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The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology

Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1983)

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  1. Evolutionary psychology and the massive modularity hypothesis.Richard Samuels - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (4):575-602.
    In recent years evolutionary psychologists have developed and defended the Massive Modularity Hypothesis, which maintains that our cognitive architecture—including the part that subserves ‘central processing’ —is largely or perhaps even entirely composed of innate, domain-specific computational mechanisms or ‘modules’. In this paper I argue for two claims. First, I show that the two main arguments that evolutionary psychologists have offered for this general architectural thesis fail to provide us with any reason to prefer it to a competing picture of the (...)
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  • Perceptual constraints and perceptual schemata: The possibility of perceptual style.Jennifer A. McMahon - 2003 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 61 (3):259–273.
    <The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com > -- In this paper I carve out a space between the concept of "the object" and the seemingly endless ways in which "the object" can be represented pictorially. I will call the aspect of the pictorial representation which is made possible by this space, the pictorial representation's "style". I will explore this space by drawing upon theories of pictorial representation, leaving out, for the sake of my purposes here, a consideration of the (...)
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  • The modular structure of physical theories.Olivier Darrigol - 2008 - Synthese 162 (2):195 - 223.
    Any advanced theory of physics contains modules defined as essential components that are themselves theories with different domains of application. Different kinds of modules can be distinguished according to the way in which they fit in the symbolic and interpretive apparatus of a theory. The number and kind of the modules of a given theory vary as the theory evolves in time. The relative stability of modules and the variability of their insertion in other theories play a vital role in (...)
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  • The Phenomenology of Agency.Tim Bayne - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (1):182-202.
    The phenomenology of agency has, until recently, been rather neglected, overlooked by both philosophers of action and philosophers of consciousness alike. Thankfully, all that has changed, and of late there has been an explosion of interest in what it is like to be an agent. 1 This burgeoning field crosses the traditional boundaries between disciplines: philosophers of psychopathology are speculating about the role that unusual experiences of agency might play in accounting for disorders of thought and action; cognitive scientists are (...)
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  • (1 other version)The massive redeployment hypothesis and the functional topography of the brain.Michael L. Anderson - 2008 - Philosophical Psychology 21 (2):143-174.
    This essay introduces the massive redeployment hypothesis, an account of the functional organization of the brain that centrally features the fact that brain areas are typically employed to support numerous functions. The central contribution of the essay is to outline a middle course between strict localization on the one hand, and holism on the other, in such a way as to account for the supporting data on both sides of the argument. The massive redeployment hypothesis is supported by case studies (...)
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  • Consciousness, art, and the brain: Lessons from Marcel Proust.Russell Epstein - 2004 - Consciousness and Cognition 13 (2):213-40.
    In his novel Remembrance of Things Past, Marcel Proust argues that conventional descriptions of the phenomenology of consciousness are incomplete because they focus too much on the highly-salient sensory information that dominates each moment of awareness and ignore the network of associations that lies in the background. In this paper, I explicate Proust’s theory of conscious experience and show how it leads him directly to a theory of aesthetic perception. Proust’s division of awareness into two components roughly corresponds to William (...)
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  • Introspective physicalism as an approach to the science of consciousness.Anthony I. Jack & T. Shallice - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):161-196.
    Most ?theories of consciousness? are based on vague speculations about the properties of conscious experience. We aim to provide a more solid basis for a science of consciousness. We argue that a theory of consciousness should provide an account of the very processes that allow us to acquire and use information about our own mental states ? the processes underlying introspection. This can be achieved through the construction of information processing models that can account for ?Type-C? processes. Type-C processes can (...)
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  • Cognitive modules, synaesthesia and the constitution of psychological natural kinds.Richard Gray - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):65-82.
    Fodor claims that cognitive modules can be thought of as constituting a psychological natural kind in virtue of their possession of most or all of nine specified properties. The challenge to this considered here comes from synaesthesia. Synaesthesia is a type of cross-modal association: input to one sensory modality reliably generates an additional sensory output that is usually generated by the input to a distinct sensory modality. The most common form of synaesthesia manifests Fodor's nine specified properties of modularity, and (...)
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  • A functional disconnection between spoken and visual word recognition: Evidence from unconscious priming.Sid Kouider & Emmanuel Dupoux - 2001 - Cognition 82 (1):35- 49.
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  • From simple associations to systematic reasoning: A connectionist representation of rules, variables, and dynamic binding using temporal synchrony.Lokendra Shastri & Venkat Ajjanagadde - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):417-51.
