- Responsibility and Control: A Theory of Moral Responsibility.John Martin Fischer & Mark Ravizza - 1998 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by Mark Ravizza.details
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The Epistemology of Physical Action.Brian O'Shaughnessy - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Perceiving Intentions.Joelle Proust - 2003 - In Johannes Roessler & Naomi Eilan (eds.), Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Rationality in Action: A Symposium.Barry Smith - 2001 - Philosophical Explorations 4 (2):66-94.details
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(4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Lawrence Foster & Joe William Swanson (eds.), Experience and Theory. London, England: Humanities Press.details
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(1 other version)Human Freedom and the Self.Roderick Chisholm - 1982 - In Gary Watson (ed.), Free will. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1.Donald Davidson - 2001 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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Perceptual experience.Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.) - 2006 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Free will: a very short introduction.Thomas Pink - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Conscious intention and motor cognition.Patrick Haggard - 2005 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9 (6):290-295.details
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Agency, authorship, and illusion.Eddy Nahmias - 2005 - Consciousness and Cognition 14 (4):771-785.details
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(1 other version)Who is the controller of controlled processes?Daniel M. Wegner - 2005 - In Ran R. Hassin, James S. Uleman & John A. Bargh (eds.), The New Unconscious. Oxford Series in Social Cognition and Social Neuroscience. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-36.details
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The Illusion of Conscious Will.Daniel M. Wegner - 2002 - Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):59 - 70.details
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(1 other version)Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1986 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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The phenomenology of free will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.details
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(1 other version)The folk psychology of free will: Fits and starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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Agent-causation.John Bishop - 1983 - Mind 92 (January):61-79.details
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(1 other version)Pushmi-pullyu representations.Ruth Garrett Millikan - 1995 - Philosophical Perspectives 9:185-200.details
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Intentionality and the phenomenology of action.Jerome C. Wakefield & Hubert L. Dreyfus - 1991 - In Ernest Lepore (ed.), John Searle and His Critics. Cambridge: Blackwell.details
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Nonphenomenal consciousness.Eric Lormand - 1996 - Noûs 30 (2):242-61.details
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The Significance of Consciousness.Charles P. Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.details
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(1 other version)Mental Reality.Galen Strawson - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)The Folk Psychology of Free Will: Fits and Starts.Shaun Nichols - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (5):473-502.details
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Creating the Kingdom of Ends.Christine M. Korsgaard - 1996 - New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Modularity of Mind.Robert Cummins & Jerry Fodor - 1983 - Philosophical Review 94 (1):101.details
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(4 other versions)Mental Events.Donald Davidson - 1970 - In Essays on Actions and Events: Philosophical Essays Volume 1. Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. pp. 207-224.details
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(1 other version)The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.details
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Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - Oxford: Clarendon Press.details
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(1 other version)Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.details
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(2 other versions)An enquiry concerning human understanding.David Hume - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA. pp. 112.details
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Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action.Christopher D. Frith, S. J. Blakemore & D. Wolpert - 2000 - Brain Research Reviews 31 (2):357-363.details
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The sense of agency: Awareness and ownership of action.Anthony J. Marcel - 2003 - In Agency and Self-Awareness: Issues in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press. pp. 48â93.details
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(1 other version)Agent causation.Timothy O'Connor - 1995 - In Agents, Causes, and Events: Essays on Indeterminism and Free Will. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 61-79.details
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The phenomenology of first-person agency.Terence E. Horgan, John L. Tienson & George Graham - 2003 - In Sven Walter & Heinz-Dieter Heckmann (eds.), Physicalism and Mental Causation: The Metaphysics of Mind and Action. Imprint Academic. pp. 323.details
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(1 other version)Mental ballistics or the involuntariness of spontaniety.Gale Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-257.details
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When Self-Consciousness Breaks: Alien Voices and Inserted Thoughts.G. Lynn Stephens & George Graham - 2000 - MIT Press.details
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The Immaterial Self: A Defence of the Cartesian Dualist Conception of the Mind.John Foster - 1991 - Routledge.details
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(1 other version)Mental Ballistics Or The Involuntariness Of Spontaneity.Gale Strawson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (3):227-256.details
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(1 other version)In defence of free will.Charles Arthur Campbell - 1938 - London,: Allen & Unwin.details
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(1 other version)The Phenomenology of Efficacy.Susanna Siegel - 2005 - Philosophical Topics 33 (1):265-84.details
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(1 other version)The Experience of Mental Causation.Jakob Hohwy - 2004 - Behavior and Philosophy 32 (2):377 - 400.details
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How is strength of will possible?Richard Holton - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of will and practical irrationality. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 39-67.details
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Narrators and Comparators: The Architecture of Agentive Self-Awareness. [REVIEW]Tim Bayne & Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - Synthese 159 (3):475 - 491.details
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(1 other version)Monothematic delusions: Towards a two-factor account.Martin Davies, Max Coltheart, Robyn Langdon & Nora Breen - 2001 - Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology 8 (2-3):133-58.details
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Rationality in Action.John R. Searle - 2001 - MIT Press.details
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(1 other version)Is conscious will an illusion?Jing Zhu - 2004 - Disputatio 1 (16):58-70.details
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(2 other versions)Freedom and Belief.Galen Strawson - 1988 - Mind 97 (387):481-484.details
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Free Agents.Galen Strawson - 2004 - Philosophical Topics 32:371-402.details
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