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The Normative Evaluation of Belief and The Aspectual Classification of Belief and Knowledge Attributions.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Journal of Philosophy 109 (10):588-612.details
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A Frankfurt Example to End All Frankfurt Examples.James Cain - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):83-93.details
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The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.details
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Internalism empowered: how to bolster a theory of justification with a direct realist theory of awareness.Benjamin Bayer - 2012 - Acta Analytica 27 (4):383-408.details
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The deontological conception of epistemic justification.William P. Alston - 1988 - Philosophical Perspectives 2:257-299.details
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How We Choose Our Beliefs.Gregory Salmieri & Benjamin Bayer - 2014 - Philosophia 42 (1):41–53.details
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Frankfurt-type examples and semi-compatibilism.John Martin Fischer - 2001 - In Robert Kane (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.details
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An Essay on Free Will.Peter Van Inwagen - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Doxastic freedom.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Synthese 161 (3):375-392.details
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Belief, Voluntariness and Intentionality.Matthias Steup - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (4):537-559.details
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Alexander of Aphrodisias, on Fate.R. W. Sharples - 1986 - The Classical Review 36 (01):33-.details
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Doxastic compatibilism and the ethics of belief.Sharon Ryan - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 114 (1-2):47-79.details
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Further thoughts about a Frankfurt-style argument.Derk Pereboom - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):109 – 118.details
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Does doxastic responsibility entail the ability to believe otherwise?Rik Peels - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3651-3669.details
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Against Doxastic Compatibilism.Rik Peels - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (1):679-702.details
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Précis of Upheavals of Thought.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):443-449.details
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Doxastic agency.John Heil - 1983 - Philosophical Studies 43 (3):355 - 364.details
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Epistemic responsibility without epistemic agency.Pascal Engel - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.details
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.Peter van Inwagen - 1988details
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Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will.Timothy O'Connor - 2000 - New York, US: Oxford University Press USA.details
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Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions.Martha C. Nussbaum - 2001 - Cambridge University Press.details
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Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.details
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Doxastic Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontology.Matthias Steup - 2000 - Acta Analytica 15 (1):25-56.details
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Emotions and Choice.Robert C. Solomon - 1973 - Review of Metaphysics 27 (1):20 - 41.details
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Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. State University of New York Press. pp. 141--166.details
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Deciding to believe.Bernard Williams - 1973 - In Problems of the Self. Cambridge University Press. pp. 136--51.details
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Epistemic deontology, doxastic voluntarism, and the principle of alternate possibilities.Christoph Jäger - 2004 - In Winfried Löffler and Paul Weingartner (ed.), Knowledge and Belief. ÖBV. pp. 217-227.details
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The Objectivist Ethics.Ayn Rand - unknowndetails
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Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief.R. Audi - 2001 - In M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty. Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue.details
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Must knowers be agents.Linda Zagzebski - 2001 - In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 142--57.details
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'Making up Your Mind' and the Activity of Reason.Matthew Boyle - 2011 - Philosophers' Imprint 11.details
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Alternate Possibilities and Reid's Theory of Agent-Causation.William L. Rowe - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate. pp. 219.details
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Responsibility and agent-causation.John Martin Fischer - 2003 - In David Widerker & Michael McKenna (eds.), Moral Responsibility and Alternative Possibilities: Essays on the Importance of Alternative Possibilities. Ashgate.details
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Voluntary belief and epistemic evaluation.Richard Feldman - 2001 - In Matthias Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue. Oxford University Press. pp. 77--92.details
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