    Human agents draw a variety of inferences effortlessly, spontaneously, and with remarkable efficiency – as though these inferences were a reflexive response of their cognitive apparatus. Furthermore, these inferences are drawn with reference to a large body of background knowledge. This remarkable human ability seems paradoxical given the complexity of reasoning reported by researchers in artificial intelligence. It also poses a challenge for cognitive science and computational neuroscience: How can a system of simple and slow neuronlike elements represent a large (...)
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  • Neural events and perceptual awareness.Nancy Kanwisher - 2001 - Cognition 79 (1):89-113.
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  • (1 other version)Desiderata for cognitive architectures.Ron Sun - 2004 - Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):341-373.
    This article addresses issues in developing cognitive architectures--generic computational models of cognition. Cognitive architectures are believed to be essential in advancing understanding of the mind, and therefore, developing cognitive architectures is an extremely important enterprise in cognitive science. The article proposes a set of essential desiderata for developing cognitive architectures. It then moves on to discuss in detail some of these desiderata and their associated concepts and ideas relevant to developing better cognitive architectures. It argues for the importance of taking (...)
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  • A connectionist theory of phenomenal experience.Jonathan Opie & Gerard O'Brien - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1):127-148.
    When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches _vehicle_ and _process_ theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space (...)
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  • Evo-devo meets the mind: Toward a developmental evolutionary psychology.Paul E. Griffiths - 2007 - In Roger Sansom & Robert N. Brandon (eds.), Integrating Evolution and Development: From Theory to Practice. MIT Press. pp. 195-225.
    The emerging discipline of evolutionary developmental biology has opened up many new lines of investigation into morphological evolution. Here I explore how two of the core theoretical concepts in ‘evo-devo’ – modularity and homology – apply to evolutionary psychology. I distinguish three sorts of module – developmental, functional and mental modules and argue that mental modules need only be ‘virtual’ functional modules. Evolutionary psychologists have argued that separate mental modules are solutions to separate evolutionary problems. I argue that the structure (...)
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  • Context-sensitive inference, modularity, and the assumption of formal processing.Mitch Parsell - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (1):45-58.
    Performance on the Wason selection task varies with content. This has been taken to demonstrate that there are different cognitive modules for dealing with different conceptual domains. This implication is only legitimate if our underlying cognitive architecture is formal. A non-formal system can explain content-sensitive inference without appeal to independent inferential modules.
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  • Innateness and Domain Specificity.Muhammad Ali Khalidi - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):191-210.
    There is a widespread assumption in cognitive science that there is anintrinsic link between the phenomena of innateness and domain specificity. Many authors seem to hold that given the properties of these two phenomena, it follows that innate mental states are domain-specific, or that domain-specific states are innate. My aim in this paper is to argue that there are no convincing grounds for asserting either claim. After introducing the notions of innateness and domain specificity, I consider some possible arguments for (...)
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  • Proxytypes and linguistic nativism.John M. Collins - 2006 - Synthese 153 (1):69-104.
    Prinz (Perceptual the Mind: Concepts and Their Perceptual Basis, MIT Press, 2002) presents a new species of concept empiricism, under which concepts are off-line long-term memory networks of representations that are ‘copies’ of perceptual representations – proxytypes. An apparent obstacle to any such empiricism is the prevailing nativism of generative linguistics. The paper critically assesses Prinz’s attempt to overcome this obstacle. The paper argues that, prima facie, proxytypes are as incapable of accounting for the structure of the linguistic mind as (...)
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  • (1 other version)Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition.Vittorio Gallese - 2007 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669.
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  • Are theories of imagery theories of imagination? An active perception approach to conscious mental content.Nigel J. T. Thomas - 1999 - Cognitive Science 23 (2):207-245.
    Can theories of mental imagery, conscious mental contents, developed within cognitive science throw light on the obscure (but culturally very significant) concept of imagination? Three extant views of mental imagery are considered: quasi‐pictorial, description, and perceptual activity theories. The first two face serious theoretical and empirical difficulties. The third is (for historically contingent reasons) little known, theoretically underdeveloped, and empirically untried, but has real explanatory potential. It rejects the “traditional” symbolic computational view of mental contents, but is compatible with recentsituated (...)
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  • (1 other version)Computer modeling and the fate of folk psychology.John A. Barker - 2002 - Metaphilosophy 33 (1-2):30-48.
