van Orman Quine - 1960 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.details
|
|
(5 other versions)On what there is.W. V. Quine - 1953 - In Willard Van Orman Quine (ed.), From a Logical Point of View. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. pp. 1-19.details
|
|
(1 other version)Philosophy of logic.Hilary Putnam - 1971 - London,: Allen & Unwin. Edited by Stephen Laurence & Cynthia Macdonald.details
|
|
Philosophical Papers: Volume 1, Mathematics, Matter and Method.Hilary Putnam (ed.) - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Must existence-questions have answers?Stephen Yablo - 2009 - In Ryan Wasserman, David Manley & David Chalmers (eds.), Metametaphysics: New Essays on the Foundations of Ontology. Oxford, England: Oxford University Press. pp. 507-525.details
|
|
Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
From an ontological point of view.John Heil - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Truth and truthmakers.D. M. Armstrong - 2004 - New York: Cambridge University Press.details
|
|
Ontological commitment: Between Quine and Duhem.Penelope Maddy - 1996 - Philosophical Perspectives 10:317 - 341.details
|
|
Truthmaker commitments.Jonathan Schaffer - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 141 (1):7-19.details
|
|
(1 other version)Does Ontology Rest on a Mistake?Stephen Yablo - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):229 - 283.details
|
|
(1 other version)Response to Colyvan.Joseph Melia - 2002 - Mind 111 (441):75-80.details
|
|
Truthmakers and explanation.David Liggins - 2005 - In Helen Beebee & Julian Dodd (eds.), Truthmakers: The Contemporary Debate. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 105--115.details
|
|
(1 other version)On "on what there is".Jody Azzouni - 1998 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 79 (1):1–18.details
|
|
Truthmaker realism: Response to Gregory.Barry Smith - 2002 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 80 (2):231-234.details
|
|
Scientific vs. mathematical realism: The indispensability argument.Michael Resnik - 1995 - Philosophia Mathematica 3 (2):166-174.details
|
|
Weaseling away the indispensability argument.Joseph Melia - 2000 - Mind 109 (435):455-480.details
|
|
Smith on truthmakers.Dominic Gregory - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):422 – 427.details
|
|
Turtles all the way down: Regress, priority and fundamentality.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (230):1-14.details
|
|
(2 other versions)Mathematical truth.Paul Benacerraf - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (19):661-679.details
|
|
From an Ontological Point of View.John Heil - 2003 - Philosophy 79 (309):491-494.details
|
|
The conservativeness of mathematics.J. Melia - 2006 - Analysis 66 (3):202-208.details
|
|
(1 other version)Logical Necessity and Other Essays.Edward Craig, I. G. McFetridge, John Haldane & Roger Scruton - 1991 - Philosophical Quarterly 41 (164):352.details
|
|
(1 other version)Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism.Jody Azzouni - 2004 - Oxford, England: Oup Usa.details
|
|
Mathematics and Reality.Mary Leng - 2010 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Necessity and triviality.Ross P. Cameron - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (3):401-415.details
|
|
The Indispensability of Mathematics.Mark Colyvan - 2001 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
The reality of numbers: a physicalist's philosophy of mathematics.John Bigelow - 1988 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena?Alan Baker - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):223-238.details
|
|
Conservativeness and incompleteness.Stewart Shapiro - 1983 - Journal of Philosophy 80 (9):521-531.details
|
|
A reductio ad surdum? Field on the contingency of mathematical objects.Bob Hale & Crispin Wright - 1994 - Mind 103 (410):169-184.details
|
|
(2 other versions)On conservatives and incompleteness.Hartry Field - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (5):239-260.details
|
|
The conceptual contingency of mathematical objects.Hartry Field - 1993 - Mind 102 (406):285-299.details
|
|
Conceptual contingency and abstract existence.Mark Colyvan - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):87-91.details
|
|
Truthmakers and ontological commitment: or how to deal with complex objects and mathematical ontology without getting into trouble.Ross P. Cameron - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):1 - 18.details
|
|
(2 other versions)On Conservativeness and Incompleteness.Hartry Field - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (5):239-260.details
|
|
(1 other version)Ontological Independence as the Mark of the Real. Jody Azzouni. Deflating Existential Consequence: A Case for Nominalism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2004. Pp. viii + 241. ISBN 0-19-515988-8. [REVIEW]Mark Colyvan - 2005 - Philosophia Mathematica 13 (2):216-225.details
|
|
(1 other version)I_– _Stephen Yablo.Stephen Yablo - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):229-261.details
|
|
(1 other version)Thick Epistemic Access.Jody Azzouni - 1997 - Journal of Philosophy 94 (9):472-484.details
|
|
(1 other version)I_– _Stephen Yablo.Stephen Yablo - 1998 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 72 (1):229-261.details
|
|