    Although Paul Churchland and Jerry Fodor both subscribe to the so-called theory-theory– the theory that folk psychology (FP) is an empirical theory of behavior – they disagree strongly about FP’s fate. Churchland contends that FP is a fundamentally flawed view analogous to folk biology, and he argues that recent advances in computational neuroscience and connectionist AI point toward development of a scientifically respectable replacement theory that will give rise to a new common-sense psychology. Fodor, however, wagers that FP will be (...)
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  • The mind as the software of the brain.Ned Block - 1990 - In Daniel N. Osherson & Edward E. Smith (eds.), An Invitation to Cognitive Science: Visual cognition. 2. MIT Press. pp. 377-425.
    In this section, we will start with an influential attempt to define `intelligence', and then we will move to a consideration of how human intelligence is to be investigated on the machine model. The last part of the section will discuss the relation between the mental and the biological.
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  • Emotions in the Wild: The Situated Perspective on Emotion.Paul Edmund Griffiths & Andrea Scarantino - 2008 - In Murat Aydede & P. Robbins (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Situated Cognition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    This chapter describes a perspective on emotion, according to which emotions are: 1. Designed to function in a social context: an emotion is often an act of relationship reconfiguration brought about by delivering a social signal; 2. Forms of skillful engagement with the world which need not be mediated by conceptual thought; 3. Scaffolded by the environment, both synchronically in the unfolding of a particular emotional performance and diachronically, in the acquisition of an emotional repertoire; 4. Dynamically coupled to an (...)
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  • High-level perception, representation, and analogy:A critique of artificial intelligence methodology.David J. Chalmers, Robert M. French & Douglas R. Hofstadter - 1992 - Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intellige 4 (3):185 - 211.
    High-level perception--”the process of making sense of complex data at an abstract, conceptual level--”is fundamental to human cognition. Through high-level perception, chaotic environmen- tal stimuli are organized into the mental representations that are used throughout cognitive pro- cessing. Much work in traditional artificial intelligence has ignored the process of high-level perception, by starting with hand-coded representations. In this paper, we argue that this dis- missal of perceptual processes leads to distorted models of human cognition. We examine some existing artificial-intelligence models--”notably (...)
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  • The frame problem and theories of belief.Scott Hendricks - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 129 (2):317-33.
    The frame problem is the problem of how we selectively apply relevant knowledge to particular situations in order to generate practical solutions. Some philosophers have thought that the frame problem can be used to rule out, or argue in favor of, a particular theory of belief states. But this is a mistake. Sentential theories of belief are no better or worse off with respect to the frame problem than are alternative theories of belief, most notably, the “map” theory of belief.
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  • (1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.
    An empirical study of people's intuitions about freedom of the will. We show that people tend to have compatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more concrete, emotional way but that they tend to have incompatiblist intuitions when they think about the problem in a more abstract, cognitive way.
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  • Realization: Metaphysics, mind, and science.Robert A. Wilson - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (5):985-996.
    This paper surveys some recent work on realization in the philosophy of mind and the philosophy of science.
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  • Perception.Casey O'Callaghan - 2012 - In Keith Frankish & William Ramsey (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Cognitive Science. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
    To appear in the Cambridge Handbook to Cognitive Science, eds. Ramsey and Frankish.
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  • Gestalt theory has been misinterpreted, but has had some real conceptual difficulties.Gaetano Kanizsa - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (2):149-162.
    In the present article, the role of Gestalt concepts in clarifying the issues of perception is evaluated. Grounded in anti-atomism, Gestalt assumed organizing forces intrinsic to perception. Insofar these were identified with singularity preference, Gestalt is criticized for having failed to distinguish between perception and thought.
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  • The Two-Dimensional Content of Consciousness.Simon Prosser - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 136 (3):319 - 349.
    In this paper I put forward a representationalist theory of conscious experience based on Robert Stalnaker's version of two-dimensional modal semantics. According to this theory the phenomenal character of an experience correlates with a content equivalent to what Stalnaker calls the diagonal proposition. I show that the theory is closely related both to functionalist theories of consciousness and to higher-order representational theories. It is also more compatible with an anti-Cartesian view of the mind than standard representationalist theories.
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  • Object lessons: Spelke principles and psychological explanation.Sara Bernal - 2005 - Philosophical Psychology 18 (3):289-312.
    There is general agreement that from the first few months of life, our apprehension of physical objects accords, in some sense, with certain principles. In one philosopher's locution, we are 'perceptually sensitive' to physical principles describing the behavior of objects. But in what does this accordance or sensitivity consist? Are these principles explicitly represented or merely 'implemented'? And what sort of explanation do we accomplish in claiming that our object perception accords with these principles? My main goal here is to (...)
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  • The Language of Thought: No Syntax Without Semantics.Tim Crane - 1990 - Mind and Language 5 (3):187-213.
    Many philosophers think that being in an intentional state is a matter of being related to a sentence in a mental language-a 'Language of Thought' (see especially Fodor 1975, 1987 Appendix; Field 1978). According to this view-which I shall call 'the LT hypothesis'-when anyone has a belief or a desire or a hope with a certain content, they have a sentence of this language, with that content, 'written' in their heads. The claim is meant quite literally: the mental representations that (...)
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  • Precis: Being No-One.Thomas Metzinger - 2005 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 11:1-30.
    This is a short sketch of some central ideas developed in my recent book _Being No One_ (BNO hereafter). A more systematic summary, which focuses on short answers to a set of specific, individual questions is already contained _in _the book, namely as BNO section 8.2. Here, I deliberately and completely exclude all work related to semantically differentiating and empirically constraining the philosophical concept of a "quale" (mostly Chapter 2, 3 & 8), all proposals regarding conceptual foundations for the overall (...)
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  • On the Return to Metaphysics in Analytical Philosophy of Mind.G. A. Zolotkov - 2018 - Russian Journal of Philosophical Sciences 10:130-142.
    The article examines the change of theoretical framework in analytic philosophy of mind. It is well known fact that nowadays philosophical problems of mind are frequently seen as incredibly difficult. It is noteworthy that the first programs of analytical philosophy of mind were skeptical about difficulty of that realm of problems. One of the most notable features of both those programs was the strong antimetaphysical stance, those programs considered philosophy of mind unproblematic in its nature. However, the consequent evolution of (...)
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  • Distinguishing sōtō and rinzai zen:.Rui Zhu - 2005 - Philosophy East and West 55 (3):426 - 446.
    : Scholars have underestimated and misunderstood the distinction between Sōtō and Rinzai, the two major branches of Zen Buddhism, because they have either parroted the sectarian polemics of the schools themselves or, as in the case of prominent scholars Carl Bielefeldt and T. P. Kasulis, dismissed these polemics as deriving from institutional politics rather than substantive doctrinal or practical differences. Here it is attempted for the first time to understand the polemics of these two schools as reflecting a real disparity (...)
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  • Perceptual-Semantic Congruency Facilitates Semantic Discrimination of Thermal Qualities.Yizhen Zhou, Hsin-Ni Ho & Junji Watanabe - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Neural Redundancy and Its Relation to Neural Reuse.John Zerilli - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (5):1191-1201.
    Evidence of the pervasiveness of neural reuse in the human brain has forced a revision of the standard conception of modularity in the cognitive sciences. One persistent line of argument against such revision, however, cites the evidence of cognitive dissociations. While this article takes the dissociations seriously, it contends that the traditional modular account is not the best explanation. The key to the puzzle is neural redundancy. The article offers both a philosophical analysis of the relation between reuse and redundancy (...)
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  • Neural Reuse and the Modularity of Mind: Where to Next for Modularity?John Zerilli - 2019 - Biological Theory 14 (1):1-20.
    The leading hypothesis concerning the “reuse” or “recycling” of neural circuits builds on the assumption that evolution might prefer the redeployment of established circuits over the development of new ones. What conception of cognitive architecture can survive the evidence for this hypothesis? In particular, what sorts of “modules” are compatible with this evidence? I argue that the only likely candidates will, in effect, be the columns which Vernon Mountcastle originally hypothesized some 60 years ago, and which form part of the (...)
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  • Communication and Variance.Martín Abreu Zavaleta - 2019 - Topoi 40 (1):147-169.
    According to standard assumptions in semantics, ordinary users of a language have implicit beliefs about the truth-conditions of sentences in that language, and they often agree on those beliefs. For example, it is assumed that if Anna and John are both competent users of English and the former utters ‘grass is green’ in conversation with the latter, they will both believe that that sentence is true if and only if grass is green. These assumptions play an important role in an (...)
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  • Practices and the Direct Perception of Normative States.Julie Zahle - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (4):493-518.
    The overall aim of this two-part article is to provide a supplement to ability theories of practice in terms of a defense of the following thesis: In situations of social interaction, individuals’ ability to act appropriately sometimes depends on their exercise of the ability directly to perceive normative states. In this Part I, I introduce ability theories of practice and motivate my thesis. Furthermore, I offer an analysis of normative states as response-dependent properties. Last, I work out and defend an (...)
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  • The Social Brain and the Myth of Empathy.Allan Young - 2012 - Science in Context 25 (3):401-424.
    ArgumentNeuroscience research has created multiple versions of the human brain. The “social brain” is one version and it is the subject of this paper. Most image-based research in the field of social neuroscience is task-driven: the brain is asked to respond to a cognitive (perceptual) stimulus. The tasks are derived from theories, operational models, and back-stories now circulating in social neuroscience. The social brain comes with a distinctive back-story, an evolutionary history organized around three, interconnected themes: mind-reading, empathy, and the (...)
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  • Ethereal oscillations.Malcolm P. Young - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (3):476-477.
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  • Emotions as modulators of desire.Brandon Yip - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (3):855-878.
    We commonly appeal to emotions to explain human behaviour: we seek comfort out of grief, we threaten someone in anger and we hide in fear. According to the standard Humean analysis, intentional action is always explained with reference to a belief-desire pair. According to recent consensus, however, emotions have independent motivating force apart from beliefs and desires, and supplant them when explaining emotional action. In this paper I provide a systematic framework for thinking about the motivational structure of emotion and (...)
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  • The frame problem, the relevance problem, and a package solution to both.Yingjin Xu & Pei Wang - 2012 - Synthese 187 (S1):43-72.
    As many philosophers agree, the frame problem is concerned with how an agent may efficiently filter out irrelevant information in the process of problem-solving. Hence, how to solve this problem hinges on how to properly handle semantic relevance in cognitive modeling, which is an area of cognitive science that deals with simulating human's cognitive processes in a computerized model. By "semantic relevance", we mean certain inferential relations among acquired beliefs which may facilitate information retrieval and practical reasoning under certain epistemic (...)
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  • The comparative simplicity of tool-use and its implications for human evolution.Thomas Wynn - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):576-577.
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  • Visual spatial constancy and modularity: Does intention penetrate vision?Wayne Wu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (2):647-669.
    Is vision informationally encapsulated from cognition or is it cognitively penetrated? I shall argue that intentions penetrate vision in the experience of visual spatial constancy: the world appears to be spatially stable despite our frequent eye movements. I explicate the nature of this experience and critically examine and extend current neurobiological accounts of spatial constancy, emphasizing the central role of motor signals in computing such constancy. I then provide a stringent condition for failure of informational encapsulation that emphasizes a computational (...)
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  • Tools of the trade: the bio-cultural evolution of the human propensity to trade.Armin W. Schulz - 2022 - Biology and Philosophy 37 (2):1-24.
    Humans are standouts in their propensity to trade. More specially, the kind of trading found in humans—featuring the exchange of many different goods and services with many different others, for the mutual benefit of all the involved parties—far exceeds anything that is found in any other creature. However, a number of important questions about this propensity remain open. First, it is not clear exactly what makes this propensity so different in the human case from that of other animals. Second, it (...)
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  • Unintended Consequences of Security Motivation in the Age of the Internet: Impacts on Governance and Democracy.Erik Z. Woody & Henry Szechtman - 2016 - Journal of Cognition and Culture 16 (5):365-382.
    There has been a striking recent shift in how political discourse seems to work, with, for example, partial information of sometimes dubious accuracy or relevance propagating very rapidly and widely on electronic networks and overriding clearer, more complete, more accurate information. In explanation of such phenomena, we address ways in which highly interconnected electronic networks may create vulnerabilities that involve tapping into special, relatively hard-wired motivational systems in the brain, particularly the security motivation system. We also discuss a mode of (...)
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  • Talking to yourself about what is where: What is the vocabulary of preattentive vision?Jeremy M. Wolfe - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):254-255.
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  • An ecological approach to cognitive (im)penetrability.Rob Withagen & Claire F. Michaels - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (3):399-400.
    We offer an ecological (Gibsonian) alternative to cognitive (im)penetrability. Whereas Pylyshyn explains cognitive (im)penetrability by focusing solely on computations carried out by the nervous system, according to the ecological approach the perceiver as a knowing agent influences the entire animal-environmental system: in the determination of what constitutes the environment (affordances), what constitutes information, what information is detected and, thus, what is perceived.
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  • Cognitive aging and hearing acuity: modeling spoken language comprehension.Arthur Wingfield, Nicole M. Amichetti & Amanda Lash - 2015 - Frontiers in Psychology 6.
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